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It is a partnership in all science; a 
partnership in all art; a partnership in 
every virtue, and in all perfection. As the 
ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained 
in many generations, it becomes a partnership 
not only between those who are living, but be- 
tween those who are living, those who are dead, 
and those who are to be born. Each contract 
of each particular state is but a clause in 
the great primaeval contract of eternal 
society, linking the lower with the higher 
natures, connecting the visible and invisible 
world,... 
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Chapter VI The study of the small group 
183 Theories of the structure of the small group have 
been based upon an insufficient study of actual examples, 
and this defect has not yet been adequatel supplied by 
social psychology. 
184 The problem is initially one of method: the methods 
of study applied to the twofold relation can in rant be 
applied to the small group. 
185 The difficulties of these methods are partly those 
of introspection as a psychological method. 
186 In social psychology, as in other sciences, practice 
and training result in increased power of observation. 
187 Study of a relation through the observation of one's 
. own mental states as a partner to it involves a special 
difficulty, 
188 Study of a relation involves an attempt to apprehend 
separately and in relation to one another eleven distinct 
series of facts. 
189 The attempt itself involves a further degree of 
complication. 
190 (a) Study of a relation by a -partner to it results 
in a change in the relation; but this may be regarded 
as an op!..ortunity rather than an obstacle. 
191 Such study requires happy opportunities and also a 
continuous preoccupation with the theoretical aspects of 
one's own social life. 
192 (b) The one -sided view so obtained may be corrected 
by the study of a relation in which one is at the 
complementary point of view. 
193 Such study is limited to the general aspects of each 
type of relation. 
Chap VI Sect 194 xx 
194. (c) The social experience of the observer may not 
be typical because of peculiarities 
195 (i) in the social responses of the observer himself, 
196 (ii) in his social experience, 
197 (iii) in the responses of otaers to him, 
198 A threefold relation may affo- -1 one partner to it an 
opportunity of studying the relation between the other 
two. 
199 Use may be made of written records of an actual 
relation; 
200 but relations described in works of imagination can- 
not be used, 
201 except as themselves raw materials of social psy- 
chology or for purposes of illustration. 
202 A threefold relation implies three twofold relations, 
each based upon a twofold common mental frame, 
203 but it cannot be fully described in these terms, 
since 
204 (a) some elements in the twofold relations do not 
properly belong to the threefold relation at all, 
205 (b) some elements in the threefold relation cannot 
be shown as elements in the twofold relations, 
206 and (c) the same is true of the other- conscious 
processes involved; 
207 therefore it is necessary to recognise its structure 
as involving one threefold and three twofold common mental 
frames. 
208 These are not distinct and separate systems but 
aspects of personalities each of which is a unity. 
209 If we try to separate them in thought, we must still 
think of them as closely interwoven. 
210 In a fourfold relation there is a possibility of the 
Chap VI Sect 210 xxi 
development of twofold, and threefold relations in 
addition to one fourfold relation. 
211 Large groups admit of further subgroupings, not all 
of which are likely to develop separate common mental 
frames. 
212 The proportion of the possible common mental frames 
which is actually developed depends upon the intensity 
and duration of life of the group. 
213 Larger groups. come into existence in two ways: 
214 (a) Groups of more than two persons may (as in the 
case of the twofold relation) arise from similar or 
complementary responses to a common situation: but as 
the numbers increase this principle is limited in two 
ways: 
215 (i) in most large assemblies a common mental frame 
of preformed elements already exists, 
216 and (ii) in a large fortuitous assembly similar re- 
sponses are practically limited to the primitive emotional 
tendencies. 
217 (b) Groups may develop. by aggregation: 
218 (i) through the establishment of a link between a 
group and a person or another group outside it, 
219 which may be temporary, or permanent, or may lead 
to the incorporation of one group in the other; 
220 (ii) through the incorporation singly of further 
individuals in consequence of their similar or com- 
plementary responses, 
221 the group which grows up round one central person- 
ality being a special case of this; 
222 and (iii) through the transmission to individuals of 
essential elements in its common mental frame so that 
these become organised as elements in his'mind. 
223 Relevant mental structures, resulting from part- 
icipation in the life of other groups, are already organ- 
ised in the mind of a new member joining any group. 
Chap VI Sect 224 xxii 
224 Membership of a group is frequently begun or con- 
tinued as a result of external constraining circumstances. 
225 The deductive line of argument so far pursued re- 
quires to be supplemented by an inductive argument based 
on an analysis of observed phenomena of group life. 
Chapter VII The mental structure of groups 
226 The structur.e.of the large group, can be described as 
a common mental frame; and it results from similar and 
complementary responses to a common frame of circumstances. 
227 There are two topics - the evidence for this view and 
its relation to other theories. 
228 The phenomena involved are difficult to describe 
adequately, especially in restricted space. 
229 The common mental frame of a group is the determinant 
of what we call its "atmosphere". 
230 To join a group is to influence it as well as to be 
influenced by it. 
231 Individuals differ in their social sensitiveness. 
232 The process of the formation of a common mental frame 
may sometimes be observed. 
233 Through the operation of the common mental frame a 
man may be adjusted to his company without the intervention 
of conscious processes. 
234 The aspect of a man's personality organised in a 
common mental frame is called by William James a "social 
self ". 
235 Among the different types of group, the crowd has 
attracted particular attention. 
236 McDougall's account of the crowd shows it as a 
special case of the operation of the principle of similar 
responses to a common frame of external circumstances. 
237 The tendencies stimulated are necessarily of a 
Chap VII Sect 237 xxiii 
primitive character, 
238 and involve some intensity of emotion, 
239 and a crowd is necessarily unstable and fickle, 
240 since in a random assembly of men there is no greater 
tendency to one direction of response than another. 
241 The crowd is therefore not typical of social life; 
but McDougall's account of its genesis can be widened so 
as to fit other groups. 
242 In ordinary speech the term crowd is applied to 
assemblies with a greater co:Lrnunity of experience, 
sentiment, knowledge, interest and will. 
243 A section of the community with such a degree of 
mental homogeneity, but without organisation, may be 
called a public. 
244 These may be related. in different ways to an exploit- 
ing organisation. 
245 The procedure of the propagandist is an example of the 
exploitation of similar responses. 
246 The army as a group of long standing and high organ- 
isation should afford decisive evidence for or against the 
principles here under discussioni 
'247 it will be sought to show that the cohesion of a 
military force depends upon its common mental frame (rather 
than upon other bonds which can be more easily observed), 
and that its common mental frame results from the similar 
and complementary res- onses of its members. 
248 The success of an army depends upon its aim being 
strongly willed by all its members. 
249 In the late war troops responded to authority 
differently at a base and with a unit in the line. 
250 The same principle is shown in the behaviour of troops 
before and after the armistice. 
251 The inhibition of fear responses is an example of the 
working of a common mental frame, 
Chap VI; Se ct 252 xxiv 
252 which may be introspectively detected. 
253 The experiences of transition to and from active 
service conditions show the existence of a massive 
psychical structure related to these conditions. 
254 It is possible to understand how the self instincts 
come to be organised as part of the common mental frame 
of the unit. 
255 The sentiment of esprit de corps is the consequence, 
rather than the cause, of the group's cohesion. 
256 Esprit de corps is developed as a part of the common 
mental frame of a group, and in consequence of the similar 
and complementary responses of its members. 
257 The relative importance of the different elements 
in the mental structure of an infantry platoon will be 
illustrated by the detailed examination of a single 
incident. 
258 An infantry platoon was successfully set to work 
under difficult circumstances. 
259 The platoon had lost its cohesion as a result of the 
relative exhaustion of the impulses which had brought men 
into the army and the temporary development of negative 
impulses, especially towards authority in the person of 
the officer. 
260 It retained its cohesion through a series Of similar 
responses to the officer, in consequence of which it be- 
came again suggestible towards him, and was set to work 
by him. 
261 This process, inexplicable in terms of authority, 
discipline, habit or esprit de corps, is easily explained 
in terms of the conception of a common mental frame, 
262 and a series of similar and complementary responses, 
involving a redirection of emotion and the establishment 
of a series of new habits, with a consequent period of 
vigorous activity and the recovery of its morale 
263 The army is the supreme example of anticipatory 
organisation combined with initiative; but because of 
its special character it does not afford good examples 
Chap VIC Sect 263 
of the development of organisation and leadership from 
within a group itself. 
xxv 
Chapter VIII The deliberate adjustments of a relation 
and the development of institutions 
264 Deliberate adjustments of one partner to the other 
made in the course of a relation will be made in terms of 
its common mental frame or in terms of its common form 
of expression. 
265 Relations do not arise out of other -conscious pro- 
cesses, but vice versa, 
266 though it is possible, if unusual, for a relation 
to be preceded by some degree of other -consciousness, 
usually on one side only, and usually more or less 
illusory. 
267 A relation implies sonne degree of awareness of one's 
partner's mental structures and mental states as such. 
268 Such awareness will fall far short of a full under- 
standing of the relation and the sphere of adjustments 
based upon it is therefore a limited one. 
269 An op osition is not only an occasion when an adjust- 
ment is required but also an occasion leading to increased 
other -consciousness. 
270 An adjustment (and the other- conscious processes on 
which it is based) may be clearly expressed in conversation. 
271 Allusions to anotherTs mental structures and processes 
may not be well received, especially in circumstances of 
opposition. 
272 Colloquially "I like thisTT and "This is good" are 
near to being equivalent phrases. 
273 Adjustments can therefore be more profitably discuss- 
ed and made in terms of a common form of expression than 
in terms of the c=on mental frame. 
274 An adjustment of a common form of expression is 
necessarily an adjustment of the common mental frame to 
which it is related. 
Chap VIII Sect 275 xxvi 
275 Collaboration in w._ iting is a process of building up 
a common form of expressi. -n related to a common mclital 
frame of which it is the expression. 
276 The processes of agreement may be analysed in terms 
of the mental structures and processes of the collaborat- 
ors. 
277 An opposition may lead to increased self- knowledge 
as well as increased other -consciousness. 
278 Since no such_increase of self -knowledge or other - 
consciousness accompanies a concord the essential 
elements in a common mental frame, being based upon con- 
cords, may be entirely uncognised. 
279 This has important consequences for practice and 
theory. 
280 The principle that adjustments are made in terms of 
the form of expression rather than in terms its 
determinants is true not only of two persons and of large 
groups but of individual behaviour. 
281 It ap lies in particular to the procedure of a 
committee. 
282 Such procedure conduces to the formation of relations 
of the cooperative complementary type, or relations based 
on common or complementary ends. 
283 These involve multi- determination. 
284 The determinants involved may be classified as (a) 
expressed determinants, 
285 (b) unexpressed determinants, 
286 which may be related to the formation of parties, 
287 and (c) unwitting determinants. 
288 Oppositions arising out of the men-Gal heterogeneity of 
a group may lead to deliberation, 
289 during which the group will fall into parties with 
different plans, 
Chap VIII Sect 290 xxvii 
290 and each plan related to a diversity of determinants 
291 and possibly regression. 
292 The breaking of a group into rarties does not imply 
the complete disintegration of its common mental frame. 
293 Discussion issues in a verbal formula, 
294 Which is an incomplete representation of the common 
form of expression to which it relates and consequently 
capable of a greater degree of multi -determination. 
295 Such formulae, when related not to a single occasion 
of action but to actions of a particular type are called 
institutions. 
296 An institution is related to determinants which may 
become more complex and of greater vigour while it re- 
mains unchanged 
297 or which may lose their vigour so that it is abandon- 
ed. 
298 An institution is relatively fixed, its determinants 
are continuously subject to growth and decay; its de- 
velopment (or its obsolescence) takes place by multi- 
determination and displacement. 
299 The continued power of an institution to produce 
social results shows it to be still related to active 
determinants. 
300 The principle implied in any institution is usually 
formulated in such a way as to imply an independence of 
subjective conditions which it does not possess. 
301 Presumably some of the principles implied in in- 
stitutions have such an independence and some have not. 
302 Ethics may inquire which are morally obligatory and 
in what sense: psychology and social psychology may 
discuss their relations to other mental structures and the 
processes by which they come to be socially recognised. 
303 An impulsion may (apparently for no reason but its 
intensity) generate a feeling that it is an obligation or 
-a "right ". 
Chap VIII Sect 304 xxviii 
304 The principles implied in institutions may be class- 
ified_ according to their ethical and psychological status. 
305 Those principles which are "felt" as obligatory are 
not first discovered to be so by philosophic reflection 
and then imposed from without 
306 but are developed by the group from within. 
307 They are afterwards systematised by trial and error 
and by reflection. 
308 Social interaction implies a further degree of 
systematisation 
309 and an increased feeling of obligation. 
310 Institutions develop as a result of changes in the 
common mental frames to which they are related and as a 
result of reflection, not u_-on first principles, but upon 
the particular princiles implied_ in the institution. 
311 Common forms of expression which are the objects of 
explicit group discussion may be divided into three 
classes, 
312 of which the first two are distinguished by ethics 
but not by social psychology 
313 whereas the third, the regulative form of expressim , 
is marked off by a distinction of a different kind, the 
tpe of function it performs. 
314 The common forms of expression to the achievement of 
which the activities of the group. may be directed cannot be 
exhaustively anticipated but the institutional structure of 
the group may prescribe the order in accordance with which 
such expression shall be pursued. 
315 Such a principle of order may be implied in the 
activities of a group without being formulated, 
316 and may be formulated as such ab extra. 
317 Its formulation within the group may result in a 
similar manner from its being already implied in social 
behaviour, 
Chap VIII Sect 318 xxil 
318 and when formulated it is determined by the sane 
dispositions which as elements in the common mental frame 
of the group already determine that behaviour. 
319 Further examination of this process belongs to the 
field of historical jurisprudence, the procedure of 
which is an extension of the same social process. 
320 The subject is also related to the topic of social 
transmission. 
Chapter IX Group structure in relation to initiative 
321 The phenomena of leadership in unorganised groups 
are related to (a) individual differences (b) similar 
and complementary responses. 
322 Initiative may depend upon the priority, vigour and 
appropriateness of a response; it may be related to 
primitive passive sympathy and the self tendencies. 
323 The individual who takes the initiative effectively 
on one occasion will in consequence do so more easily on 
subsequent occasions. 
324 In cases in which there is hesitation between two 
patterns of action in each of the members of the group, 
decisive action on the part of one. may determine the 
action of the others. 
325 Such determination of the action of the group may be 
facilitated in some degree by the prestige of the person 
who seeks to give a lead, 
326 but the importance of this factor should not be 
overestimated. 
327 A more important factor is that he be recognised as 
having special knowledze or experience: 
328 but the acceptability of the pattern of action whic'_ 
he supplied is related also to other factors. 
329 In an unorganised_ group initiative may pass freely 
from one member of the ,roue to another, 
330 and faciliations of the initiative of this person 
Chap IX Sect 330 XXX' 
and that in relation to special types of situation may 
become organised as parts of the common mental frame of 
the group. 
331 Initiative in different types of situation may come 
to be recognised as belonging respectively to different 
members. 
332 A member prominent in more than one branch of the 
group's activities may come to dominate the group entirely. 
333 The continuance of his bower depends largely upon 
other- conscious processes. 
334 It is likely to lead to some degree of opposition and 
perhaps to its organisation. 
335 The case of the wiring party discussed in Chapter VII 
further illustrates these principles. 
336 The continuance of the life of a group depends upon 
the adjustment of its responses to external circumstances; 
we have, therefore, to consider forms of expression 
originating with a leader (or would -be leader) from the 
point of view of their effectiveness as well as from that 
of their acceptability. 
337 Routine responses may be based upon (a) innate 
tendencies, (b) acquired tendencies 
338 and (c), in the case of group routine responses, 
principles belonging to the institutional structure of 
the group, 
339 but a relatively novel situation may require that (a) 
someone devise an effective pattern of action, and that 
(b) it be adopted by the group. 
340 In the case of individual action in a novel situation 
an effective response mgy result from processes of trial 
and error. 
341 In the case of the group there is little possibility 
of the discovery of,an effective response by trial and 
error. 
342 In the case of individual action an effective re- 
sponse may result from reflection. 
Chap IX Sect 343 xxxi 
343 In the case of group action an effective response to 
a novel situation depends upon (a) the conce tual processes 
of individuals, (b) cooperation in conceptual processes, 
and (c) the acceptance by the group of a plan so devised. 
344 The discovery of an effective response to a novel 
situation depends upon both acquired knowledge and innate 
ability. 
345 Such knowledge and ability are differently dis- 
tributed in different groups, and in the case of 'in- 
telligence' these distributions can be studied. 
346 A group will res;ond differently according as relevant 
knowledge and ability are relatively evenly or unevenly 
distributed. 
347 The ability of a group to make effective responses 
to novel situations may be called the intelligence of the 
group. 
348 Returning to a consideration of the twofold relation, 
we see that two persons may be relatively equal or relative- 
ly unequal in knowledge, experience, special capacity or 
general ability relevant to a common situation. 
349 If they be relatively equal, a common plan, ar-ived 
at separately by each, may have similar conceptual de- 
terminants in both minds. 
350 If they be unequal, the plan of the better equipped 
may be adopted by the other, 
351 (a) because it is adequately explained to him; 
352 (b) because he makes a rational judgement that the 
other is likely to devise a superior plan; 
353 (c) because for inadequate reasons it appears to him 
to be a good plan, 
354 probably in consequence of a process of suggestion, 
355 but without an effective grasp of it; 
356 (d) because of some degree of coercion. 
357 All these modes of acceptance may be reproduced in a 
Chap IX Sect 357 xxxii 
large group on a single occasion, 
358 each mode being characteristic of a sub -group, such 
groupings being subordinate to party groupings. 
359 This principle applies in different degrees to 
different groups. 
360 Procedure by similar conceptual processes or by 
conceptual cooperation is possible only in small groups of 
specialists. 
361 The latter is the more usual process. 
362 The methods of practical and theoretical corporate 
decision differ on account of their differing urgency. 
363 The decisions of the deliberating and directing body 
may be accepted by the group in consequence of its organ- 
isation and discipline or through a party structure. 
364 All the modes of acceptance described may be involved 
on a single occasion, 
365 and the effectiveness of the group's action depends 
upon the extent to which it is based on the conceptual 
processes of those of its members who are fittest to arrive 
at a decision, 
366 but whether these modes of acceptance result in the 
adoption of the best decision depends upon the structure 
of the group. 
Chapter X The transmission of forms of expression 
367 In social psychology the term social transmission is 
to be preferred to the term imitation. 
368 The term social transmission may be used to cover all 
cases in which two forms of expression, which are products 
of different minds, are so related that the second would 
have been in any way different if the first had not occurred. 
369 There may of course be resemblance without causal re- 
lation and therefore without transmission. 
Chap X Sect 370 xxxiii 
370 The distinction is in psycholoical terms, 
371 in terms, that is, either of (a) the determinants of 
the form on the two occasions of its occurrence lr in 
terms of (b) the mental processes by which it has been 
attained. 
372 Instances of transmission may therefore be classified 
according to the degree of likeness between these de- 
terminants and processes. Where these are perfectly 
similar, we have a case of production by similar re- 
sponses to similar situations( d-). 
373 The example of another may result in a reinforcement 
of motives ( /3 ) . 
374 An example may show how conative states already 
actively seeking expression may be integrated; and an 
integration reached in this way may be one which (in the 
absence of the example) would presently have been dis- 
covered or it may be one which would not have been dis- 
covered without the help of the example, or it may be an 
improvement upon the example ( 
375 The conative states themselves may be aroused for 
the first time by the sight of the example - the problem 
and the answer to it are presented together ( 
376 Such cases do not justify the assumption of an in- 
stinct of imitation and the process involved may be called 
reproduction by similar determinants. 
377 Such reproduction results from similar processes of 
analysis and synthesis, which may be pe =ceptual or con- 
ceptual, and which may be directed to the inter -relations 
of elements in the form of expression, to relations be- 
tween the latter and some of its determinants, or to the 
inter -relations of the determinants. 
378 When there are differences in the situations or in the 
mental structures of the two persons, a form reproduced ta 
this way will be reproduced with some degree of change and 
adaptation; i.e. it will be reproduced by similar and dis- 
similar determinants. 
379 Reproduction by similar determinants implies analysis 
where before there was synthesis. 
380 Effective transmission requires a shortening of the 
Chap X Sect 380 Div 
process by which similar determinants become focussed upon 
the transmitted form of expression. 
381 The transmission of a form of expression implies 
understanding of the inter- relations of its elements, of 
the relations of these elements to their determinants and 
of the relations of these determinants to one another: in 
so far as there is a failure of such understanding there 
will be deterioration in the form or in its expressiveness. 
382 A form of expression may be transmitted with sub- 
stitute determinants and with a decrease 
383 or an increase of expressiveness; i.e. by multi - 
determination and displacement. 
384 A form may be reproduced with inappropriate de- 
terminants and consequent deterioration. 
385 Reproduction by inappropriate determinants is im- 
portant because of its frequency rather than because of the 
value of the results to which it leads. 
386 Deterioration in a form of expression may be due either 
to external circumstances or to mental factors. 
387 In the former case recovery may be rapid, in the latter 
impossible. The maintenance, improvement or decay of a 
culture may therefore be related to the distribution in a 
population of innate special and general abilities. 
388 An emotional state is normally accompanied by an 
expression which is immediately intelligible to an ob- 
server. 
389 This implies an innate common mental frame in con- 
sequence of which the observed expression is immediately 
intelligible in terms of the observer's own organic 
sensations and emotional states. 
390 Some instances of this process suggest that its 
communicative aspect is secondary, others that it is 
primary, 
391 and that, as in the case of articulate speech, the 
medium of communication and the processes by which it is 
interpreted have been developed together. 
Chap X Sect 392 XXX V 
392 This process of communication is usually called 
sympathy; and it can be brought und.e- the general formula 
of reproduction by similar determinants. 
393 It can communicate an infinite variety of shades of 
emotion but it cannot communicate any perceptual or con- 
ceptual material. 
394 It is of social importance in three ways: 
395 (1) It may lead directly to the transmission of 
emotional elements in the organisation of sentiments; 
396 and this is of particular importance in the case of 
the mother and the child, 
397 with important results socially and politically, 
398 and sometimes with pathological consequences. 
399 The process is also exploited by the advertiser and 
the propagandist. 
400 (2) It may lead to imposing consequences by altering 
the balance between tendencies which are in equilibrium, 
401 particularly in the education of taste. 
402 In consequence of it political or religious conversion 
may turn upon apparently trivial incidents. 
403 (3) It may be the occasion of trains of thought or 
imagery which are really the products of the mind in- 
fluenced by it. 
404 The transmission of a culture is nevertheless de- 
pendent upon processes of reproduction by similar concept- 
ual determinants and therefore upon minds capable of such 
transmission. 
405 The continuance of the advance in science and in 
economic and social developments has frequently been taken 
for granted. 
406 Such a view is characteristic only of recent times, 
407 and it ignores the conditions, external and internal, 
upon which the continued life of a society depends. 
408 (a) The principal biological condition is not the 
Chap X Sect 408 xxxV 
birth of a sufficient number of outstanding persons but 
the birth of such persons conjoined with a sufficiently 
high standard in the general population. 
409 (b) The principal psychological condition of the 
transmission of a culture is its transmission by re- 
production by similar conceptual determinants and there- 
fore with unimpaired expressiveness. 
410 Forms transmitted with impaired expressiveness may 
be socially useful and may regain their expressiveness. 
411 (c) To be socially effective in the fullest sense 
a form must have full expressiveness for at least some 
minds and, except in the case of those simple elements 
of culture which are transmitted to all the members of 
a community, it cannot have full expressiveness for all 
the members of a community. 
412 In respect of eve Ty form there will therefore be 
concentric circles of the community for whom it has 
degrees of expressiveness varying from full expressive- 
ness at the centre and corresponding7the modes of its 
acceptance (sections sso - 366 ) 
413 Each member of a community occupies a different 
position relatively to such a centre in respect of each 
important part of a social tradition. 
414 A social tradition is continuously renewed in the 
processes of development of young minds. 
Chapter VI 
The study of the small group 
...the frame of social life... 
But of this frame the bearings and the ties, 
The strong connections, nice dependencies, 
Gradations just, has thy pervading soul 
Look'd through? or can a part contain the whole? 
340 
Chapter VT 
The study of the small group 
183 A number of theories have been put forward to ex- 
plain the structure of the social group and the processes 
by which it comes into existence. These theories are 
all in different degrees psychological, though they have 
been more frequently developed by writers primarily in- 
terested in political science than by psychologists. In 
consequence of this, interest has been directed mainly to 
some problem of political organisation to which the treat- 
ment of the psychological problems involved has been sub- 
ordinated; and, in hurrying on to these engrossing and 
in some cases urgent practical questions, the preliminary 
psychological inquiry has been scamped. The employment 
of a naive psychological account of social relations has 
also been rendered inevitable by the slowness of the 
development of psychology itself, which has not been until 
recently in a position to provide the political scientist, 
or the writer on jurisprudence, with concepts adequate to 
the psychological analysis of his data. Such criticism 
may be directed not only to such older writers as Hobbes 
Chap VI Sect 183 341 
(who sought to explain human associations in terms of one 
natural tendency, fear) but also to much contemporary work 
in political science and in economics, work which in many 
cases has none the less a high value. 
This defect has begun to be supplied by the writers 
on social psychology, but there has perhaps scarcely been 
time for results of permanent value to be achieved, and 
still less for them to win general acceptance with workers 
in other fields of social science. What has been achieved 
is a point of view the value of which is evident enough. 
What has been lacking has been a method of inquiry by 
means of which the study can be carried on in a vigorous 
and systematic way, and a sufficient basis of fact dis- 
covered. Given such a basis it should be possible to 
reach generalisations which will be more than acute but 
unsystematised observations of social life presented in 
a semi -psychological terminology, or interesting specul- 
ations which captivate the intelligence but do not put 
one's feet on the road to a progressive understanding. 
In social psychology as in other branches of science the 
discovery of a sufficient basis of fact will require time, 
and the cooperation of many workers: and the development 
of the science will require the cooperation not only of 
psychologists but of specialists in the various branches 
of social science (section 21). 
Chap VI Sect 184 342 
184 In the last chapter an attempt has been made to 
apply psychological methods of study to the relations 
which may exist between two persons. We may now seek to 
discover how these methods can be applied to the invest- 
igation of the small group and whether any of the concepts 
used for the description of the structure of a dual 
relation are of use in the study of a more complex system 
of relations. There is the possibility that an under- 
standing of the small group may be a step on the way to 
the understanding of larger associations, that the under- 
standing of the small group may prove to be the key to 
unlock some of the problems of human society. In any case 
there is here for social psychology the advantage that it 
is possible to apply to the small group some of the methods 
of psychological inquiry which we have already used in 
discussing the twofold relation. 
185 Before attempting to do so it is desirable to 
review this procedure and to note the particular difficult- 
ies in the way of it. As it is the projection into a new 
field of the procedure of psychological inquiry, and its 
peculiar difficulties, we may begin by considering these 
shorty in so far as they are relevant. 
As the observation and study of one's own mental 
states occupies a central position in psychology so it 
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must also occupy a central position in social psychology, 
for the relations which are most open to study are those 
in which one is a partner, and the groups which are most 
open to study are those of which one is a member: and in 
either case the psychological processes most easily 
observed and studied are one's own. The difficulties 
and paradoxes of a mind which is its own object of study 
- which is at once the observed and the observer - have 
been discussed at great length. They are projected - and 
with new complications - into the further field of social 
psychology. In either case such observation is a matter 
of everyday occurrence: before we become psychologists 
we are already amateur observers and students of our 
mental states, including our mental states in relation to 
our fellows. 
186 The field of such amateur observation is greatly 
widened by psychological training, in the course of which 
r(I 
appropriate concepts and principles are acquired. Other- 
wise unnoted incidents of psychical life attract attention 
and acquire significance. The process is parallel to 
that in any of the sciences - the process for example by 
which in geology a fragment of stone, without interest or 
meaning for the casual observer, becomes for the student 
of geology the topic of a lengthy argument reaching far 
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back in time, and far outwards to surrounding geological 
formations. It is also possible that the field of intro- 
spection is widened in consequence of practice; or at any 
rate that a new mental agility is acquired by which the 
attention alternates rapidly between a normal and a psy- 
chological point of view. In any case it is quite certain 
that, as in other branches of science, "A fool sees not 
1iß 
the same tree that a wise man sees "; and in consequence 
the psychologist is able by such means to extend the 
effective area of his self -consciousness, so as to be- 
come aware of tendencies of which he would otherwise know 
nothing, and to detect otherwise unsuspected_ relations 
between conscious states in themselves easily observed, 
or between such conscious states and external events or 
past experiences. This can again be still further ex- 
tended by the technique of following up lines of 
association from easily observed mental events suspected 
to have special significance. 
187 These methods of study may be applied to one's 
own experience as a partner to a dual relation or as a 
member of a group; and no new principle is involved in 
such an application of them. If they are regarded as 
valid for other psychological purposes they must be re- 
garded as valid for this: if their validity elsewhere 
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is questioned, their validity here will not be allowed, 
But in making such an application of them one has not so 
far passed from the territory of psychology (which in- 
cludes the study of the individual against the background 
of his social environment) to that of social psychology, 
which is concerned with the structure and processes of a 
relation, or of a group, in a way that transcends the 
point of view of an individual partner or member (section 
119), and seeks to apprehend the mental processes and 
evaluations of each of the persons concerned as equally 
parts of one sociological situation which comprehends 
the relevant all of them. 
In other words I have made no progress towards a 
sociological view of the phenomena until in my study of 
a relation to which I am a partner I have escaped from 
my personal point of view as a partner to it; so that we 
have the paradox of social psychology (somewhat similar to 
the paradox of psychological inquiry mentioned in the 
preceding section) that I cannot know directly the mental 
processes involved in a relation except in so far as they 
are my mental processes as partner to it, and that I cannot 
understand the relation except in so far as I can view with 
detachment the mental processes of the -partners to it of 
iFor example, by the behavourists. 
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whom I am one. Otherwise my report is not an account of 
the processes of the relation but is itself a part of the 
processes of the relation, not a scientific description of 
the relation but material, useful in combination with other 
such material, in working up a description of the relation 
which may have scientific value. Whoever goes astray 
through not heeding this may comfort himself with the 
thought that he errs in good company; for the rejection 
of all the so- called sociological treatises in which it is 
conspicuous would considerably lighten our shelves. But 
we ought not to reject them; we ought to retain them for 
use in building up our 1icture of the society of which 
their authors and readers were members. They are at 
least raw material for a history of movements of opinion 
and social aspiration. As for the error itself, though 
it is a dangerous trap for the unsuspecting, there is a 
way round it which is possible, if a little difficult and 
troublesome, and the most well -beaten :art of it is the 
road which every psychologist has to tread in learning to 
regard his own mental states with a detachment which is 
necessary for the pursuit of his science, and which is 
hardly to be learned from any other line of study. 
138 Before proceeding to indicate by what measures 
we may safeguard ourselves against this pitfall it is 
desirable to define more exactly the difficulties that 
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are involved. When as a partner to a relation I set 
out to study the relation as such I am attempting to 
apprehend the following groups of facts separately and 
in relation to one another:- 
/i3 
(a) A particular group of facts or circumstances 
external to myself and to the relation - the frame 
of external circumstances of the relation. 
(b) My own understanding of these circumstances, 
i.e. my sensations, perceptions, affective and 
conative experience, judgements and processes of 
self -criticism and volition as related to these; 
or, shortly, my response to the circumstances. 
(ö) The corresponding mental processes which 
make up my partner's valuation of the circum- 
stances; that is, my partner's response to the 
circumstances. 
(d) Any cognitive, affective and conative ex- 
perience in relation to my partner, the per- 
ceptions and feelings and impulses with which I 
react to him, and to what he saya and does; 
that is, my response to my partner. 
(e) My partner's corresponding mental states 
with regard to myself, and my actions and words; 
that is, the response of my partner to me. 
(f) The background of past experience which 
shares in determining my response to the circum- 
stances and my response to my partner: shortly, 
My relevant past experiences. 
(g) My partner's corresponding mental structures; 
that is, my partner's relevant past experiences. 
(h) My understanding of my partner's mental pro- 
cesses, that is, df his response to the circumstances, 
his response to me and his relevant past experiences 
(c, e, and g, above); that is, my other -conscious 
processes. 
(i) my partner's corresponding understanding of 
my mental processes (b, d, and f, above); a is, 
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my partner's other- conscious processes. 
(j) The modifications of my response to the 
circumstances (b), and of my response to my partner 
(d), which result from my other -conscious processes. 
(k) The modifications of my partner's response to 
the circumstances (c), and of his response to me (e), 
which result from his other- conscious processes. 
189 All these are distinguishable aspects of a 
normal relation, a relation between two persons engaged 
in some process of common living, neither of whom has 
sought to pervert or complicate it for purposes of psy- 
chological or sociological study. When one of them is 
a psychologist, interested in the theoretical aspects of 
human relations and using his experience as the material 
of his study, there is added to all of these items a 
twelfth - the mental processes in which the psychological 
observer endeavours to become aware of each of these 
eleven aspects of the relation. And if he becomes 
critical of his own attempt to do so and endeavours a 
critical assessment of it, I suppose we must add an un- 
lucky thirteenth - the processes which make up such a 
discussion as we are engaged upon in this section. It 
will however be sufficient to limit our consideration to 
the first eleven categories without going on to describe 
the mental interactions of a pair of social psychologists, 
each, by a superhuman division of attention, engaged in 
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processes of the twelfth and thirteenth types, while 
they jointly decide upon bacon and eggs or finnan 
haddock for breakfast. 
The reader may also be spared an extension of the 
above table to the case of a relation between three 
(even non -psychological) persons; for it is evident 
enough in what way the further complications come in. A 
mathematician would easily ascertain the increase in the 
number of categories for larger numbers up to that of a 
meeting of the British Association, or, indeed, the 
population of these islands: but such a calculation would 
be entirely fallacious, since it is obvious that as the 
size of the group increases many of the logically possible 
categories are eliminated, since only a small proportion 
of the members of a group of any size secure such pro- 
minence that all the others have any clear awareness of 
them as individuals, and these in their turn have a 
clear apprehension of only a small number of their fellows; 
and the larger the group the more true this is. 
190 How far may a partner to a relation apprehend 
separately, for purposes of psychological study, the 
eleven aspects of it which can be distinguished? Of the 
psychical structures and processes involved in the 
relations between two persons, the only ones which are 
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open to easy observation are those which are li,'hted up 
by self -consciousness and other -consciousness. An account 
of relations limited to these would as we 'lave seen be a 
very imperfect account of the structures and processes 
involved. We have therefore to consider what means there 
are of pushing observation further. 
(a) The first difficulty that will occur to the reader 
is that the relation which is being studied is itself 
altered when a new aspect of it is apprehended. A 
corresponding difficulty is a commonplace of psychological 
study: how can a mental state be studied when it is 
altered by the mere fact of being observed? And to this 
there are at least two practical answers: (i) that it may 
be observed and studied during its process of alteration; 
and, (ii) that it may be studied in retrospect. Whatever 
difficulties these answers may have to meet in general 
psychology, there is a rough satisfactoriness about them 
for our present purpose. Thus, in the course of a dis- 
cussion of plans with my friend, I may be annoyed by his 
apparent wrong- headedness; this annoyance may not h wever 
prevent the development of an other -conscious process by 
which I become aware of his point of view; my anger under- 
goes a consequent modification, and I proceed to attempt 
in a more intelligent way to make him see the situation as 
I do. There seems to be no reason why I should not note, 
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if not that I am annoyed, at least that I have been, and 
also the relation of the subsidence of my annoyance to 
my increase in understanding of its occasion; and I 
ought to be able to observe directly the process of sub- 
sidence itself. 
If, instead of altering his point of view, I make 
some change in my own in consequence of my becoming aware 
from his remarks of some element in the external circum- 
stances which he has noted and I have not, some inter- 
pretation of them which I have missed, or some other 
possibility arising out of them, then I may well be able 
to observe this process of modification of my own views 
as it takes _lace; and I should be able to distinguish 
my own original response to the circumstances (b), from 
this further light upon them which brings me nearer to 
an adequate view of them (a), and some elements in my 
partner's response to the situation (e), which his remarks 
have thus revealed to me; with a little care I may 
notice also the part played by my first annoyance, an 
element in my response to my partner (d), his patience 
with me or his similar annoyance (with which I have had 
to deal tactfully)jelements in his response to me ( 
I should be able to trace out in my past experience '(some 
of the determinants of my own responses (f), and, 
am intimately acquainted with my partner, some of the 
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determinants of his (g); I should be able to see what 
-:,art has been played by other -consciousness on both 
sides, (h) and (i), and to form some estimate of the 
modifications of our responses which have resulted, (j) 
and (k). Thus the change in the relation consequent ur,on 
the attempt to study,it is not so much a difficulty as an 
opportunity; and it should be possible, in consequence 
of it, to see something of the relation as it would have 
been in its absence as well as the mode of its actual 
development.i 
191 It is true that to carry out this requires happy 
opportunities of observation which must be waited for. 
'So far as concerns the distinction between the ex- 
ternal frame of circumstances (a), and the response which 
the observing partner makes to it (b), we may note that 
it is a normal part of psychological procedure to 
distinguish between a relatively objective and a re- 
latively subjective valuation of a situation, as when 
in the laboratory we study the valuation of two lines 
as differing in length when the measurement shows them 
to be actually equal; and this attitude is readily 
carried over into normal life as when we find a dish at 
table unappetising and explain this resonse in terms of 
our physiological state instead of in terms of a mis- 
judgement of the cook's. The making of such distinctions 
between an objective and a subjective judgement of an 
external fact may be facilitated by the circumstance of 
a social relation as when one partner finding; a room 
chilly ascertains that his companion finds it comfortable 
and an appeal to the thermometer leads to a comparison 
of its verdict with the sensory experience of each. 
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It requires also a strong interést in the problems of 
relations, if such opportunities are to be recognised 
and used, such a division of attitude maintained, and 
one's observations made as full as possible. It is 
necessary indeed that throughout the course of one's 
social living one should be continually interested in 
the theoretical problems of relations as well as occupied 
with the interests which make up the relations themselves. 
No doubt this has its disadvantages, but here as in other 
fields of .observation increasing insight comes with 
practice; and this is its reward. 
192 (b) Although it is possible in this way to see 
something of each aspect of a relation in which one is 
concerned, it remains true that only a very one -sided 
view of the relation is obtained. This one -sided view 
may however be corrected by a parallel study of two or 
more relations so chosen that the observer occupies a 
different view point in each. Thus I may set beside the 
relation between myself as a subordinate and my official 
superior, another relation in which someone else is sub- 
ordinate to me; I may study a relation in which I am 
receiving instruction, or advice, or material help, along 
with one in which I am giving instructions, or advice, 
or material help; and so on, with an inexhaustible 
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number of applications of the same principle. 
It should be noted that I do not merely add to- 
gether the knowledge obtained from an experience of each 
side of the relation. Rather an experience of one side 
of it lights up in an entirely new way the experience 
which I have of the other side of it. To have acted as 
a teacher, is to understand in an entirely new way the 
attitude to me of my teacher in any relation in which I 
have been a pupil. Such understanding has not only 
theoretical but very great practical value. I may re- 
call here a remark made to me by a Company Commander 
with whom I served in France, He had been acting as 
Battalion Commander during a morning's manoeuvres and, 
impressed by the experience, he said: "to be able to 
perform the duties of any command efficiently you should 
have some practice in the duties of the command immediate- 
ly above you ". One does not always find arrangements 
made to secure this advantage; but there is a general 
recognition of the advantage of experience in the whole 
succession of posts subordinate to that which a man is 
himself finally to occupy; and the value in either case 
lies in the increased power of seeing a situation from 
the point of view of your subordinate or your superior, 
as the case may be, as well as from the point of view 
which you yourself occupy. 
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193 It is of course true that only general aspects of 
each type of relation can be elucidated in this way. A 
circumstance peculiar to a particular given relation 
which eludes my understanding will not necessarily occur 
at all in another relation of the same general type in 
which I happen to occupy the complementary position to 
that which I occupy in the first. This limitation is 
however an advantage rather than a disadvantage of the 
method so long as it is the general and typical structure 
of each relation that we are trying to make out; that is, 
so long as we are interested in the theoretical aims of 
a social psychology. If our aim is practical - for ex- 
ample the adjustment of a particular relation which has 
gone wrong, as in the practice of psychotherapy - then it 
is quite another matter; and though such generalisations 
as we are concerned here to establish may be of value in 
such a case, it is the relation in its concrete detail 
that we must have revealed to us. And this seems to re- 
quire an observer external to the relation with access to 
the minds of both the partners to it. 
194 (c) The only i:erson whom the investigator has an 
opportunity of studying in a large number of relations is 
himself. There is the obvious possibility that his social 
responses may not be typical, and that generalisations 
Chap VI Sect 194 35F 
based upon them may not be of wide application. There 
is the further possibility that individual differences 
in respect of social responses may require the recog- 
nition from this loint of view of a number of character 
types, and a corresponding number of types of relation; 
and such discrimination will be possible only on the 
basis of an intimate study of a large number of in- 
dividuals, and by means of a method admitting of the 
study of individuals of varied endowments and experience. 
So far as error due to peculiarities of the character 
and circumstances of the observer are concerned there are 
three main possibilities : - 
(i) Peculiarities in the character of the ob- 
server himself of such a nature as to render his 
social relations non -typical. 
(ii) Peculiarities or limitations of his social 
experience. 
(iii) Peculiarities in the responses which he 
evokes in others. 
195 (i) In the meantime, since we do not know at all 
accurately what constitutes a normal social response, it 
is impossible for the observer to know whether his case 
is typical or ntt. But we cannot arrive at any such 
concept of normality of social response until we have 
the reports upon their own social responses of many 
competent observers. Such a concept is also itself o -en 
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to suspicion since we may expect to find here as else- 
where, not two classes of normal and abnormal, but a 
normal distribution of individual differences in respect 
of each of a number of factors; and we should regard 
such differences as im.,,ortant and valuable data, not as 
an unfortunate obstacle in the way of a theory which seeks 
to ignore them. If then the relations that an observer. 
describes are typical of social relations in general, 
the observer has performed a valuable social service in 
the development or q general sociological theory: if they 
are not typical he has still performed a valuable service 
in revealing to us a social experience different from 
that of most of the rest of us. But if he doubts the 
normality of his own social experience because he cannot 
find in it the processes recognised by some writers on 
the subject, he may yet be quite right in rejecting their 
theories rather than his experience. 
196 (ii) Much the same must be said of the observer's 
social experience. There is the possibility that this 
may be insufficiently wide, or not typical, or peculiar 
in some way. But such as it is, it is the social ex- 
perience of an actual member of the community to which 
we belong, it is an actual fragment of the livin tissue 
of our society; and the mistake would be to refuse it, 
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not to accept it for what it is. But once again we 
should not generalise from this fragment taken by itself 
as to the nature of all the rest. 
197 (iii) An observer's social experience is just as 
likely to be abnormal on account of peculiarities in the 
ways in which people react to him. There is a story of 
a king who suffered from the illusion that all his sub- 
jects were permanently bent forward at the waist, because 
he never saw them in any other position. A somewhat 
similar misunderstanding must arise in the case of in- 
dividuals of unusual physique or physiognomy. I re- 
member meeting on a social occasion a gentleman in a 
high position who is of exceptionally imposing personal 
appearance and authoritative manner and noting with some 
amusement the deference paid to him, and to his most 
commonplace remarks, by persons some of whom were certain- 
ly much abler than himself. To be met continually by 
such automatic deference must result in important 
modifications of character, so that a man's social re- 
lations become non -typical in consequence of unusual fact- 
ors on both sides of the relation. 
Exactly the same is true of other physical peculiar- 
ities. Thus an individual's appearance may be such as 
to evoke a domineering or a protective response. Just as 
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the man of large physique and impressive countenance is 
immediately listened to, so a man of insignificant 
appearance has difficulty in attracting attention. He 
may make up for his unimpressive appearance by some 
exaggeration of emphasis or gesture in order to call 
attention to himself. Unless he does this very skill- 
fully, he is likely to be reacted to, not only as un- 
important, but also as unpleasantly assertive. And so 
his social relations become doubly non -typical. 
These are extreme and obvious cases that lie open to 
observation from outside; but they may serve to suggest 
that we shall not have an adequate light upon this 
question until we have analyses of their social experience 
from a sufficiently large number of observers. 
198 It is to some extent possible to study relations 
to which one is not a party by observing both the partners 
to the relation. Such observation must necessarily be 
interpreted very largely in terms of the results of the 
öbserver's study of his own social relations. It is 
therefore not an independent source of knowledge in such 
a degree as it at first appears. Here also insight in- 
creases with practice. But there is another difficulty. 
Prolonged and intimate observation of a relation from 
outside is only possible when the observer has a high 
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degree of intimacy with the partners to it; and such an 
intimacy renders him in fact a party to a threefold re- 
lation of himself and the two persons whose relation to 
one another he is seeking to study. What we should say. 
therefore is perhaps that a threefold relation sometimes 
affords one partner to it a good opportunity of observing 
the relation between the other two partners. 
It is unnecessary to enumerate the different difficult- 
ies that lie in the way of this kind of observation. It 
may however be pointed out that the interpretation of such 
observations will be liable to error in so far as the 
observer interprets them in terms of his own social,ex- 
perience, if his own social resonses are different in 
type from those of the subjects of his observation. There 
is in such cases a possibility of error, but there is of 
course also an opportunity - the opportunity of comparing 
two types of social experience and of ascertaining how 
far his own responses are typical. 
There is of course the possibility of submitting 
both partners to a relation to a process of analysis and 
there can be no doubt of the interest and value of such 
a double analysis. 
One has frequent opportunities of studying a relation 
on the basis of a description of it by one of the partners 
to it. This is most likely to occur when the relation 
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involves some intensity of feeling for that partner, as 
for instance when the partners are at cross rurposes. 
The view of a relation so obtained is usually in need 
of correction in the light of other observations. 
What is given in the story of the partner to the re- 
lation is not an objective account of it but a 
of one side of one of its processes of dislocation or 
readjustment, it is a part of the communicative partner's 
response to the other and, as such, is a picture of the 
other as he appears to the communicative partner and not 
as he is. Its value therefore depends upon the extent 
to which it can be set against and compared with a more 
detached view of the relation, which includes its other 
aspects. 
199 Use may be made of written records of an actual 
relation. These may include letters written during the 
course of it, a journal kept at the time, or a written 
record of it made by one of the partners to it at a sub- 
sequent time, or literary works related to it produced 
by one of the partners and expressing part of his 
attitude in it. Such material may be available in cases 
in which the inquirer is a partner to the relation, in 
cases in which one or both of the partners to it can be 
further studied, and in cases in which no evidence other 
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than documentary is obtainable. 
Written material may also take the form of written 
records made by someone else, as in biography and history. 
Such records will usually include or be based upon 
letters or documents coming from the partners to the re- 
lation, or reports of their spoken words, or the ob- 
servations of those in'personal contact with them. The 
intervention of the mind of a recorder or a biographer or 
historian obviously imposes caution in using such mat - 
erial, and necessitates an attempt to separate record 
from interpretation. lsychological considerations may 
also require to be preceded by the application to the 
material of scholarly criticism, for instance of the 
technique of the historian. 
200 Descriptions of relations are to found in liter- 
ature, particularly in drama and the novel. Such mat- 
erial may certainly embody the results of very acute 
observation, but it cannot be immediately used for psy- 
chological purposes. There is no doubt that it includes 
many accurate observations of relations which the author 
has observed or to which he has been a partner; it is 
also quite obvious that dramatists and novelists have 
very much the advantage of psychologists in their ability 
to represent the features of a relation in the medium of 
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words; and it is certain that many of them have shown 
very great ability as observers of the mental processes 
both of themselves and of others. But the results of 
their observations are recorded, not for a scientific, 
but for an artistic purpose. It is an artist's business 
to set out his matter so as to appeal to the emotions of 
his reader; and to this artistic purpose distortions 
and heightenings of his actual observations are not 
merely permissible but are actually obligatory. Such 
distortions and heightenings render his work in the main 
useless for our pur u l.ose. 
Furthermore there is no means to hand of distinguish- 
ing passages of works which are relatively accurate re- 
cords of observed relations from passages and works which 
are purely imaginary, and as such belong to the category 
of reverie and phantasy, a record not of the world as it 
is but of the world as the writer would have it - at 
least in imagination, and in the mood of the moment. 
Though certainly not lacking in psychological interest 
from a different . oint of view, such writing is as little 
useful for our present purpose as is a poet's description 
of the phoenix or the unicorn for zoology. 
Again, painstaking "psychological" studies of re- 
lations, particularly in contemporary fiction, despite 
their careful assumption of a guise of objectivity, may 
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be no more than elaborations of phantasies arising out of 
the writer's own social experience and portraying a re- 
lation as it appeared to himself as a partner to it. As 
such it is of course not an account of a relation at all 
but an elaboration of a part of what we have distinguished 
as the fourth aspect of a relation (section !gg ) - the re- 
sponse of one partner to the other. Since to such dis- 
tortions and elaborations are added the distortions and 
elaborations legitimate in an artistic work it is difficult 
to find any firm ground here for the study of relations. 
201 All this is not to exclude literature from psy- 
cholo'ical consideration - or even from consideration 
within the field of social psychology. It is merely to 
refuse to accept the dramatist and novelist as observers 
whole records of social process may be taken at their face 
value and put in evidence in the court of science. 
Literary works are themselves social facts, resultants of 
social process, and therefore primary objects of psy- 
chological study and analysis. But when I read one of 
the war novels the vogue for which is happily passing I 
must read it not as an authority for the relations be- 
tween soldiers on active service, but as evidence of a 
curious phase of public literary taste during recent 
years, a phenomenon of which I should be glad to have a 
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fuller understanding. 
Novel and drama have however one legitimate use. If 
it is desired to illustrate a conclusion which has been 
reached from direct observation of relations, it may be 
possible to find in a work of imagination a case 
sufficiently close to the observed processes to serve as 
an illustration in the expository phase of an argument. 
It may at least, if it is a well -known work, save a long 
description of an actual incident. It is also likely to 
be much better done: and that is surely an advantage as 
legitimate as if a zoologist who could not draw very well 
availed himself for purposes of illustration of a painting 
of an animal done without a zoological motive but faith- 
fully portraying the features to which he wished to draw 
attention. Perhaps even this is better avoided: but if 
literary work is used at all it should certainly be used 
for purposes of illustration only, and not ad dogmata 
ns 
confirmanda. 
202 We may now consider how we may apply to the three- 
fold relation the methods just described, and how far we 
may explain it in terms of the concepts developed in the 
previous chapter. 
Let us suppose three persons to be on terms of 
intimacyland,while following their separate vocations, 
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to live together from choice. There is then established 
a threefold relation which may be an object of study to 
any one of them, if he happens to be interested in such 
problems as we are concerned with. The threefold re- 
lation might immediately resolve itself for his consider- 
ation into three twofold relations, each of which could 
be described in terms of its own common mental frame 
- his own relation with each of his partners taken separ- 
ately, and the relation between his two partners, which 
he could observe from the outside. The study of each of 
these three relations might follow the lines already 
indicated in our discussion of methods. Thus his own 
relation to each of his partners is a relation which can 
be studied in the same way as any twofold relation to 
which the observer is a partner; and the relation be- 
tween his partners is a relation to be studied by ob- 
servation from outside - a study which their common life 
should give him sufficient opportunity to carry on. 
203 Let us suppose that we have in front of us a 
description of these three twofold relations made in 
terms of the concepts we have used in describing the 
twofold relation and as full as these terms will allow. 
We should then have for each pair an account of the 
following factors:- 
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(a) The appetitive responses of each to the 
other, whether positive or negative; and assert- 
ive, submissive and protective tendencies. 
(b) Cooperative relations, whether based on 
similar or complementary responses, or on common 
or interdependent ends. 
(c) Regulative secondary structures super- 
imposed upon the common mental frames in which 
the responses of the appetitive and cooperative 
types are organised. 
(d) Other- conscious processes, and elements 
in the common mental frame of the two partners 
resulting from the other- consciousness of one 
or both of them. 
We should thus have a system of such structures, that is, 
a common mental frame, for each twofold relation. What 
we have to inquire is: How far is the sum of these three 
accounts from being a complete account of the threefold 
relation? Or in other terms: Can the threefold re- 
lation be fully described in terms of the three common 
mental frames of the three twofold relations? 
204 (a) First we may note that some elements in their 
separate twofold relations are not truly part of the 
threefold relation at all. If A and B are in the habit 
of going for a swim before breakfast while C sleeps on, 
or if B and Care accustomed to play a game of patience 
for half al2 hour after A has gone to bed with a novel, 
or if C and A occasionally indulge in a mild gamble with- 
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out paining B by allowing their naughtiness to come to 
his attention, then each of these activities) elongs to 
one of the twofold relations and constitutes part of its 
common mental frame, but it does not enter into the three- 
fold relation at all. Of course if A and B are in the 
habit of teasing C at breakfast about his lie -abed habits, 
or if A, B and C discuss at intervals the ethics of 
betting, the teasing and the discussions belong to the 
threefold relation although the swimming and the betting 
do not. 
Secondly, the three separate accounts of the three 
twofold relations taken together would in some cases 
fall short of an adequate account of the threefold re- 
lation. Let us suppose a situation to which each of 
the three makes a like response, let us say the arrival 
of a wine -merchant's letter informing them that a further 
supply of a wine with which they would like to stock 
their cellar is available at a favourable price. To 
represent their common pleasure in terms of three two- 
fold relations involving three pairs of similar responses 
is certainly a clumsy, and perhaps an inaccurate,des- 
cription, - clumsy, because it appears to indicate three 
pairs of responses when there are only three responses, 
that is three hearts beating a little faster, and three 
slightly heightened blood pressures; inaccurate, be- 
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cause it suggests that the responses are made in pairs 
whereas each respond$ separately to the news, and the con- 
cord of the responses is at once a concord of three. We 
should therefore describe it as a threefold cooperative 
relation based on like responses to a common situation. 
205 (b) We may take an example in which a description 
in terms of three twofold relations would fall short 
even more seriously of an adequate description. Let us 
suppose the three persons to be in the habit of playing 
trios after dinner. This ac-divity is obviously an ex- 
ample of cooperative behaviour involving complementary 
responses. But it would be impossible to describe it in 
terms of three twofold relations. There is for example 
one form of expression for all three - the piece of music 
which at any time they are engaged in performing - and 
that form of expression involves a programme of act- 
ivities any part of which implies for its completion the 
activities of all three players. Such a relation is then 
an example of a threefold cooperative relation based on 
complementary responses (section 131). 
Instances of threefold cooperative behaviour of the 
third and fourth types (sections 132 & 134) would certain- 
ly be present in the threefold relation which we have 
been considering. It is however unnecessary to set out 
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examples Of them here. Enough has been said to make 
clear that cooperative, if not appetitive, relations may 
exist between three persons in such a war that the 
structure of the threefold relation requires to be des- 
cribed in terms of a threefold common mental frame, a 
mental organisation involving structures in all three 
minds which together constitute one functional unit. 
206 (c) We may, thirdly, illustrate still further the 
inadequacy of an analysis of the threefold relation into 
three twofold relations by considering the part played 
by other- conscious processes. There are of course other - 
conscious processes directed to the regulation of each of 
the three twofold relations; but each of the partners 
to the relation may have developed other -conscious pro- 
cesses related to the common mental frame of the three- 
fold relation, as for example when he considers a 
possible item of the common menu or a topic of con- 
versation or a musical work for performance after dinner 
in relation to the taste or digestion or interests or 
prejudices or musical skill of one or both of his part- 
ners; and similarly for any other rearrangement of the 
habits and ways of living of the three of them. 
207 The conclusions of this argument may be summed up 
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by saying that in analysing a relation involving three 
persons it is necessary to distinguish: 
(i) (a) The common mental frames which form 
the basis of the three twofold relations and which 
include in their organisations dispositional 
structures regulating in each case the twofold 
relation but not extendin to the threefold re- 
lation; and (b) the other- conscious processes 
belonging thereto. 
(ii) (a) The common mental frame which forms 
the basis of the threefold relation, and which 
cannot'be analysed into parts which can then be 
exhibited as structural elements of the twofold 
common mental frames; and (b) other -conscious 
processes directed to adjustments of the three- 
fold common mental frame. 
The methods of such an analysis will obviously be 
similar to the methods described for the analysis of a 
twofold relation. But their employment will be more 
complicated in consequence of the greater complication of 
the threefold relation as just described. A partner to 
the relation will be able to analyse the threefold common 
mental frame, and the processes related to it, by the same 
methods that he wou__d_ use in studying a twofold relation 
to which he is a partner; but there is the difference 
that, in this case, two minds instead of one are in inter- 
action with his own, and are consequently known only 
through inference and not directly. 
208 Normal personalities are unities which in some 
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degree we misrepresent when we distinguish different 
aspects of them as expressed in different activities. 
John eating his dinner and John saying his prayers are 
both the same John; and the two activities are not refer- 
able to two distinct organs or faculties of John's mind 
which exist separately and independently, as a carburettor 
and a magneto exist separately in a car. What is true 
of John's individual activities is equally true of John's 
social activities. It follows, then, that, if John is 
one of the three persons in our last example, the twofold 
common mental frames and the threefold common mental 
frame of which his mental organisation is a part, and 
which are a part of his mental organisation, should not 
be thought of as distinct and separable systems. Thus 
we have here a re-ptition on the social level of the 
difficulty which we have already discussed with reference 
to a single mind taken by itself - the difficulty of 
finding language which will allow of the discrimination 
of different aspects of mental unity which are expressed 
in different activities, without letting that unity dis- 
appear into the background of out thought. While we 
cannot wholly avoid the difficulty - except by pulling 
ourselves up at intervals and reminding ourselves of it 
- we can go some way towards doing so b showing how 
mental structures, even in our abstract and unsatisfact- 
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ory way of representing them to ourselves, are inter- 
woven with one another. 
209 The twofold common mental frames and the three- 
fold common mental frame just described are closely inter- 
woven in this way. We may see this by taking any element 
in any one of them and tracing out its ramifications. 
Let us begin with A's and BTs morning swim. The habits 
and sentiments concerned with it are part of their two- 
fold common mental frame which is related to all the 
activities they share together. The threefold con- 
versations at the breakfast table are similarly related 
to the threefold common mental frame of A, B and C. But 
these conversations will presumably include references to 
A's and BTs early morning expeditions. We may imagine 
C to make kindly inquiries as to the temperature of the 
water or the condition of the weather, and also to take 
the opportunity of a chilly morning to make some kind of 
a counter- offensive against his teasing as a lie -abed. 
These breakfast table conversations are related to the 
threefold common mental frame, both as determined by it, 
and as determining it in turn: but they are also very 
clearly related to the twofold common mental frame of 
which the habits and sentiments related to the morning 
swim are a part. Now these are certainly stimulated by 
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and share in determining the part played by A and B in 
these conversations. This is best described by saying 
that the twofold common mental frame and the threefold 
common mental frame are closely interwoven with one an- 
other although they are distinguishable structures, com- 
posed, so far as concerns the main outline of each, out 
of different elements. 
We may make our explanation in another way. A is in 
some degree a different person as a result of his morning 
exercise - just as he is some degree a different person 
as a result of any other of his activities. He is a 
man in a different physiological condition, with a differ- 
ent muscular tone, a different endocrine balance and the 
like; he is similarly a man in a different psychological 
condition. But it is this so conditioned A who is 
present on each of the occasions of interaction of the 
group of three. It is an A so conditioned who expresses, 
and expresses differently in some degree on account of 
this conditioning, his pleasure in the wine -merchant's 
letter; and his expression of pleasure is again a factor 
in the building up of the threefold common mental frame. 
Or we may express the same truth with greater accuracy 
and generality by saying that the systems of dispositions 
which constitute the common mental frame of either of As 
twofold relations are parts of his pùrsonality at all 
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times, including those times when he is active as a 
member of the threefold relation, and all his responses 
then, as at all times, are responses of a personality of 
which they are parts. It is therefore desirable to re- 
member that the distinction we have made between the two- 
fold and the threefold common mental frames, though 
legitimate for its purpose, is one which is easily capable 
of misconstruction. 
210 With this caution we may now proceed to extend 
our analysis to relations of four or more persons. Let 
us suppose a partnership of four in __lace of pattner- 
ship of three which we have just been considering. It 
is a mere matter of arithmetic to see that if we take 
the partners in pairs we may now have six twofold re- 
lations, the common mental frames of which will be closely 
interwoven with the common mental frame of the fourfold. 
relation in the way described in the last section. There 
is novv. . however a further possibility. Let as suppose 
one of the partners, A, to dine from home every Monday. 
On that evening there will usually be a party of the 
other three, the conversation and behaviour of whom will 
be in some degree different from that of the other even- 
ings as lacking A's contribution to its wit or learning, 
its seriousness or its levity, and also as lacking what- 
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ever inhibitions his presence imposes. There will thus 
come into existence a common mental frame involving the 
three minds of B, C and D; and arithmetic shows a poss- 
ibility of the emergence of three other threefold common 
mental frames in a group of four persons, combinations 
which will come into existence either (a) through the 
pressure of external circumstances as in the instance we 
have just considered or (b) through the arising of three- 
fold cooperative responses out of their similar or com- 
plementary dispositions or common or interdependent ends. 
It is certain that each of these possible common mental 
frames will develop in some degree: but it is not tunlike- 
ly that they will develop unequally, external circum- 
stances favouring some of these combinations more than 
others, and some of them involving fortuitous concords 
of dis;Jositions and others a less fortunate concordance 
or even some degree of opposition. The mental organ- 
isation of a group of four persons therefore involves a 
hierarchy of common mental frames, twofold, threefold and 
fourfold, all interwoven with one another, all developed 
in some degree, though not perhaps equally. 
211 As the number of persons in the group is in- 
creased there is an increase in the number of possible 
sub -groupings. But with this increase comes also a 
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sudden increase in the disparity of their importance. 
A group of six persons will give us, according to the 
arithmetic of combinations, the possibility of fifteen 
twofold combinations, twenty threefold combinations, 
fifteen fourfold combinations, six fivefold combinations 
and one sixfold combination - a total of fifty -seven 
possible combinations. How many of these give rise to 
separate functional mental structures, so as to be act- 
ually distinguishable in terms of the responses organised 
in them, depends uon the nature of the group, the degree 
of intimacy involved, and the intensity, continuity and 
duration of its life. 
This may easily be illustrated by examples. Let us 
first suppose six persons not previously acquainted to 
travel together in the same railway carriage for a couple 
of hours by previous arrangement and under circumstances 
conducive to general conversation - let us say they are 
invited to the same week -end party or attending the same 
conference. Such a group would have some homogeneity 
of manners and tastes, but perhaps little intensity of 
common interest; and it would be of short duration. It 
is highly improbable that the fifty -seven arithmetically 
possible combinations of the six persons would each re- 
sult in the organisation of a recognisable common mental 
frame. An observer so placed so as to overhear all their 
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conversation might however readily detect the development 
of a common mental frame of the whole party, representing 
concords and compromises of their interests in the pro- 
gramme of the immediate future, politenesses appropriate 
to the situation of the moment, and responses arising out 
of the existing common situation. There may be no 
further development, but it is of course quite possible 
that more engrossing topics may be started. These may 
interest the whole party and hold it together, in which 
case, as agreements and differences of view occur, 
possibilities of the development of twofold, threefold 
and fourfold common mental frames may begin to appear. 
More probably the topics started will interest different 
persons in different degrees and they will presently be 
conversing in small groups, four and two, or three and 
three or even three pairs. This will involve some 
development of the corresponding mental frames; and 
since the groups may form and dissolve again, giving 
place to other groupings, there may be a beginning of 
other common mental frames also, corresponding to other 
combinations. It is however quite evident that only a 
very few of the fifty -seven possible combinations will 
give rise to any specialised mental organisation. 
212 We may contrast with such an example a group with 
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greater intensity and longer duration of common life. 
The best example is that of a family held together by 
strong ties of intimacy, and not broken up by circum- 
stances, or forced to endure very lengthy separations. 
In the case of a family of six persons there will 
certainly be a rich development of the sixfold frame on 
the one hand and of all the twofold relations on the 
other; and it may well be that a common mental frame 
corresponding to each of the fifty -seven possible com- 
binations will develop in some degree.i 
Other kinds of groups are likely to be intermediate 
in intensity and duration of life between these two ex- 
amples and in consequence intermediate in their degree of 
iConsideration of the family of which I am a member 
leads to the conclusion that of the fifty -seven 
theoretically possible common mental frames of the 
group (which comprised father, mother, son and three 
daughters) eleven may be regarded as having had no 
reality as separate working psychological structures; 
and of the remaining forty -six (all of which could be 
recognised) twenty -nine had a very strongly marked 
development and a vigorous life. 
In the case of the staff of an university depart- 
ment, including the professor and five lecturers, that 
is six persons in all, I reckon twenty -four of the 
possible combinations to have developed some degree of 
common mental life including (a) the whole group (b) the 
five lecturers taken together (c) two groups of four (d) 
five groups of three (e) the twofold combinations, which 
must all be included since in a group of this size meeting 
continually each member must necessarily have some minimum 
degree of relation with every other, a relation which in 
particular cases extends to important official relations, 
cooperation in routine duties and voluntary intimacy. 
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development. In the case of groups with larger numbers 
of members the development of separate common mental 
frames will of course fall short of the increase in the 
number of possible combinations. Indeed as we come to 
the consideration of large groups we should expect to 
find that the proportion of possible combinations which 
actually develop common mental frames will become smaller, 
being limited to the common mental frame of the whole 
group, those of a proportion of the possible twofold re- 
lations, a much smaller proportion of the threefold and 
fourfold etc. and a few well -marked large intermediate 
groups or parties. 
213 How do such large groups come into existence? 
Since we regard the common mental frame as the mental 
structure of the group we may put this question in the 
form: How do common mental frames involving such a 
number of persons come into existence? Consideration of 
this process as we can observe it in the course of every- 
day life shows that we must distinguish at least two modes 
(a) the formation of a group in consequence of the similar 
or complementary responses of a number of persons to a 
common situation; and (b) the increase in size of a group 
by a process of aggregation. 
214 (a) In the case of the twofold relation we saw 
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that some common mental frames arise immediately out of 
the innately determined patterns of instinctive dis- 
kositions, and some out of situations leading to co- 
operative behaviour. In either case the initiation of 
the relation is in a situation in which similar or com- 
plementary dispositions are stimulated in both minds and 
express themselves in a unified pattern of activity, be- 
coming in the course of that activity in some degree 
specialised to the relation, so that they work as a unified 
system or common mental frame, the unity and strength of 
which is increased with the increasing specialisation of 
the dispositions composing it. 
Common mental frames involving more than two minds 
may come into existence in the same way. If two boys 
catching sight of an animal may be stimulated to chase 
it in concert, so may three, or four or a larger number. 
But there is an obvious limit, in the limitation of the 
human senses, to the size.of the group that can be formed 
in this way - the limitation in the number of persons who 
can be simultaneously in touch through the senses with 
one situation, and/also in touch with one another, so that 
their responses are made in awareness of the responses 
of their fellows. 
215 The operation of this principle is in some degree 
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limited in another way.(i) Assemblies of persons in con- 
tiguity are either fortuitous or organised. In the case 
of assemblies resulting from some degree of organisation 
there is already present some kind of common mental frame 
in some degree regulating (except in the extreme case of 
its breakdown under such circumstances as those of panic) 
the response of the assembly to an unanticipated situation. 
In such cases therefore we do not have the birth of a 
new common mental frame but the rapid modification in new 
circumstances of one which already exists. 
In the case of a fortuitous assembly which meets 
with a new or striking situation we may have a comparative 
absence of any such already formed common mental frame, 
though there are likely to be some preformed elements of 
one in any assembly of adult persons with experience of 
social life. Let us suppose the possibility of such a 
case. It is clear that, in accordance with the law of 
chance, the larger the assembly the smaller is likely to 
be the number of similar or complementary dispositions 
out of the stimulation of which a cooperative response of 
the whole assembly may arise. In other words, the smaller 
will be the number of situations which can lead to a re- 
sponse of the assembly as a whole and the consequent 
development of a common mental frame. Dispositions common 
to all human beings and therefore to all members of such 
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a fortuitous assembly include the innate dispositions 
and a few universal sentiments. A few further sentiments 
are very common. Such instincts and sentiments may form 
the basis of unified responses in even very large assem- 
blies (the phenomena of crowds which we shall consider in 
greater detail later); but not even the instinctive 
tendencies can be regarded as absolutely similar and 
common factors, since they are built up into the develop- 
ed character in a varety of ways, and are in consequence 
subject to all kinds of checks and controls. 
216 If therefore we wish to find examples of unified 
responses on the part of comparatively large fortuitous 
assemblies, responses which result in the coming into 
existence of common mental frames, we must seek our ex- 
amples in assemblies of the comparatively unsophisticated 
whose responses are relatively primitive; or, in the 
case of a more mixed assembly, we must exclude from our 
view those more sophisticated persons present who do not 
become one with the assembly in spirit, because their 
responses are of a less primitive character; or we must 
look for assemblies meeting in circumstances conducive 
to the breaking down of inhibitions due to education and 
maturity of character, and favouring a degree of re- 
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gression which causes primitive responses to be readily 
evoked in all, as happens for example in danger situations 
provocative of panic. Large groups with some degree of 
psychological unity formed in consequence of the similar 
or complementary responses of their members to a common 
situation are therefore phenomena which can be exhibited 
as instances of the same principle as small groups; but 
they may be regarded as abnormal rather than as normal 
manifestations of the principles which underlie man's 
social life. 
217 (b) Groups may also develop by aggregation. This 
is a much more usual and familiar process. A common 
mental frame can develop in two directions. Already ex- 
isting between two persons it can develop in the number 
and complexity of the dispositional systems it comprises 
as the relation extends to wider and more varied interests 
and activities (sections 139 - 141): it can also 
develop by extension to the mind of a third person; and 
as to a third so to a fourth, a fifth, and so on. The 
second of these two modes of development covers all cases 
of increase in the size of a group by aggregation. 
We may distinguish three types of process by which 
aggregation takes place: (i) By the establishment through 
similar or complementary responses of a link between the 
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group as it exists and a person or group outside it. (ii) 
By the incorporation of an individual within a « roup 
through a process of similar or complementary responses 
so that his responses become organised in its common 
mental frame. (iii) By the communication to an in- 
dividual outside the group of some habit, sentiment, be- 
lief or other mental structure forming part of the group's 
+common mental frame, so that his mind comes to be organ- 
ised as part of its common mental frame. 
218 (i) We have seen that a twofold relation mau 
arise in a situation which evokes similar or complement- 
ary responses in two persons. We can find a close 
parallel in a situation in which two or more persons, on 
one side, come into relation with one or more persons on 
another. Let us suppose two persons to be becalmed in a 
sailing boat. Desiring to return to harbour they begin 
to row. A third person approaches with a motor boat, 
perceives their difficulty and volunteers to tow them in 
- an offer which they accept. There is thus formed a 
threefold cooperative relation based on complementary 
responses; but it has this peculiarity that it is formed, 
not by the coming together of three hitherto separate 
persons, but by the development of a twofold relation into 
a threefold relation; by the addition of a third person. 
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There is first a well developed common mental frame of 
the two persons in the sailing boat - we need not ask 
what common interests, common sentiments or common ex- 
perience already united them before they set sail a few 
hours before: we need only consider such a structure as 
would grow up out of the circumstances of the cruise it- 
self, the pur;oses of the little expedition, their fulfil- 
ment or frustration, the failing wind, the need or desire 
to return to the shore, the labour at the oars. There is, 
secondly, the perception of their situation by a third 
person and his response to it. If we suprose him an 
entire stranger to the others, his response is not a re- 
sponse to this person or to that person: it is a re- 
sponse to two persons in a particular difficulty; it is 
a response to a group. Out of this response is formed a 
second relation superimposed on the first, when his offer 
is accepted. As A and B are already bound to one another, 
so is he, C, bound not to A or to B but to A and B as a 
group. Or we may express it thus: A and B are joined 
by their common mental frame to which C does not become 
a party; C is joined to A and B and they to him by a 
common mental frame comprising the dispositions active in 
the offer of a tow, its acce_tance and the activities of 
carrying it out; the second common mental frame is, so 
far as A and B are concerned, closely interwoven with the 
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first (section c208 ) 
Now it is clear that there would be no difference in 
principle if we supposed three or more persons instead of 
two to occupy the sailing boat. If however we suppose 
two or three or more persons to occupy the motor boat 
there is a small difference to be noted. We have now two 
common mental frames which pre -exist the offer of a tow 
- the common mental frame of each boat's company - and 
there results a third, that which arises out of the re- 
sponses to one another of the two groups; and this third 
is interwoven with both of the others, which however do 
not otherwise come into contact. We may then think of 
the two boats' companies as composing one group with two 
centres of mental organisation, with two well -developed 
and mutually exclusive common mental frames and a common 
mental frame of a less permanent character interwoven 
with and joining both of them. 
219 In the example chosen the circumstances are such 
that the secondary or bridge cómmon mental frame is 
outlived by the primary ones and. discarded (d). It 
would not be difficult to find examples in which (ß ) the 
secondary common mental frame becomes a permanent bond, 
absorbs the more important energies of both groups and 
leads to the disappearance of the primary common mental 
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frames as separate and distinguishable organisations, (as 
when two business organisations or two political units 
begin to cooperate in a limited sphere, retaining at 
first their separate identities, and finally become merged 
in one another); or in which (y) one of the primary 
common mental frames is subordinated to the other, and 
gradually absorbed by it, so that no trace remains of the 
earlier stage by which this process of development has 
taken place. And we should not omit the fourth 
possibility (s), the continuance of a relation between 
a group and a person outside it who does not become a 
member of it, but maintains a continuous relation to it, 
as for example a patron of a society, a tradesman whom 
it employs, a subscriber to its funds who takes no other 
share in its activities and the like. A similar re- 
lation may be maintained in the case of a group. 
220 (ii) The second type of aggregation is that by 
which an individual is incorporated into a group through 
the evocation in him by the situation to which it is re- 
acting, of responses similar or complementary to those 
of the members of the group. If the appearance of an 
animal calls out the hunting impulse in three boys who 
catch sight of it simultaneously, that is a case of a 
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common mental frame arising out of similar responses. If, 
when the hunt is up, a. fourth boy, perceiving the animal, 
joins in with them, he does so in virtue of a similar 
response in consequence of which he becomes a fourth 
member of the group: and we have an instance of aggre- 
gation by a similar response. We may call it an in- 
stance of aggregation by complementary response if we 
think of the boys as in some degree differently employed 
in seeking the common end, as when one ;,ursues, one heads 
off and so on: and equally simple examples of aggregation 
by the other types of complementary response, common and 
interdependent ends, could easily be found. 
It is more important to note that the same principle 
is at work in the case of larger groups. A number of 
persons with a common desire to play badminton have 
established a club: I, desiring to play badminton, seek 
them out and associate myself with them for that purpose. 
The same process may be observed in other types of 
association, and also in groupings based on interdependcn.t 
ends. Thus, feeling hungry, I seek a restaurant - that 
is, a place for the satisfaction of this appetite provided 
by its proprietor with a view to pecuniary gain, on the 
basis of his knowleftge that the occurence of such impulses 
in the neighbourhood of his establishment will secure the 
creation of a network of relations such as that which I 
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establish with him by eating a meal at his table, and 
paying for it; and through him I also establish re- 
lations with his other customers, without whom, and their 
support of this restaurant by entering into similar re- 
lations with its proprietor (and through him with me), 
it would not be there to save me and. then )the )th trouble of 
carrying a packet of sandwiches, and eating them in the 
nearest public garden. 
In the case of most associations this is disguised 
to some extent by advertising, proselytising and propa- 
gandist activities. It seems at first sight rather as 
if the association sought me out, and assimilated me. 
So far as this process is taking place it affords an 
example of the third type of growth by aggregation, the 
type which we are to consider next. But even where 
such processes are at work they are successful, partly, 
if not wholly, on account of the type of process just 
described. It is because I have already some desire to 
play badminton that a member of a badminton club will 
easily persuade me to join his organisation. And in 
the same way it is because I desire to insure my life that 
an insurance company's agent will succeed in persuading 
me to insure with his firm. Not even the assistance of 
the slickest of American publicity agents will enable a 
restaurant proprietor to hypnotise me into increasing 
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his turnover apart from some impulse of hunger arising 
out of my private ïhysiological and psychological pro- 
cesses; though, by good cooking and service, and by 
tactfully drawing my attention to both, he may certainly 
induce me to go to his shop instead of to the one next 
door, or to spend more money than I should otherwise have 
done. 
221 One special type of group requires mention in 
this connection. That is the group which grows up 
round one central personality. It is a group the firm 
part of the structure of which is the series of twofold 
relations to which this central person is a partner. 
Such a group will grow as further persons establish 
similar relations with its leader. The group has a 
second, but less important structure in the relationsof 
the subordinate members with one another; and the 
neophyte, when smiled upon by the leader, will be re- 
ceived by them also - as Miss Mackenzie was received by 
the Stumfoldians when she had aubmitted herself with the 
required degree of respect to the object of their admir- 
ation and worship. 
1I(o 
222 (iii) The increase in the size of a group through 
the communication to new individuals of the essential 
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elements of its common mental frame, the habits, 
sentiments, beliefs or other mental structures which 
give it its character and its existence as a group, is 
a topic which can only be glanced at here. It is a 
particular case of the transmission to new minds of 
common forms of expression, and it is the rocess some- 
times spoken of as imitation but better termed social 
transmission. In a later chapter it will be dealt with 
at greater length. 
The point with regard to it which has importance 
here, is the point already made (section A9.0) - that rr- 
cesses of _propaganda, proselytising and advertising are 
scarcely to be regarded as a separate tyre of process 
by which groups attract new members, but rather as the 
facilitation of the relevant similar and complementary 
responses. What the propagandist, proselytiser, mission- 
ary or advertiser does may be better described as follows:- 
First, he discovers, by attacking all and sundry which 
individuals are automatically selected from the mass by 
their responses to the stimuli he uses, because they are 
actuated by disositions which can be excited to co- 
operative responses in relation to his organisation; 
secondly, he makes his organisation known to such persons 
and, if possible, represents it as more attractive or 
satisfying to their relevant dispositions, or to other 
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related sentiments, than competing organisations; third- 
ly, by some degree of "education ", he seeks to organise 
existing tendencies which are otherwise insufficient to 
lead to participation in his organisation, as when a new 
product of industry, not yet consciously desired, is given 
away in samples, or a new piece of apparatus is offered on 
trial, or demonstrations are given of its use, or in- 
formation, or misinformation, is supplied which will make 
some kind of link between the individual's existing im- 
pulses and the beliefs or aims of the organisation; and, 
lastly, he may aim at some real process of education 
which results in the communication of forms of expression 
through which existing dispositions are more fully ex- 
pressed and the personality reaches a fuller development, 
as in the training of a craftsman or a soldier, or the 
communication to fresh minds of the forms of expression 
of religion or art or science. 
The last case is at once the most important and the 
most interesting. It is through these processes that 
the great religious organisations have grown up, usually 
founded upon the teaching of one man and practising and 
teaching forms of expression of which he.was the origin- 
ator. In the case of art and science the domination of 
the process by single highly originative minds is 
equally obvious though a different and usually narrower 
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or looser kind of organisation has resulted for their 
maintenance and transmission. This process has already 
been examined from the point of view of the individual 
(sections 104 -110) and it will afford the subject of a 
later chapter. 
223 Mention has been made (section ) of the pre- 
existence of appropriate mental organisation which forms 
an immediate link between a new member and a group with 
which he comes in contact and which he joins. Such 
structures are analogous in their nature, origin and 
function to the generalised common mental frames which 
were described in reference to twofold relations (sections 
145 -147). In general it may be said that each experience 
of participation in the life of a group will influence 
initial responses to a new group, and later responses as 
a member of it. 
In some cases these influences will smooth the path 
of the new member; in others they will be unfavourable 
to it. Whether the influence of one group is related to 
another favourably or unfavourably depends upon whether 
the two groups are alike in their general sentiments, 
manners and standards. Membership of a golf-club is not 
necessarily a favourable preparation for membership of a 
musical society, so far as the technical elements of its 
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common mental frame are concerned; but there are 
395 
generalised elements which are common, and so far as these 
are concerned the one is in some degree a preparation for 
the other. The newcomer to the musical society must not 
enter upon conversation on the assumption that golf is the 
one sure conversational entry: but he will do well to 
assume that an excessive self -assertiveness will be as 
unfortunate in its cr:nsequences in the one group as in 
the other. The separation of the generalised elements 
from the specialised elements will be greatly facilitated. 
by a wide experience of membership of groups of different 
tyres. 
224 As in the case of the twofold relation, so in the 
case of the larger group, membership is frequently begun 
or continued as a result of external constraining circum- 
stances. Such constraints on the free impulses of the 
individual are more open to observation - and in particular 
are more under the individual's own notice - than the 
other bonds of the group. If I am compelled by some ex- 
ternal authority to become a member of ä particular 
association, or to maintain my membership of it, I am 
not unlikely to be more sharply aware of this compulsion 
than of any of the other ways in which I are related to it. 
It is, however, a great mistake to exaggerate the import- 
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ance of such constraints as social bonds. By themselves 
they would do little to hold social 7roups together, 
though they are important both because, properly ex- 
ercised, they bring in the unwilling conformist, and be- 
cause, improperly exercised, they excite the opposition 
of the unwilling conformist to a degree that may result 
in the collapse of the real structure of the group. 
The limitations set by enforced contiguity constitute 
the simplest type of external constraining circumstances. 
Three persons in a railway compartment must come to some 
agreement about the window since it cannot at the same 
moment be shut up, in order that one of them may not get 
a chill, and wide open in order that another may not catch 
cold by infection. Dwellers by the same stream must 
seek new homes in the wilderness, or come to some agree- 
ment about water rights. We all of us find ourselves 
born into and growing up in a society which we must 
accept as it is, or, with great difficulty, exchange for 
another which we prefer. 
The constraining force may be that of an authority 
external to the individual, and to the group of which he 
is forced to become a member. Thus a student may find 
himself compelled to join, or at least to pay a sub - 
scription to, an undergraduate society. In war the 
citizen may find himself compelled to join the army. The 
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constraining force may be that of the group itself, as 
when a trade or professional association enforces member- 
ship of itself upon all persons wishing to practice that 
trade or professioh. Or the conditions under which I 
may become a member of a group may be previously laid 
down by the group, so that only by accepting them can I 
become a member of it, and some of these conditions may 
be such that, though I strongly desire to join the group, 
I may feel the imposition of them upon me as a limitation 
of my freedom. 
225 The argument with regard to the structure of re- 
lations has so far been mainly deductive. Beginning 
with an account of the individual, we proceeded to in- 
quire what consequences would follow from the bringing 
of two such individuals together. The deductive 
argument which followed was at every point checked 
against actual cases of twofold relations. Indeed it 
was deductive in form rather than in reality, since the 
conclusions so set out were ones which observation of 
actual twofold relations forces ujon us. But a deduct- 
a. 
ive order is/convenient one for setting out such con- 
clusions in an orderly manner. The procedure in treat- 
ing of larger groups has also been deductive in form. 
But it has come much hearer to being deductive in fact 
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also. It has been less an answer to the question: If 
we examine larger groups, what mental structures ao we 
find? than an answer to the question: If larger groups 
are similar in structure to the twofold relation, and if 
the concepts we have used in describing the twofold re- 
lation are adequate to describe the structure of larger 
groups also, what do we expect to find when we examine 
the larger group? Certainly we have checked up the 
answer so obtained in terms of examples of group life as 
realistic as possible, but it is necessary that this 
mainly deductive argument should now be balanced by one 
mainly inductive, that we should now turn to an examination 
of some of the more easily observed phenomena of group 
life in order to study them in the light of the principles 
at which our discussion has arrived. 
Chapter VII 
The mental structure of groups 
A true community - a genuine frame 
Of many into one incorporate. 
Chapter VII 
The mental structure of groups 
226 It has been said that such an account of group 
structure as has been given must remain unsatisfactory 
until it is given the support of an inductive argument 
based on actual observations of the phenomena of group 
life. The aim of this chapter is to show that the 
structure of the group as known from such observations 
may be described in terms of a common mental frame, and 
that, as in the case of the twofold relation, the common 
mental frame of the larger group results, in the main, 
from similar and complementary responses to a common 
frame of circumstances. If it can be shown that the 
phenomena of larger groups can be described and explained 
in these terms, and that these terms describe it more 
satisfactorily than those hitherto in use, it is rer_haps 
unnecessary to apply to it seriatim the other concepts 
developed in Chapter V, in order to show that these 
apply tó it equally. This would be to go outside of 
the scope of this work, the intention of which is to 
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study in detail small scale social structure, and to 
establish in principle the possibility of using the 
concepts derived from such a study for the analysis -f 
larger social units: its intention is not to make a 
formal analysis of the group - a task requiring the de- 
votion to it of a complete work, and quite impossible as 
a subordinate theme in a thesis centred upon another 
topic. 
227 The aim of this chapter so defined implies two 
closely related topics. (a) It must consider some 
sufficiently obvious phenomena of group life, and show 
that they afford support to the account of group structure 
which is being argued for: and (b) it must consider 
these phenomena in relation to some of the theories of 
group structure which have already met with acceptance. 
It must show, either that the hypothetical structures 
and processes assumed by these theories are only special 
cases of the hypothesis to be preferred to them, as of 
wider application ( cL); or that they are subordinate to 
the main framework of the group ((s ) ; or that they are 
unnecessary assumptions ('' ). Thus Professor McDougall's 
account of the crowd will be regarded as in the first of 
these categories (du-); his concepts of the idea of the 
group and the group spirit will be regarded as falling 
Chap VII Sect 227 402 
1l8 
into the second ((S ), as also the more familiar 
phenomena of habit, descipline and authority; while it 
will be obvious that such a hypothesis as that of a 
specific inherited social or herd instinct is un- 
necessary if the cohesion of the group can be explained 
without it (,K ). With this purpose in view a number of 
different examples of group activity will be considered. 
228 It is perhaps desirable to preface this con- 
sideration by confessing that such fragmentary descrip- 
tions of group phenomena as can be brought in for 
illustrative purposes are a poor substitute for first 
hand observation of group life. They must therefore be 
much less convincing than if a demonstration could be 
based upon some concrete example of group life, with 
which both writer and reader were intimately acquainted 
as participants in it. To represent the complex and 
subtle phenomena of the group in a verbal description, 
and to attempt to represent them in restricted space, 
are tasks the results of which are at best poor sub- 
stitutes indded for the proper basis of such an argument. 
Since they are phenomena which cannot be mechanically or 
statistically recorded, or brought into the laboratory 
for study, it is necessary that the investigator of them 
should continually observe and analyse these groups of 
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which he is a member - that he should sit on a committee, 
frequent the ball room, romp with the children less in- 
tent upon committee business, the pleasure of the dance 
or the fun of hide and seek than upon the psychological 
processes which underlie what is immediately heard or 
seen. If he can then make clear to another in abstract 
terms (with such concrete illustration as the circum- 
stances admit of) the results of such studies, it is 
possible for the other to check up these conclusions in 
terms of his own experience of group life. Such a -ír -- 
cedure is strictly parallel to that of analytic psy- 
chology which is in a similar difficulty - the imposs- 
ibility of two observers studying the same mental pro- 
/V) 
cess, and the consequent necessity of a procedure in 
which each studies his own mental life and they compare 
their observations, each returning to an examination of 
his own experience in the light of the recorded intro - 
spections of the other and the principles which they 
appear to him to exemplify. 
229 If we inquire whether in our experience of social 
life we find any immediate evidence of the existence of 
a common mental frame, the answer is that the term may 
be a novel one but the phenomena to which it refers are 
familiar enough. We are aware of something which we call 
Chap VII Sect 229 404 
the "atmos.,_here" of any group of which we become members. 
To enter a new group - it may be a committee, or a club, 
or a family, or a tea party, or a political meeting, or 
a city, or a university, or a profession, or a nation 
- is to be at once conscious of feeling "str.ang_e" or 
feeling "at home ". Analysis of these states will very 
quickly show that they are related to the extent to which 
one can express oneself freely in the unfamiliar group. 
My feeling of "strangeness" is a result of the series of 
restraints which the group puts on my natural way of ex- 
pressing myself until I have found my place in it. My 
sentiments, my manners, my modes of speech, my dress, my 
opinions may be sufficiently different from those common 
to the group to make me aware, not perhaps of the actual 
process of adjustment which takes place, but of the 
difficulties and restraints which it involves. Similarly, 
if I at once feel "at home ", that feeling can easily be 
shown to be due to the fact that some part of my person- 
ality at once finds free expression in the group in 
question. In the one case my feeling "strange" is my 
awareness that my mental structures and processes do 
not immediately fit into those of the members of the 
It 
group, that is into the common mental frame of the group: 
in the other case I have been so fortunate as to bring 
with me mental organisation - acquired in a similar 
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group, or through experiences similar to those common to 
the members of the group - which does immediately fit into 
the common mental frame of the group I am joining. Tt is 
possible that I may feel "strange" in a particular company 
and accordingly not seek that company again. It is also 
possible that I may feel "strange" at first, and succeed 
later in adapting myself, by assimilating the particular 
modes of response common to the group in question, as a 
school boy does in going to a. new school, or a recruit 
on joining his regiment: that is, I may make myself a 
part of the group by assimilating the necessary elements 
in its common mental frame. 
230 It is again possible that the processes of adjust- 
ment may be less onesided. I enter the group with 
manners or opinions or standards of value which are 
strange to it. Some of these I may impose ujon the group 
so that they become part of its common mental frame, part 
of the system of ideas and standards which it takes for 
granted, or which it at least tolerates. The group is 
not something fixed to which I must conform; it is some- 
thing to the making of which I contribute, as well as 
suffering its influence. In fact there is no group 
which receives or rejects me; instead there are some 
persons in intimate interaction with one another, of 
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whom I am one. This is quite clear in the case of join- 
ing a casual group of persons - for example three or four 
persons of one's own age or class already engaged in con- 
versation in a railway carriage or a smoking room; or in 
joining a small formally organised group, such as the 
staff of a university department: where the numbers are 
/ / U1 
larger it is not so evident, but not the less true. 
231 All this assumes a normal degree of sensitiveness 
on the part of the individual taken as an example. It is 
quite possible for the person we describe as "thick- 
skinned" to feel comfortably "at home" in a group which 
regards him as an "outsider" and to which he is unable 
to assimilate himself. The other members of the group 
will, in such a case, probably take steps to make him 
aware of the difference between their view of the 
situation and his. 
23.2 We may on some occasions watch a gathering of 
people become a psychological group as they discover a 
common mental frame through which they may express their 
impulses concordantly. A dance -room may s- metimes 
afford an example. 
, If people meet for dancing who are in the habit of 
dancing, there is no evidence of the kind we are seeking. 
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The ballroom etiquette of the period is known to each of 
them, and also the dancing steps in fashion, and the 
normal programme of such an entertainment. That is to 
say, those who are assembled together bring with them 
(although they have never met before) the same standards 
of behaviour, etiquette and fashion, the same expectations 
of the events of the evening;, the same motor habits, the 
same readiness to be pleasantly titillated, or un- 
pleasantly bored, by the dance -tunes the band will xlay, 
(since in different ballrooms they have listened to the 
same tunes during the season), the same habits of 
emotional response, emotional expression or emotional 
restraint. Thus the responses of all these individuals 
are so moulded on the same pattern by their similar ex- 
perience as habitual attenders at the ballroom that they 
do not need to create a common mental frame: they 
bring it with them ready -made. 
We may find the example which we are in search of 
in an assembly, met together to dance, which has not 
such a ready -made common mental frame. Let the assembly 
be, not a meeting of dancers to dance, but a social 
function held by some group not primarily concerned with 
dancing - an old students association, the staff of a 
business undertaking or the like. Even here we must 
avoid as our example an assembly in which the atmosphere 
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will be determined by the section of it who are habitual 
dance -goers. We may then find that there are several 
well -marked stages in the process of "warming up ", that 
is, in the process whereby a common mental frame of the 
assembly appropriate to its circumstances is created. 
In a good example of such an assembly, people will 
begin by talking to one another in small groups of mo-e 
or less intimate friends, each group eyeing the other with 
a mixture of curiosity and the feeling states of super- 
iority or inferiority. The newcomer finds - or thinks 
he finds - all eyes focussed upon him as he walks across 
the floor. He hastily attaches himself to the first 
friend he sees, or, if he does not see a friend, to some 
mere acquaintance, like a drowning man catching at a 
straw. Thus, at this stage, there is gathered in one 
place a company which is so comletely without a common 
mental frame that no one can behave naturally, and every- 
one is conscious of an atmosphere of restraint or "stiff- 
ness". :Presently, when the band begins to play, there 
will begin the process known as "breaking the ice ", A 
few of the bolder couples will timidly venture upon the 
floor. Their action is to the others like a symbol 
which Says: "This is quite proper; you see, we can do 
it with impunity ". .The ice being broken, the floor 
presently becomes crowded, as other couples follow their 
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example, and the ordinary manners and etiquette of the 
ballroom become the established common mental frame of 
the company, and continue to regulate its behaviour 
throughout the evening. A third stage may follow when, 
towards the end of the evening, some of the ..;ore lively 
spirits throw off the restraints which the common mental 
frame has imposed upon them, and behave in a way rather 
less decorous than it would admit. This is, as it were, 
an attempt to break through the existing frame and sub- 
stitute a new one, and it may or may not be successful. 
233 A very interesting example of the common mental 
frame of a casual group, and the unconscious way in 
which it functions to control the individual's speech 
and behaviour, is quoted by Dr. Freud from Dr. Ferenca.i :- 
At a social gathering some one Quoted, Tout 
comprendre c'est tout pardonner, to which I re- 
marked that the first part of the sentence should 
suffice, as 'pardoning' is an exemption which must 
be left to God and the priest. One of the guests 
thought this observation very good, which in turn 
emboldened me to remark - probably to ensure my- 
self of the good opinion of the well -disposed 
critic - that some time ago I thought of s,mething 
still better. But when I was about to repeat 
this clever idea I was unable to recall it. There- 
upon I immediately withdrew from the company and 
wrote my concealing thoughts. I first rec'.11ed 
the name of the friend who had witnessed the birth 
of this (desired) thou--ht., and of the street in 
Budapest where it took glace, and then the name 
of another friend, whose name was Max, whom we 
usually called Maxie. That led me to the word 
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'maxim', and to the thought that at that time, as 
in the present case, it was a Question of varying 
a well -known maxim. Strangely enough, I did not 
recall any maxim but the following sentence: 'God 
created man in His own image', and its changed 
conception, 'Man created God. in his own image'. 
Immediately I recalled the sought -for recollection. 
My friend said to me at that time in Andrassy 
Street, 'Nothing human is foreign to me'. To 
which I remarked, basing it on psycho- analytic 
experience, "You should go further and acknowledge 
that nothing animal is foreign to you ". 
But after I had finally found the desired re- 
collection I was even then -Prevented from tell- 
ing it in this social gathering. The young wife 
of the friend whom I had reminded of the animality 
of the unconscious was also among: those p;-resent, 
and I was perforce reminded that she was not at all 
prepared for the reception of such unsympathetic - 
views. The forgetting spared me a number of un- 
pleasant questions from her and a hopeless dis- 
cussion, and just that must have been the motive 
of the (temporary amnesia'... 
That the desired thought so rapidly appeared 
may be also due to the fact that I withdrew into 
a vacant room, away from the society in which it 
was censored. 
We may note the following points in this example. A 
group of tendencies, including the memory of the incident 
in Question, functioning in a perfectly normal manner 
brought Dr. Ferenczi to the point of telling his story. 
But presence in the group imposed a temporary censorship 
upon it. The process being entirely unconscious, and 
the repressive forces not coming into consciousness at 
all, the result was an apparently unaccountable lapse of 
memory. Dr, Ferenczi proceeded to recover by analysis 
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the lost memory, and with its recovery discovered also 
the nature of the forces repressing it. Thus there was 
laid bare a system of forces such as operates in all of 
us in any group into which we come, but of which we are 
not normally aware. :then a man -asses from one group 
to another to which he is socially adjusted, there comes 
into play the apropriate system of tendencies and in- 
hibitions, which is the organisation of his mind as a 
part of the common mental frame of the group into which 
he has cope, and a different aspect of his personality is 
in readiness to be revealed in speech, gesture and action. 
234 This process is very beautifully described by 
William James in different language to that just made use 
of. Every aspect of a man's personality which is re- 
vealed in this way in one or other of the groups to which 
he belongs, James calla a social self. Each of us, as he 
points out is one man in one group, another in another. 
roperly speaking, a man has asklany social 
selves as there are individuals who recognize him 
and carry an image of him in their mind. To wound 
any one of these his images is to wound him. But 
as the individuals who carry the images fall natur- 
ally into classes, we may practically say that he 
has as many different social selves as there are 
distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he 
cares. He generally shows a different side of 
himself to each of these different groups. Many 
a youth who is demure enough before his parents and 
teachers, swears and swaggers like a pirate among 
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his 'tough' young friends. We do not show our- 
selves to our children as to our club -companions, 
to our customers as to the laborers we employ, to 
our own masters and employers as to our intimate 
friends. From this there results what practically 
is a division of the man into several selves; and 
this may be a discordant splitting, as where one is 
afraid: to let one set of his acquaintances know him 
as he is elsewhere; or it may be a perfectly har- 
monious division of labor, as where one tender to 
his children is stern to the soldiers or prisoners 
under his command. 
The advantage of our terminology over that which 
James uses lies in the fact that it emphasises and ex- 
plains the relation of the social self to the group of 
which it forms a part. The activities of Jones's club 
social self are not merely the activities of Jones. They 
are, looked at from another point of view, a Dart of the 
activities of the club. The club, with its customs, 
standards, manners and the rest, has no existence excerpt 
in the social selves of its members. The term common 
mental frame defined as we have defined it and used as we 
are using it, has the double advantage, that, when we are 
thinking of Jones it keeps present to our ._:finds the re- 
lation to the group of this one o ±his social selves and 
the mode of its origin, and also that, when we are think- 
ing of the group, it reminds us that the group has no 
other existence than as a series of mental structu-es in 
the minds of its members. As we have said before of the 
individual and the society of which he is a member, he is 
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a part of it and it is a part of him. 
235 Consideration may now be given to the large, casual 
and temporary associations properly spoken of as crowds. 
06- 
The crowd has had much attention directed to it and the 
fundamental forms of human association have been sought 
in its phenomena. These phenomena attract attention 
and interest: they are at once imposing and bizarre. 
But they are also abnormal: we live our lives as members 
of social groups but we do not live our lives as members 
of crowds. A crowd is not so much an example of the 
normal forms of human association as an example of the 
temporary breakdown of the common mental frames in 
accordance with which the actions of its membe-.s would 
have been regulated had not circumstances led to its 
formation. 
The aim of the following argument is to show that 
the crowd is in its structu :e and in the processes of 
its formation an example of the principle in terms of 
which we are seeking to describe all social groups. 
236 In his discussion of the crowd Professor Mc- 
Dougall denies the application of the term in its psy- 
chological sense to "a mass of human being gathered to- 
gether into one place within sight and sound of one an- 
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other" unless "the attention of all is directed to the 
/d(' 
same object ". Any event capable of attracting the 
simultaneous attention of a casual concourse of persons 
may therefore be the occasion of their taking the first 
step to becoming a crowd. This must be followed by 
their experiencing "in some degree the same emotion ", 
and "the state of mind of each person is in some degree 
affected by the mental processes of all those about him ". 
"Those ", he says "are the fundamental conditions of 
collective mental life ". 
It is quite clear that this account of the genesis 
of a crowd is simply a special example of the general 
principle which we are here concerned to apply to groups 
of all types - it is a case of a common mental frame 
arising out of similar responses to a common situation. 
A number of individuals respond in a similar way to a 
common situation, and their similar responses to that 
situation, together with their responses to one another's 
excitement, constitute a common mental frame remarkable in 
that it comes suddenly and unexpectedly into existence, 
that it is a common mental frame of a relatively large 
numberJf persons, and that it is of extreme shallowness, 
extending perhaps only to a single common element in the 
responses of a large number of minds. 
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237 Such similar responses must result from the 
stimulation of similar dispositions. Where the number 
of persons is large and their juxtaposition is the result 
of chance (and not of any process of selection according 
to the possession of this or that interest) the number 
of dispositions common to nearly all of them must 
necessarily be at a minimum - they must have in common no 
more than these innate tendencies which are universal 
and those sentiments which are formed in the mind of every 
or almost every member of their community. 
One touch of nature makes the whole world kin,...27 
The touch of nature which will turns a casual concourse 
into a psychological crowd must therefore come from a 
common object of attention which will appeal to the 
primary emotions either directly, as the object of an 
instinctive tendency, or t.hr-ouoh a sentiment which is 
the product of some well nigh universal experience of 
the excitement of such a tendency; and it is an obvious 
corollary that a common mental frame produced in this 
way must be peculiarly shallow and peculiarly incapable 
of enrichment. 
238 It is an equal:' obvious corollary that it must 
involve some intensity of emotion: for those di.s: ositions 
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which are common to all the members of such an assembly 
and which are consequently the only dispositions from 
which similar resanses of its members can be derived 
are dispositions which lead to emotional states of some 
intensity; also, since individuals differ in the degree 
of excitability of their emotional tendencies, the 
situation sufficiently striking to attract the attention 
of all, even the less excitable, members of a random 
sample of humanity, will be to the more excitable an 
occasion of proportionately more intense degrees of 
emotion; and, finally, the circumstances are such as 
conduce to the further intensification of these emotional 
states through the operation of primitive passive sympathy. 
239 Thus if we define the crowd in this way - that is, 
as a relatively large number of persons, casually collected 
together, and similarly excited by an object or situation 
capable of attracting and holding the attention of all of 
them - and then apply to it the theory of a common mental 
frame arising out of similar responses, it is clear that 
the well .known characteristics of crowds can readily be 
deduced from that theory. Crowds are without organisation, 
since they are born of the circumstances of the moment, and 
have no previous history as groups; they manifest 
emotions of primitive types, since only objects and situ- 
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ations capable of producing such emotional states can 
attract the attention of all members of an assembly 
selected by chance; they are unstable, since a common 
mental frame originating in this way has little depth or 
permanence - first, because similar responses link persons 
together much less strongly than complementary responses 
which render them interdependent; and, secondly, because 
(since we have seen the persons concerned will differ 
in their excitability) some persons will cool off more 
rapidly than others, and so the temporary homogeneity of 
experience and response will quickly be lost; they are 
fickle, since, being random samples of humanity, they 
have all the normal human tendencies in a normal distri- 
bution of excitability and persistence, and just as, to 
begin with, one emotional pattern would have been as 
easily excited as another, so when one has been excited, 
and the exôitement has subsided, another, and perhaps an 
opposite one, is as easily excitable. 
240 This last point is so important as the reason for 
this characteristic of crowds - a characteristic frequent- 
ly commented upon, and familiar to everyone in con- 
sequence of its dramatic exploitation in imaginative 
literatures$ that it should perhaps be stated in more 
detail. In a fortuitous assembly each universal tendenc -: 
Chap VII Sect 240 418 
or sentiment will be present in all persons. But the 
excitability and persistence of each tendency will vary 
from person to person - thus one person will be readily 
moved to anger, another less so, a third only on extreme 
provocation, and so on. Could we assign a quantitative 
value to the degree of excitability in each case, we 
should no doubt find, when we assembled all these 
quantities, that they exhibited a particular statistical 
pattern, not improbably that of a curve of normal distri- 
bution. In a similar way one person would be found to 
differ from another in the persistence or transience of 
such an emotion when excited, and these facts might be 
exhibited quantitatively also. Since the man most easily 
aroused to anger is also, not infrequentl', the man most 
easily appeased, and vice versa; while the contrary is 
also true in some cases, the same person would occupy in 
many instances very diffe-ent positions on these scales 
relative to his fellows. Now exactly the same line of 
argument can be applied to other tendencies such as those 
of fear, wonder, elation, submission and tender feeling; 
and, if we made similar estimates in the case of each of 
these tendencies, we should presumably find that the in- 
dividual who had a high value for one, either in respect 
of excitability or persistence, had frequently a low 
value for another in the same respect. Let us suppose 
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it possible to dress every member of a chance assembly 
in brightly coloured garments made of a striped material 
in which each emotional tendency is represented by a 
stripe of a particular colour, the intensity of the hue 
corresponding to the excitability of that tendency in 
that individual, and the breadth of the stripe to the 
persistence which that tendency usually exhibits in him. 
The assembly would then present to the eye the pattern 
of its possibilities of emotional excitement - and this 
pattern would be simply that of average human nature - the 
drab of everyday life, if viewed from far enough off to 
allow the colours to blend with the distance. Inter- 
preted in terms of emotional excitability it would be, 
similarly, the emotional excitability of average human- 
ity; and the assembly would a_pear as no more irascible 
than kindly, no more destructive than easily moved to 
awe and wonder, no more fearful than courageous, no more 
rebellious than amenable to leadership. 
Let us now suppose each person's countenance on the 
excitement of any emotion, in him to become at once 
coloured with the hue corresponding to it with a bright- 
ness corresponding to the degree of his excitement. An 
object or situation which excited any one emotional 
tendency in the assembly would then be visible as a 
sudden predominance of one colour, but individuals would 
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contribute to the predominance in very varying; degrees 
according to the progress, intensity and duration of 
their excitement. As by hypothesis the exciting object 
or situation is capable of moving every member of the 
assembly in some degree, the crowd, for it would now be 
a crowd, would at once have a predominant colour. This 
colour would begin to fade out again with the passing of 
the excitement of those members of the crowd in whom it 
was least intense, or of least persistence. 
If the situation and the excitement are such that 
the crowd begins to act as a corporate body, then that 
action depends upon the members' entering .0 on relations 
with one another involving com-plementary responses; t1 -iese 
imply acme degree of organisation and the crowd is there- 
fore ceasing to be a crowd and becoming an organised body. 
If the crowd does not undergo such a transformation, then 
each of its members has experienced a response to some 
object or situation such as he might have experienced if 
he had been in the company of a few persons instead of a 
large number; the experience has been intensified by the 
presence of his fellows, and he has shouted or wept or 
shaken his fist along with them; and the emotional ex- 
citement has passed, leaving possibly a tem_;.orarily 
heightened degree of excitability, or perhaps a degree of 
excitability lessened on account of fatigue, but no other. 
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result, and certainly no resultant structure capable of 
uniting him to his fellows for a longer period of time. 
The crowd as a psychological group has therefore come to 
an end (although the same persons are still present in the 
same place); and it has resumed the drab colour of every- 
day life which indicates a readiness to be stimulated in 
any of the tendencies, in the colours of which we have 
supposed it to be painted: and what we have seen is only 
one more example of the imposin.`r result of the social 
organisation of a familiar tendency. Had the countenance 
of one member of the crowd been coloured with one emotion, 
.another with another, so that the different kinds of 
emotional excitement were about equally distributed, its 
general appearance would have been as drab as before. 
But one kind of excitement wäs aroused in all, or aroused 
so as to predominate over all others, and its social 
organisation gives it this impressive character (section 
70). It has passed and the assembly is once again no 
more irascible than kindly, no more destructive than 
easily moved to wonder and awe, no more timid than brave, 
no more seditious than loyal - as ready to be stimulated 
in a new way as to a repetition of the kind of excite- 
ment which it has just experienced. 
241 The principal conclusion which I wish to draw from 
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this analysis of the structure and processes of the crowd. 
is that the circumstances under which the true psycho- 
logical crowd is formed are peculiarly unsuitable to the 
develop.Qent of any but the most rudimentary social life 
and organisation. The crowd is therefore not ty ical 
of social life either among civilised or among primitive 
peoples, and the amount of attention given to it has, I 
think, given to social psychology a bias which has 
hindered the development of an adequate understanding of 
social life in psychological terms. In disentangling 
his own account of the crowd from some of the misconcept- 
ions which have resulted, Irofessor McDougall has correct- 
ly described its genesis and structure. He has done 
more than this. In the following sentence quoted from 
the pages in which he discusses the mental life of the 
crowd, he has stated the fundamental principle of human 
social aggregation in so far as this is not instinctive, 
that is, based on common mental frames which are innate; 
and his statement of the principle could be easily amended 
so as to cover them also: 
essential conditions of collective mental 
action are... a common object of mental activity, 
a common mode of feeling in regard to it, and some 
degree of reciprocal influence between the members - 
of the group. 
The principle seems to be unduly narrowed by two 
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terms which he uses. For, in the case of such instinct- 
ive relations as those of nursing and sexual union there 
is no common object, each partner to the relation having 
the other partner as the object to which his impulses are 
directed. Also, in the case of some activities based 
mainly on acquired tendencies, the mental processes and 
behaviour of the partners is related_ not to a common 
object but to a common form of expression, as when two 
or more persons sing or play together, act together on 
the stage, hunt together, fight as a body, work in co- 
operation and so on. 
The definition is also unnecessarily narrowed by 
the use of the phrase a common mode of feeling, if this 
is to be understood as referring to the experience of 
similar mental states and similar impulses. In the 
case of the nursing instinct and the sexual instinct it 
is impossible for any one to make an introspective c,m- 
parison of the related experiences, but there is no 
reason to suppose them entirely similar, and the im- 
pulses are certainly not so. In the case of the self 
tendencies it is possible to make such a comparison, anc9 
to see that the emotional states and impulses of a re- 
lation of assertion and submission possess elements which 
are not similar but complementary, and this even when the 
relation is for both partners suffused with tender feeling 
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in the highest degree, and each in turn plays the assertive 
part in reference to the other. And we may assume that 
in other cases there is a similar combination of like and 
complementary factors, tender feeling,being, for example, 
beyond reasonable doubt a normal element in the ex- 
perience of both partners to the nursing and sexual re- 
lations, and in a very high degree. 
I should therefore prefer a statement of this 
important principle in the following form:- 
The essential conditions of collective mental 
action are, then, a common form of expression re- 
lated to a common frame of circumstances, the ex- 
yerience of common or complementary modes of feel- 
ing and impulses, and some degree of reciprocal in- 
fluence between the members of the group. 
When amended in this way the statement covers all the 
types of relation which it has been found necessary to 
distinguish in the case of relations between two persons 
and, I believe, all the types of relation that it is 
necessary to make use of in the analysis of larger groups. 
I could also wish that Professor McDougall had de- 
veloped this conception with reference to some more normal 
type of human aggregation than the crowd. Its general 
application to all social groups would then have been more 
easily seen. To take the crowd as the starting point for 
studies in social psychology is to be in danger of being 
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deceived by a false perspective: but, if one first sees 
this principle exemplified in the processes of groups 
of a more normal character, there is no difficulty in 
seeing the crowd as another example of it. 
242 So far I have used the term crowd in a strict 
sense which it has acquired in psychological discussion. 
In ordinary speech - and in some psychological writing 
- it has a rather different sense. It is used to refer 
to a large body of persons present in one place, assembled 
in a more or less casual manner and without explicit 
organisation but not necessarily without a much greater 
community of experience, sentiment, knowledge, interest 
and will than the universal instincts and sentiments 
which are the only common mental factors in an assembly 
of persons who have come together entirely at random. 
If the term crowd is used in this second and less 
technical sense, it refers to assemblies which have a 
greater degree of mental homogeneity, and, in consequence, 
exhibit a different level of corporate behaviour. Thus 
in a football crowd there is in each member some degree 
of interest in football, there are in different members 
sentiments of loyalty to the two opposing teams, there is 
past experience of attendance at such matches, knowledge 
of rules of the game and its etiquette, and so on. Such 
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an assembly may have no explicit organisation but it has 
already a high degree of implicit mental organisation 
which sets it far apart from the zurely random assembly 
in which a common object of attention leads to a moment- 
ary common feeling. 
243 This implicit mental organisation is independent 
of the possibility that the individuals involved have 
ever before been spectators at the same match. Y,`e may 
express this by saying that it is due to their béing 
members of the football public, that is to their being 
persons each of whom has separately gone through ex- 
periences similar to the others - in watching matches, in 
discussing them, in reading newspaper reports of them. 
We may then define a public as a section of a community 
consisting of persons who share some more or less special- 
ised interest or experience, but who are not explicitly 
organised in pursuit or expression of it. Thus there 
is the motoring public, the novel reading public, the 
theatre -going ;_ublic, the sporting public, and so on in- 
definitely. The members of such a public are linked to- 
gether in two ways. First, though they are never gather- 
ed into one place or organised from one central office, 
A knows B and C, B knows D and E, C knows F and G and so 
on in an unbroken series of personal relations in which 
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all of them are linked up. Secondly, their interests 
are usually exploited by an organisation which seeks its 
own ends with regard to them - the newspapers which publish 
the news this or that rublic desires, the business under- 
takings which supply the commodities or entertainments 
desired by others. These organisations will seek to 
strengthen and extend the implicit mental organisation of 
/30 
the public with which they are concerned. 
244 A community consists therefore of a great variety 
of publics and any individual belongs to a considerable 
number of them. These publics differ widely in the ex- 
tent to which they are organised by an exploiting body 
of some kind. They also differ equally in the extent to 
which they are spontaneous movements in the minds of 
their members, or social artefacts created by interested 
persons under cover of giving a spontaneous social move- 
ment a voice and an organisation. Underlying these 
differences is the general principle upon which all publics 
rest - the simultaneous responses of their members to 
similar circumstances. These circumstances are of two 
kinds - (a) those which give rise to the fundamental 
similar responses upon which the whole structure rests, 
and (b) those which are contrived by the exploiting organ- 
isation, its advertisements, displays, propaganda and 
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other means of social stimulation. On the other hand the 
relation of the exploiting organisation to the public ex- 
emplifies the fourth type of cooperative relation, the 
relation of interdependent ends, or sometimes (notably in 
the case of political agitation) a pseudo -cooperative re- 
lation. 
245 The procedure of the propagandist exemplifies 
these principles. His typical procedure is to assemble 
a group of persons by some relatively crude initial 
appeal, the purpose of which is to bring them together to 
listen to him. He then proceeds to stimulate in them 
common sentiments and to make them mutually aware of their 
common modes of response to situations which are common to 
them - aware for example of a common grievance and a 
common irritation - and upon that basis he seeks to organ- 
ise them as a group to pursue the particular object for 
which he is working. 
Such a procedure, even if it leads to no explicit 
organisation, results in some modification of the mental 
organisation of the persons addressed. Sentiments of a 
particular character are impressed upon them; they are 
led to put certain interpretations upon their experience, 
to respond emotionally to certain catch -words, to nurse 
such and such hopes or expectations. Should this be 
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done on a large scale and such persons brought together 
in large numbers, either drawn by some public event or 
by the conscious contrivance of the exploiting organ- 
isation, there is an assembly of a very different 
character from the innocent chance assembly which we be- 
gan by considering. The crowds and mobs of insurrections 
are of this type, not of the former one. They are 
possessed of this greater mental homogeneity, and there is 
in their minds some kind of aim or plan of action, some 
kind of common form of expression. 
Thus the crowd (in the strict sense), the public and 
assemblies of members of a public constituting crowds or 
mobs in the ordinary senses of these words, can all be 
understood in terms of the principles here made use of. 
246 It is now time to turn to an example of another 
kind. The social groupings which we have so far con- 
sidered have been of a casual or loosely organised type: 
it is now necessary to .consider the application of the 
concepts we aine using to groups of long standing and a 
high degree of implicit and explicit organisation. 
There is no better example of such a group than a military 
force. Its purpose demands unified action, and unified 
action of a highly technical kind; and that action is 
taken in circumstances which put the very greatest strain 
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upon its cohesion. If the bonds of social groups are 
in their common mental frames, we should here find the 
strongest evidence in favour of this principle of ex- 
planation. On the other hand., the army, more than 
perhaps any other group, presents to the observation 
bonds of a different kind - a formal organisation of 
authority exercised through a hierarchy in which every 
man has his place from the commander -in -chief down to 
the latest recruit, a system of regulations in which 
the duties and obligations of each are exactly defined, 
supplemented at every point by customs scarcely less 
rigid, a system of discipline whereby an individual who 
fails in the performance.of his duties, or in maintain- 
ing the standards of c nduct assigned to him by regul- 
ation or custom, is visited by penalties, ran4 :ing in 
severity from a trifling fine to sentence of death, a 
system of habits resulting from a severe process of 
formal training and ranging from the semi -automatic 
motor habits of handling arms, drilling or manoeuvring, 
to responses to a uniform or a badge of rank coloured by 
a specific emotional tone, a hierarchical system of 
sentiments of the kind usually referred to by the phrase 
esprit de corps, the sentiment for the section or platoon 
of which a man is a member, that for the company of which 
it is a part, for the battalion, for the brigade, for the 
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division, for the whole force, for the army in general. 
These are the bonds of unity of such a body that are 
most readily observed. 
247 The positions now to be argued are two. In the 
first place, an attempt will be made to show that a 
description of a fighting force in these terms omits the 
principal condition of its cohesion, and that, in the 
absence of that condition, the structures just enumerated 
are insufficient to hold it together and maintain its 
power of unified action. It will be sought to show that 
this principal condition is a common mental frame which 
underlies these structures, and upon which tpey are built 
as a foundation, and of which they may therefore be shown 
to be in fact differentiations and elaborations. Secondly, 
it will be shown that the processes by which the more 
readily observable structures are developed are analogous 
to the - orocesses we have already distinguished in describ - 
ing the development of common mental frames in smaller 
groups, or in groups less highly integrated. 
248 In support of the first of these positions I can 
quote again from Professor McDougall. Writing on this 
subject, he says: 
Chap VII Sect 248 432 
That the success of its undertaking shall be 
strongly willed by all is perhaps the most im- 
portant factor contributing to the success of 
an army;... 
and he speaks of the practical recognition which this 
opinion has received from experienced officers, quoting 
a little later from Sir Ian Hamilton the striking remark: 
/n. 
...the army that will not surrender under any 
circumstances will always vanquish the army 
whose units are prepared to do so under suffic- 
ient pressure. 
To add further quotations from distinguished general 
officers, ancient and modern, who have expressed the same 
opinion would not be difficult but might yet fall short 
of being conclusive. To report one's own similar oyninion 
formed in the course of an experience of active service is 
rnly to add an inconsiderable item to the mass. Actual 
examples of the relation of military cohesion to this 
principle may be more to the point. 
249 At one period during tp:e war a large body of 
troops at one of the bases got very much out of hand. 
Disciplinary measures were taken which resulted, not in 
the restoration of order, but in what was practically a 
state of mutiny. Orders were disobeyed, troops refused 
to parade or to perform any normal duties, and, all other 
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means of dealing with the situation having failed, it 
was resolved to send them up the line to their units in 
the trenches as quickly as possible. The present writer 
had the duty of conducting a large party of these men, 
and the opportunity of observing their behaviour on the 
journey, and when they were absorbed in their units. No 
special supervision was exercised, no disciplinary 
difficulties occured, there were no desertions, and the 
same men who had been the source of trouble a few days 
before, faced with willingness the labours and dangers of 
the fierce fighting which followed. 
The explanation would appear to be in terms of some 
group of motives which were in operation in one situation 
and not in the other. Men had come into the army for 
a variety of motives, varyin. ; from a desire for adventure 
to a conscious resolution to take a share in beating the 
enemy, a resolution arising out of a sense of their duty 
as citizens. At the base the motives which brought the 
men into the army had no expression. Discipline at the 
base therefore depended upon authority, regulations, 
discipline, esprit de corps, tradition and habit. In the 
absence of other more fundamental motives these were in- 
sufficiently strong to secure the degree of order 
necessary to the carrying out of the normal programme of 
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camp life. When the men rejoined their units, the more 
fundamental motives again came into play and were express- 
ed in each man's daily activities. They were sufficient- 
ly strong, in concert with the habits and sentiments de- 
rived from training, to make him face the hardships, 
labours and dangers of the front line. 
It may, of course, be argued that the man who is 
at the base is not actuated by the sentiments for his 
regiment in the same way as when he is with his battalion, 
and that this sentiment is the strongest of those which 
we would include in the term esprit de corps. The reply 
is that the change from a mutinous attitude to a 
disciplined one was already evident as soon as the men 
were paraded to go up the line, and, secondly, that most 
of them were ..oining battalions of which they had not 
previously been members, and for which, therefore, they 
could not have any developed sentiment. 
250 But a second example is even more conclusive. It 
was commonly observed in the armies that an extreme re- 
laxation of discipline followed immediately upon the 
armistice, that is, upon the achievement of the end for 
which all were fighting. There were many cases in which 
units refused to obey orders, ard very difficult Problems 
of control arose. 
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A particular incident may be related. The writer 
has had described to him by an eye- witness the behaviour 
of a large number of men who had fought in Mesopotamia 
and who were collected in India to wait for trans-port 
to take them home. These men had entered the army for 
the duration of the war. Frontier trouble in India led 
the authorities to organise them as a force for frontier 
fighting. The troops immediately mutinied ante :maintain- 
ed an orderly, passive resistance to their officers under 
leaders whom they had chosen for themselves. This resist- 
ance was so strong that it was quite impossible fr the 
higher command to impose its will upon them, and they 
were shortly afterwards sent home and disbanded. 
The deduction from this would appear to be as 
follows: Armies either in France or in Mesopatamia 
were willing to undergo the extremities of labour, danger 
and privation as a result of the separate desire of each 
man to take his share in beating the enemy, reinforced by 
esprit de corps, and such sanctions as the fear of dis- 
grace and punishment, tradition and habit. The 
armistice made an end of the first of these as a motive, 
but the others remained. By themselves they were not 
strong enough to keel, men to the performance of the 
normal duties of a soldier's life. It seems then a 
fair inference that the strength and cohesion of the 
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army was in these common purposes shared. by every member 
of it, and that it was these motives which enabled a 
man to endure the much, heavier burdens of nn years of 
fighting: that is, the strength and cohesion of the 
army as a military fo°ce de, ended on its conirnon mental 
frame, the strongest element in which was the common 
_:urjpose of its members. 
251 I shall next consider the same princi le in re- 
lation to the working of the common mental frame of a 
military unit which has come under fire. The iroblem 
here is how those tendencies are inhibit: d which, in 
such circumstances, we might expect to be not only strong - 
ly excited but violently expressed. Under fire a form- 
ation may maintain its unity (and., if making an assault, 
continue to advance, or, if withstanding an assault, hold 
its group); or it may disintegrate. Tha. t it s` all be 
brought to do the latter is the aim of the enemy action 
directed to it, the infliction of casualties being a 
means to that end rather t-_° .n an end in itself. ,Lia the 
excitement of fear and its expression, are, it will be 
agreed, the immediate causes of such disintegration 
when it occurs. The explanation of such phenomena is 
therefore bound up with the study of the factors which 
are related to the non- occurence of fear resconses in 
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such circumstances, the inhibition of them when they are 
incipiently active and the breakdown of the inhibitory 
forces which results in their being expressed with the 
consequent disinteegration of the group. 
I have never,.I am happy to say, had an opportunity 
of observing troops under circumstances in any degree 
approaching panic; but no one of a psychological turn 
of mind could take part in operations under fire without 
reflecting on the factors which keel_ men to the perform- 
ance of their duties unheedful of dangers which would be 
strongly reacted to in other circumstances; nor could 
one be unheedful of those small indications, either in 
one's own experience or in the behaviour of tethers, from 
which the nature of such factors may be inferred. Of the 
elements organised in the common mental frame of a 
military force, and active in determining its behaviour 
during an action, I am confident that the most important 
is the will to inflict defeat upon the enemy which has 
already been spoken of. Such a disposition, especially 
when reinforced as a result of the knowledge that it is 
strongly shared by one's comrades, is of course of itself 
a powerful inhibitor of competing negative tendencies 
such as fear. As to how far it is a sufficient one 
those with experience of active service will, I imagine, 
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differ quite markedly: for I have among my friends a 
former fellow student, with a brilliant record as an 
infantry officer, who, when I referred in conversation to 
the strain of active service as largely due to the almost 
uninterrupted conflict between fear and opposing tendencies 
which it involved, assured me that he had no such ex- 
perience whatsoever. The personnel of any unit under 
fire may be presumed to vary, in the extent to which they 
undergo such a conflict, from the practical immunity from 
it of my friend at one extreme to a shrinking timidity at 
the other, prevented from passing into a complete state of 
terror only by all the inhibitory forces which can be 
brought against it, including the powerful exercise of 
active volition. 
One among these inhibitory forces organised in the 
common mental frame of the group is that which on all 
occasions forbids to the soldier the expression of fear 
in speech or gesture. An obligation to control the out- 
ward manifestations of fear is part of the male tradition 
(civilian as well as military) in contrast with the female 
traditions; and it has no doubt a military origin. 
Among soldiers there is a perfectly clear distinction: no 
expression may be given to the emotion of fear under 
circumstances of danger, but on other occasions it may 
be freely recognised and discussed; and in fact a 
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special slang is developed for the purpose with a rich 
allusiveness to the concomitant visceral processes of 
the experience. This inhibition of the expression of 
fear is thus organised in the common mental frame of a 
military unit, and we may compare with it the inhibition 
of a certain range of conversational topics by a similar 
group structure in the incident quoted from Dr. Ferenczi 
and already discussed (section 233). 
252 Its actual working may be introspectively de- 
tected. Let us suppose a subaltern to find himself in 
command of a section of the front line for the first time 
in his life. The circumstances are sufficiently strange 
and terrifying to waken in him the impulse of fear as he 
listens to the usual noises of a battle front and watches 
the enemy's Very lights falling near, or passing over- 
head as enemy patrols creep nearer in the darkness. As 
his fear awakens he glances at a group of three of his 
men calmly keeping a look out and apparently untroubled. 
Because the apparently take the situation calmly, he 
does so too. Now it is quite possible that the men in 
question are going through an experience exactly similar 
to his own. The noise, the approaching enemy and the 
feeling of isolation of a modern battlefield give rise 
in them also to the impulse of fear; but they are con- 
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scious of the presence of the subaltern, not only as a 
representative of authority, but as a fellow human being 
in the same situation as themselves and apparently taking 
it calmly. The manifestation of fear by either party 
would thus destroy one of the inhibitory forces controlling 
it in the other; that is, a part of the common mental 
frame, and might result in the free expression of the 
spontaneous impulse of flight. 
This example shows the working of one element in the 
very complex mental organisation which is built up in con- 
sequence of training and an experience of active service; 
and it is this mental organisation which enables men to 
undergo privations and dangers together which many of 
them would be unable to face separately. Tanic and riot 
result from the failure of such mental structures under 
excessive strain. Thus we say of men who advance to- 
gether, come under heavy fire and are dispersed, that 
they break. They do not attack as a group and run away 
as a group: they attack as a group, its psychological 
bonds are broken, each man finds himself as it were a 
solitary individual in extreme bodily danger and his im- 
pulse of flight overcomes him. It is quite unnecessary 
to appeal to primitive passive sympathy as an explanation 
of this sudden access of terror, though no doubt the 
intensity of the emotion may be in some degree increased 
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by this process: let the inhibitory forces break down 
under heavy fire and intense terror will s.:rin >- full 
grown from the situation itself without such reinforce- 
ment. 
253 The same principle may be illustrated by the 
phenomena of transition from a situation in which the in- 
hibitory structures in the common mental frame operate 
to one in which they do not and vice versa. To proceed 
on leave from a co:ibatant unit on active service and to 
return to it is to pass from the one situatií n to the 
other and back again. I can remember quite clearly with 
what trepidation on a particular occasion I walked down 
from the front line on my way to the leave train, although 
I had made my way over the same route and unde similar 
conditions many times in the previous weeks without 
special tremors: but on these occasions I did so as a 
member of an organised group and under the control of its 
common mental frame, whereas now, proceeding upon a 
personal errand, I did so almost as a private person. 
An equally uncomfortable period was the hour or so 
that preceded boarding the train to return, a period in 
which the conditions of life to which one was returning 
seemed sufficiently forbidding. To take a seat in the 
train and to be in company with other returning officers 
Chap VII Sect 253 442 
was to be at once back again in the atmosphere of the 
expeditionary force, to be under the control of its 
common mental frame and to contemplate active service con- 
ditions in a professional frame of mind which accepted 
them as a matter of course. It is of course impossible 
to explain this in terms of primitive passive sympathy, 
since I have good reason to believe that my own experience 
was typical, in which case primitive passive sympathy 
could only have reinforced the avoidance responses of all 
concerned. 
The general principle involved in such a transition 
may perhaps be described at greater length. Given two 
massive psychical organisations, to act energetically and 
decisively in expression of one of them may involve no 
feeling of mental discomfort. If, however, they involve 
strongly conflicting aims and standards, and if it is not 
possible to act immediately and decisively in favour of 
one of them, the period of indecisive action may be highly 
unpleasant: there is conflict, and, until a train of 
action begins in which one or other is being expressed, 
there is mental discomfort. This will be particularly so 
when the act contemplated is in violent contrast to one's 
everyday behaviour: one stands upon the brink waiting 
uncomfortably for the moment to take the plunge; and 
/33 
Shakespeare's Brutus in just such a situation says, 
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Since Cassius first did vi let me against Caesar, 
I have not slept. 
Between the acting of a dreadful thing 
And the first motion, all the interim is 
Like a phantasma, or a hideous dream: 
The genius and the mortal instruments 
Are then in council; and the state of man, 
Like to a little kingdom, suffers then 
The nature of an insurrection. 
This is the mental discomfort of a change -over from one 
.political (and moral) orientation to another. The case 
we have been considering involved the mental discomfort 
of the change -over from the older habits of a former 
civilian life to the attitudes of mind of a s idler. on 
active service. This discomfort was not wholly, or even 
principally, that of negative res onses to the forbidding 
prospect of a return to the field. It was rather the 
discomfort of the temporary conflict between the two 
massive psychical organisations, one of which was that 
part of the personality organised as a part of the common 
mental frame of the army. One's mental life could run 
quite comfortably on the lines of either of these psy- 
chical systems: 
How hap ßy could I be with either... 
1344 
And so Brutus might envy Cassius his singleness of out- 
look and consequent mental .comfort. 
254 The process whereby the emotions of the self enter 
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into the common mental frame of the group is interesting. 
We may illustrate this also by considering the experience 
of the individual soldier. However he may separate his 
self -respect from the credit of his regiment, he is treat- 
ed by others as its representative. He wears its uniform, 
and wherever he goes, it evokes in others responses which 
are not responses to his ersonality but responses to the 
regiment of which he is a member. Thus, even if he be 
sufficiently self -conscious and of a sufficiently unsocial 
disposition to endeavour to keep his self -respect separate 
from the honour of his unit, he will find respect paid to 
him as a member of it and experience positive self -feeling 
in consequence, dislike and contempt of him implied in 
the speech of its rivals, or those who have an ancient 
feud with it, and experience balked positive self -feeling 
and anger. It is largely in consequence of such ex- 
periences that the traditions of his regiment and the 
stories of its exploits come to have high emotional value 
for him, and its credit becomes his credit and his credit 
becomes its credit. Out of the ordinary motives of self- 
assertion and rivalry A seeks to "put down" B in a public 
bar. Our of the same motives a private of the Xshire 
Regiment sneers at a private of the Yshire, who in re7ly 
quotes some common gibe not at the individual but at his 
regiment. The retort is a comparison of what the Xshires 
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and the Yshires did in Egypt, or on the Marne; and 
presently both are deep in regimental history as it is 
known in the barrack -room, with the support of the other 
soldiers of both regiments who hai:pen to be present; and 
in this way the sentiment for the self and the sentiment 
for the regiment becomes inextricably interwoven as parts 
of its common mental frame. The same emotions are ex- 
cited in reference to self and in reference to the 
regiment; and the man feels himself a part of it, and it 
/3S 
a part of himself. 
255 We may note here a very common mistake made with 
regard to the sentiment called esprit de corps. It is 
frequently assumed that it is the basis of the mental 
organisation of the group and therefore the ground of the 
common responses of its members. Accordin4y the leader 
may attempt to strengthen his group by fostering esprit de 
corps, by making formal appeals to group sentiment. Every- 
one can probably remember occasions upon which such 
appeals have been made to him and the rather uncomfortable 
feeling which they can produce. On the view argued for 
in this chapter esprit de corps is not the cause but the 
consequence of the group's cohesion. The group has 
esprit de corps because it is a group; it would be un- 
true to say that it is a group because it has esprit de 
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corps. The problem for the leader of a disintergrated 
group is the problem of securing identities of response 
from its members, and the consequent formation, or 
strengthening, of its common frame of expression. If he 
can get that, esprit de corps (consciousness of the group 
as such, a sentiment of attachment to it and identification 
of one's self with it) will come of itself. But it must 
obviously be consequence and not cause of the group's ex- 
istence as such. The group as a working psychological 
structure must exist first. You cannot be conscious of, 
or feel attached to, or identify yourself with, what does 
1310 
not exist. Esprit de corps, a conscious sentiment of 
attachment to a group, is a further reinforcement of its 
common mental frame. In the absence of a common mental 
frame the cohesion of the group cannot be maintained by 
it, for in the absence of a common mental frame it cannot 
come into existence at all. 
256 Army training affords an interesting example 
since both processes can be observed side by side. On 
the one hand there is a deliberate attempt to foster the 
sentiment for the regiment. The recruit is for example 
taught something of its history; its prestige and the 
honour of being a member of it are impressed upon him. On 
the other hand, from the moment of their enlistment, a 
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body of recruits pass through a series of situations of 
a kind which inevitably produce identities of response 
and result in the formation of a common mental frame. 
They suffer the same disciplinary regulations, they 
parade together, they are drilled, instructed, disciplined 
by the same N.C.Os ; they undergo together the physical 
hardships of training and share the alleviations of 
military life. They get wet together, fall out or are 
dismissed together, respond together with identical 
feelings of tension or release to the command to march at 
attention or march at ease, or the permission to smoke or 
to use their water -bottles. They experience together 
cancellation of leave, variations of duty, orders for 
active service. They suffer as one man the fatigues of 
a tour of duty in the line, the expectation of relief, 
the dangers of an assault. 
One may contrast here the very different feelings 
of a soldier for a depot battalion and for a combatant 
unit. The first formations of the New Army during the 
war consisted of men who enlisted together, underwent 
training together, went abroad together and fought to- 
gether. Thus every man's personal fate - his hope of 
active service and his actual experience of it - was 
bound up with that of his unit. These battalions showed 
very strong individuality, very strong cohésion and very 
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strong esprit de corps. It happened in the case of some 
of the later formations that, having undergone training, 
they were retained in this country to supply drafts for 
the reinforcement of the units already in France. As a 
member of such a battalion a man's hopes and fears of 
being sent abroad were personal. They were not part of 
a common frame of expression based upon identities of 
response on the part of his fellows. There was not one 
situation for all the members of the battalion, since one 
man expected to go in the next draft, another believed 
that his turn would not come so soon, another was unfit 
and unlikely to be sent at all, while many had more or 
less permanent positions on the administrative or training 
staffs of the depot, and yet others were overseas officers 
who had been evacuated from one of the expeditionary forces 
on account of wounds or sickness incurred on active service, 
and who were attached by strong sentiments to the units as 
members of which they had trained and fought. Under 
these circumstances a battalion which had originally had a 
stron es-ürit de corps lost it almost completely with the 
break up in these circumstances of the common mental frame 
upon which its esprit de corps depended. 
257 I shall now examine in detail a sinr-le incident 
which illustrates the relative importance of the different 
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elements in the mental structure of an infantry platoon. 
It is an obvious deduction from the theory of the common 
mental frame that, if the motives composin;i it cease to 
operate, the rou5 will disintegrate, and that, in the 
case of such a disintegration, the grou may be recon- 
stituted by a series of similar responses of its membors 
to a corn ìon object of attention. That this is so may be 
s_houn by the following example, the particula.r value of 
which is that it shows the cog :-ative im-.or.tance of 
various aspects of the structure of an infantry unit 
- -esprit de corps, habit, fear of punishment, submissive- 
ness to authority. All of these are important reinforce- 
ments of its s .ructure, but no one of them, it will be 
argued, can be regarded as its essential framework. 
258 h line battalion had just left the trenches after 
a strenuous tour of duty. On theJf oll owing evening it 
was ordered to go out as a working party instead of enjoy- 
ing the expected night's slee . The men were to carry 
up supplies of wiring material and to erect wire entangle. - 
ments in front of the sup -.ort line. Usually men either 
acted as a carrying --arty or else, having walked up un- 
burd ned, erected, the wire which others had brought for 
them. On this occasion the same men were to perform 
both duties. In addition, it was a very dark night, and, 
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in consequence of frost, the ground was very hard. As 
it happened, the wiring material and the method of its 
erection were both strange to the men who were to put it 
up. The result of all these circumstances was a hi,'h 
degree of recalcitrance. 
Consider now the problem from the point of view of 
a platoon commander when his men had dumped the supplies 
of wire and stakes and the moment had arrived to set 
them to work. The men, being extremely weary and in a 
state of extreme irritation, disappeared into the dark- 
ness leaving the platoon commander and his sergeant with 
the heaps of material. 
As the officer had just come to the battalion he dia 
not have the advantage of knowing his men personally. It 
was clear that habit had broken down as a structure 
securing the cohesion and cooperation of the group. If 
we next consider authority and discipline we must note 
that the officer had over these men the greatest dis- 
ciplinary power which it was possible for the army to 
give him. A refusal to obey his orders would presumably 
have been disobedience in the face of the enemy and 
punishable by death. If the reader will consider the 
situation, he may ask himself what the probable consequence 
would have been of endeavouring to set twenty men to work 
in the darkness and under fire, and in the mood which we 
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have described, by an appeal to a sanbtion of this kind. 
On the other hand an appeal mi ht have been made to 
esprit de corps, to such sentiments as the credit of the 
platoon or of the battalion. The reader's sense of 
humour will probably, as the subaltern's did, prevent him 
from thinking this a very happy way out of the difficulty. 
The problem solved itself simply enouh. The officer, 
instead of proceeding to curse his men, proceeded as 
dramatically as he could to curse for them. In con- 
versation with his platoon sergeant he audibly damned the 
war, the enemy, the conditions of the night's work and 
the strange wiring material. The result was that he 
secured the instant and undivided attention of every man 
in the platoon. Taking a stake, he then proceeded to 
give similar expression to the difficulties of the job 
in hand, the darkness, the cold and the hardness of the 
ground. But at each step, as he cursed a particular 
difficulty, he dramatised in seech and action the way 
of dealing with it. Thus, having "discovered" that the 
iron stake could not be screwed into the frost -bound 
ground, and having given full vent to his feelings, he 
borrowed his sergeant's entrenching tool and triumphantly 
broke the frozen surface. Similarly having attempted to 
screw in the stake, he "discovered" that the gromlild was 
too hard and that he could not turn it, and, after being 
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nonplussed and expressing his disgust, had the brilliant 
idea of using an entrenching tool handle as a liver. In 
this way he held the attention of the men and at the same 
time made clear the nature of each difficulty which they 
had to meet and the appropriate method of surmounting it. 
The method of erecting the strange wire was explained in 
the same way, with the cooperation of the sergeant in 
handling it: and, by the time the first section of it was 
erected, the platoon had not only gathered round to listen 
and grasped .every detail of the work but eve- -,y man was 
ready to set about it. The first indication of this had 
been when one of the men offered him an entrenching tool 
handle in reply to a request for one directed t^ the 
universe in general. It was now an easy matter to 
divide the platoon into two parties working outwards in 
opiosité directions; and from then the men worked 
steadily throughout the night without need for further 
instructions, prompting or oversight. This result was 
not limited to one night's work; for the platoon worked 
throughout a succession of nights with extraordinary in- 
dustry and willingness and a minimum of supervision, and 
so distinguished itself by the amount of wire it erected 
that it received special commendation. 
259 We have in this incident an example of a group 
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which had become disintegrated., which had for the time 
ceased to be capable of effective coo_rrerative action, and 
which completely recovered itself as a result of this 
incident. The explanation appears to be somewhat as 
follows. The impulses which had brought each man into 
the army, and which may be grouped together under the 
general title of a desire to carry the war to a victorous 
end, had been more or less exhausted_ by a long experience 
of the labours, hardships and monotony of a winter camp- 
aign. Also, since the soldier sees little of the re- 
lation of the work which he does, dig ing a trench or 
scraping a road or sitting all day in the mud, to the 
campaign as a whole, these tasks do not evoke in him the 
energy of his original motives in j oínin the army to 
the same extent as an order to take part in an assult. 
Such an order would doubtless have pulled the platoon to- 
gether at once and made it a strong group. In the secor 
place, negative tendencies, fears and avoidances, tend to 
disintegrate a group in so far as they appear in its 
members. In the instance that we have taken the die - 
integrating forces present were the strong avoidance 
reactions excited in a condition of weariness and disust 
to an unpleasant and unfamiliar .piece of work. 
A third factor present was the effect of the machinery 
of discipline. In the circumstances of the case, the 
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motives which had made each man fall in in his place, 
pick up his bundle and carry. iL through the darkness 
over a duckboard track slippery with frost and broken 
with shell fire, were those aroused within the sentiment 
for the authority of the army with its sanctions of dis- 
grace and punishment. These necessarily involved a 
high degree of conflict and repression. Of these re- 
pressive forces the platoon officer as the immediate 
representative of authority necessarily became the symbol, 
and the men were therefore not suggestible towards him. 
That is to say the mechanism of authority had broken down 
at this critical point, the relation of the soldier to 
the officer immediately superior to him. 
260 The first problem for the officer was therefore 
to find a way out of the impasse by releasing; the re- 
pressions to which it was due. This was effected by 
giving expression to all the repressed irritation of the 
situation. When the officer began to do this, he 
immediately became an object of attention and, by doing 
it, he became the symbol not of the repressive forces but 
of those forces which were in conflict with them. When 
therefore he began single- handed to erect the wire, the 
men were. already suggestible to his every word and action. 
At this point it would probably have been possible to have 
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assembled them and to have ;riven directions in the 
ordinary way for the carrying out of the night's work 
with good hope of securing attention. But the con- 
tinued dramatisation of the process had. two -results of 
value. In the first place, it was more carefully listen- 
ed to than formal directions would have been, for the men's 
attention was involuntary, and therefore every ,oint was 
permanently impressed upon their minds. Secondly, each 
man was led by primitive passive sympathy to make a suit- 
able emotional response to each of the difficulties at 
which he might have boggled. No .small point of difficulty 
was slurred over: every difficulty was reacted to 
strongly. It was wholeheartedly faced and then 
tbiumphantly overcome. That is to say each man was 
shown not only the way round the physical difficulty, but 
the way round the psychological one also. 
261 Any mental structure - a habit or a sentiment or 
a belief - will lose its power of influencing and con- 
trolling conduct if an excessive strain be put upon it. 
There is a degree of fatigue under which a man will re- 
linquish any activity, even that which has the most 
powerful motives behind it. There is a pLtch of anger 
beyond which even the most iron self control will not 
preserve a suavity of manner. And in the same way, if 
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the mental structures in question are not those of an 
individual mind considered by itself but those in a 
number of minds upon which their cohesion and corporate 
action depend, there is a point at which they will break 
down. 
In the instance just described this point seemed to 
have been approached. Yet a breakdown was successfully 
avoided.. If we approach the incident with a theory that 
such a group Ls held together by the bond of authority or 
habit, by regulations or discipline, or by esprit de corps, 
then we must suppose a failure of whichever one of these 
structures is held to be the explanation of its cohesion: 
and we must suppose the recovery of the group to be due 
to the reconstitution of that structure - authority, habit, 
regulations, discipline, esprit de corps, whichever it is 
taken to be, or all together if all are regarded as play- 
ing some part. In that case the incident must be regard- 
ed as the success for some obscure reason of a dodge which 
proved effective in a way that the theory cannot make 
plain. If on the other hand we approach it in the light 
of the theory of a common mental frame, the devices used 
appear as a series of simple and obvious deductions from 
that conception of the mental structure of a group. 
On that view the cohesion of the group rested ulti- 
mately on the common purposes of officer, non -commissioned 
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officers and men as members of the field force, but the 
circumstances were not such as to call out these motives 
strongly. In such circumstances - the circumstances of 
the daily round of military duties - reliance is normally 
upon secondary elements in the common mental frame of a 
unit which derive their strength as motives from these 
underlying purposes. Among these elements are the habits 
and sentiments acquired in the ..rocess of training, habits 
and sentiments which are derived from the underlying 
purposes through the general recognition of the need to 
undergo that training as a means to the furtherance of 
these purposes. Such habits and sentiments are therefore 
.outgrowths of the main structure of common purposes, a 
further differentiation and development of the primary 
structure of the common mental frame. They have their 
origin in the more specialised similar and complementary 
responses of men undergoing training together, just as the 
elements in the primary structure have their origin in the 
less specialised similar responses of citizens of the same 
nation in the circumstances of war. Among these elements 
in the secondary structure of the cotrrmon mental frame we 
may place the organisation of each of these minds with 
reference to each of the others with whom it came normally 
into relatións in the course of the everyday round of 
duties - relations of interdependent activities and re- 
Chap VII Sect 261 458 
lations of authority and. subordination. 
When all these structures are working; healthily the 
activities of the group are carried on with little re- 
ference to either the system of regulations as imposed 
from outside or the system of disci line with its renal- 
ties. The regulations define the duties and obligations 
of each; on the basis of these regulations each man has 
been trained in the performance of these duties; but when 
these duties have been learned, when they have become a 
part of the men, as habit and acquired impulse, and a 
part of the expectation of his fellows with regard. to 
Q 
him, they are/part of the common mental frame of the 
group; and it is only by being incorporated in this way 
in the living structure of the croup that the regulations 
have any power at all. It is not a printed instruction 
but an acquired psycho -physical disosition that makes a 
man automatically take cover, or spring to attention, or 
handle rifle or bomb, or conform to a signal or to the 
movements of his fellows in an advance. As for the 
system of discipline (with its penalties of the actual 
punishment it may inflict and the loss of the good opinion 
of those in authority, of one's fellows and of one's self) 
when the group is vigorous such sanctions have little to 
do with its vigour; when its cohesion begins to fail, 
they are felt as an obscure constraining force in the back 
ground, a force constraining to modes of behaviour which 
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have their origin and form from outside the'self and the 
group. The case of esprit de cores seems to be similar. 
Formed as a result of the group's corporate vigour it is 
a reinforcement of its corporate motives in circumstances 
of strain. 
When under circumstances of strain all the elements 
in the common mental frame have exhausted their vigour, 
so long as the circumstances are such that discipline may 
be exercised by those in authority, its exercise will 
preserve an appearance of cohesion, and men will be kept 
to their duties.i When the enforcement of discipline 
becomes difficult, the failure of cohesion at once be- 
comes evident: orders are slackly obeyed, or not obeyed 
at all. In the circumstances of the case unde- consider- 
ation the performance of the work could not be secured 
by the exercise of discipline but only by the willing 
cooperation of the men. The common mental frame of the 
platoon having broken down, it was necessary to re- 
constitute it out of similar and complementary responses. 
262 The first difficulty to be overcome was that the 
iIts exercise always depends upon the cooperation 
of the majority of the group in which it is exercised. 
It can therefore be used only against minor seditions 
- a man or a couple of men in a platoon, a company in 
a battalion, a battalion in a division and so on.'" 
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men were already responding similarly (but individually, 
and without cohesion in this direction) to the subaltern 
as the embodiment of that authority and discipline which 
had so far imposed upon them an unwilling compliance. 
He must therefore first free himself from this, and his 
little piece of acting exactly reversed the psychological 
situation in this respect. In doing so he secured that 
his score or so of men, in an enforced attention to his 
words and actions, went each through the same processes 
of surprise, sympathetic response and release from their 
accumulated inhibitions. The group was being re- 
c onstituted. out of the similar responses of its members, 
and presently each man was making positive instead of 
negative responses in concord with his fellows. When 
these responses led to active movements of cooperation in 
erecting the wire, each man came into cooperation with 
his fellows, the subaltern standing as the intermediary. 
The men came one at a time. In helping the officer they 
presently found themselves helping one another. As the 
mode of erection had been effectively explained, each 
roan's action was at once met by the appropriate action 
from the man nearest him, and, when all the men were 
drawn in in this way; the platoon went ahead as a working 
group without his further intervention or guidance. 
The reconstitution of the group was therefore a 
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consequence of the similar and complementary responses 
of its members. It involved a redirection of emotional 
responses and the initiation and establishment of a 
series of new habits, the complementary responses made 
in the erection of the wire. From these there followed 
a period of vigorous corporate work. And from this 
resulted a return to good discipline and a very r«reat 
strengthening of the sentiment of the group, its esprit 
de corps. These were again reinforced when it became 
evident that the platoon had distinguished itself by 
its good night's work. It was now on its mettle. And 
when the battalion went into support a few days later, 
mainly to wire the battle line, it worked during successive 
nights with a Minimum of supervision and with great heart- 
iness. When the results of its work received special 
commendation it may be supposed that its esprit de corps 
was still further strengthened.¡ 
263 The most striking characteristic of the organ- 
isation of an army is the extent to which the forms of 
¡Having made considerable use of this example (which 
is again referred to in Chapter IX), I should like to 
say that, in the mutual interdependence of officer and 
platoon, the subaltern was probably as often indebted to 
his non -commissioned officers and men for their example 
in times of difficulty, as they to him for a lead when 
his determination had outlasted theirs. 
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expression of its subordinate groups are devised outside 
of these groups, either before they are formed, so that 
they are formed on a model already determined, or after 
they are in being, so that modes of behaviour are 
communicated to them and assimilated as parts of their 
structure. Thus, before a unit is recruited, each 
position in it is already defined; and the relations one 
to another of the officers and other ranks who are to 
occupy these positions are fixed. Training is a process 
by which each man learns the duties and obligations, the 
powers and privileges of the position he is to occupy. 
In the same way the forms of expression of individual 
action are laid down, and the necessary habits and skill 
are acquired in formal courses of instruction. Thus for 
the infantry soldier every detail of drill, of the 
handling and care _f arms, and of their offensive use, is 
laid down in the drill book and in musketry regulations; 
and so for all other arms, and for every aspect of 
soldiering. The circumstances of battle require that 
the highest degree of preparation and of formal organ- 
isation shall be combined with the highest degree of 
flexibility and capacity for individual initiative. Be- 
cause of the greatness of the issues at stake in an action, 
and the rapidity with which an opportunity must be seized 
or a threatening situation met, an army spends the greater 
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part of its time in preparation and training for such 
moments of crisis.l It is thus - unless the navy may 
claim precedence in this respect also, a point on which 
I cannot speak from experience - the supreme example of 
this type of anticipatory organisation based u-on forms 
of ex-oression communicated to subordinate groups ab extra. 
It is in this respect sharply contrasted with other 
striking examples of groups of some size and an organ- 
isation involving a comparable degree of integration of 
many minds. An example of modern industrial organisation 
would show a similar combination of dif : erentiatinn and 
integration in its common mental frame; but it is a 
combination of differentiation and integration which con- 
tinually grows out of the process of production to which 
it is related and so lacks this special character. 
Because it differs in this way from the greater 
number of human groups, the army is an unsuitable illus- 
tration to use in studying the processes by which groups 
develop, in the course of their lives, organisation suit- 
able to the _;urposes for which they exist. Thus the army 
affords striking examples of formal organisation and 
initiative in combination: but Lo understand the way in 
Hence the gibe that a soldier spends his time in 
rehearsing for a performance which never comes off, or 
which, if it does come off, is quite different from the 
rehearsals. 
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which such a combination grows up it is necessary to turn 
to examples of a different type. Two aspects of this 
combination are now to be considered - in the next 
chapter,, the development of forms of expression)and in 
the succeedin :. one the psychological processes and 
structures of leadership; and. in both cases it will be 
best to base the argument upon a consideration of further 
aspects of the twofold relation. 
Chapter VIII 
The deliberate adjustments of a relation and the 
development of institutions 
The solid rules of Civil Government... 
...institutions are forms, established 
forms of relation between social beings. 
"There are principles which civilised 
men must contend for. Our social fabric 
is based on them. As my word stands for 
me, I hold others to theirs. Not only for 
what I lose by it, but in the abstract, 
judicially... I abhor a breach of faith:'... 
"And I... personally, and presently, abhor 
a breach of faith. Judicially? Judicially 
to examine, judicially to condemn: but 
does the judicial mind detest? I think, 
sir, we are not on the Bench when we say 
that we abhor: we have unseated ourselves. 
Yet our abhorrence of bad conduct is very 
certain..." 
Chapter VIII 
The deliberate adjustments of a relation and the develop- 
ment of institutions 
264 In the analysis and discussion of the working of a 
relation between two persons it was found necessary to dis- 
tinguish different aspects of the phenomena under consider- 
ation by using the terms common mental frame and common form 
of expression. We also saw that a relation may be in part 
regulated by the aiplication of intelligence and will to 
the problems of the relation itself and we called this pro- 
cess other -consciousness. A social psychologist acquainted 
with the concepts common mental frame and common form of ex- 
pression and concerned to analyse and readjust a relation 
to which he was a partner might presumably make use of 
these for this purpose and might make use of all the psy- 
chological concepts relevant to his inquiry which refer to 
aspects of each of them. 
Someone with no knowledge of psychology would be un- 
acquainted with such terms; but, in considering a relation 
to which he was a partner with a view to its readjustment, 
he would have to examine it, and he would do so in terms 
Chap VIII Sect 264 467 
of concepts familiar in ordinary speech. The terms the 
psychologist would use would some of them refer to the 
aspects of the relation we have summed 117 under the term 
common mental frame, and some to aspects summed up under 
the term common form of exy,ressi n. Exactly the same 
would be true of the terms taken by the other from common 
speech. Some of them would refer to the external aspect 
of actions and to external objects, and others to modes of 
thought, feelin :. and desire, or to the sentiments, habits 
and temperamental factors which determine them. 
265 In considering the ways in which two persons may 
enter upon a relation with one another we have already 
seen that these processes of interaction do not depend u-- 
on other -consciousness. Relations do not usually arise 
out of other -conscious processes: a relation begins in one 
of the ways which we have described and, after it has al- 
ready proceeded some length, one or other or both of the 
partners to the relation may develop other -conscious pro- 
cesses with regard to it; and these processes may result 
in further changes in its structure such as otherwise 
might not have taken place at all, or might have taken 
place less quickly and smoothly after some degree of cross 
purposes and an adjustment of the relation brought about by 
a process of trial and error. 
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266 It has been said that relations do not usually 
arise out of other -conscious processes but that the 
establishment of some degree of relation precedes the de- 
velopment of other- consciousness. There is one type of 
relation of which this is not true. It sometimes happens 
that one person (usually the elder and almost certainly 
the more socially experienced of the two) may have his 
or her attention drawn to anouher person under circum- 
stances that scarcely amount tó the existence of a re- 
lation between them (they may be for example members of 
the same social group but under such circumstances that 
the second person scarcely knows the first by sight or by 
name) but which permit of some degree of observation of 
the second person and perhaps of learning something of his 
or her character, tastes and circumstances. Having ob- 
tained some knowledge of him or her in this way, the first 
person may resolve to initiate a relation of a certain type 
- let us say a relation in which the elder person becomes 
the patron or adviser of the younger one - and, if such a 
relation is established, it will be a relation in which 
other -consciousness, on one side at least, has preceded 
the initiation of the relation. Ouch a relation is of 
course quite likely to take a course very different from 
that which was planned (as in the story of Lewis Seymour 
/38 
and Mrs. Bentham in Mr. George Moore's novel): and this 
may be because the elder person's judgement ^f the younger 
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person's character has gone somewhat astray, or because 
the elder 1.erson has somewhat' mistaken his or her own 
motives; that is, the process has not been a genuine 
other -conscious process at all. 
There is also the very occasional possibility of two 
iHersons getting to know of one another without ever having 
met - tii.ey may, for example, have read one another's books 
- and each resolving that a relation with the other would 
be pleasant, and the formation of the relation following 
on a suitable opportunity. In this case the formation of 
the relation would be preceded by some degree of other -c'n- 
sciousness on each side. 
It is quite clear that both these types of relation 
in which some degree of other -consciousness precedes the 
very beginning of a common mental frame may be regarded as 
very exceptional indeed. We are therefore left with the 
general conclusion that, with some paltry exceptions, the 
development of other -conscious processes follows the form- 
ation of a common mental frame. 
267 We may now consider other- conscious processes 
directed towards elements in a common mental frame - that 
is towards mental structures and processes as such. The 
circumstances of the relation give to each partner to it 
- in fact force upon him - the opportunity of observing 
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the other in all the situations which occur in the course 
of it - that is, of observing his words and actions. And 
we are so constituted that to observe some one's words 
and actions objectively, and as subh, is possible to us 
only as a result of prolonged self- training: our minds 
pass immediately from the observed word or action to an 
interpretation of it - sometimes correct, sometimes mis- 
taken - in terms of mental structures and processes, in 
terms of the doer's or speaker's sentiments and prejudices, 
or his thoughts and feelings and desires. It is with the 
correct rather than the mistaken interpretations that we 
are at present concerned. 
268 We have then, first, a relation involving a series 
of interactions between two minds and therefore some degree 
of adjustment of them in a common mental frame, the elements 
in which and their relations to one another are not cog- 
nized by either partner; and, secondly, the development of 
cognitive processes directed to it on the part of either 
or both of the partners, these cognitions arising out of 
instances of maladjustment of the relation, or out of a 
desire to enrich and promote it further. It follows that 
these cognitive processes will, at least to begin with, 
fall very far short indeed of a full understanding of the 
relation: and it should also be clear that even in their 
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fullest development they are unlikely to reach anything 
like such an understanding. A's understanding of his 
relation with B is limited by the incompleteness of his 
understanding of himself and the still more marked in- 
adequacy of his understanding of B; and similarly in the 
case of B: and the poorer the understanding is in either 
case the more likely it is to be further impoverished by 
a mistaken belief that it is entirely adequate. 
It follows that the sphere of such adjustments is a 
limited one, though it is none the less important. It 
will never extend to an understanding of the relation as 
a whole: it may however be developed in reference to 
particular aspects of the relation, especially - oints of 
opiosition. 
269 The occurrence of an oposition may be related to 
mental structures in each partner which are known to the 
other: or it may be related to structures of which he has 
previously been unaware and which are now for the first 
time brought to his notice. A proceeds to act in such and 
such a manner, or proposes such action. To his surprise 
B, usually so ready to fall in with his suggestions for 
joint action, is on this occasion sharply opposed. There 
is thus revealed to him a motive or disposition in B - a 
purpose or taste or sentiment or prejudice - of which 
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nothing in their previous intercourse has made him aware. 
The intended course of action must be modified in such a 
way as not to stimulate this op.. osition, and it is now an 
aspect of B's character which, having been brought so 
sharply to A's notice, is not likely to be forgotten by 
him on future occasions to which it is relevant. In the 
course of the relation A and B will each acquire in this 
way some knowledge of the character of the other, and this' 
knowledge will be made use of in the other -conscious pro- 
cesses of each directed to the regulation and adjustment 
of the relation. 
270 It is also possible that it may appear explicitly 
in conversation between them. "We can go by bus as I 
know that you do not like the tube." "I have ordered 
China tea for myself but Indian for you as I know that 
you prefer it." "Let us go round by X: it is only ten 
minutes longer and I know you want to ask about the fish- 
ing prospects and I want to go into L's for a book." It 
is with the more obvious interests and preferences that 
such processes are concerned - with tastes and sentiments 
and habits which are clearly enough defined to be com- 
prehensible even when not shared. 
271 Adjust:,ents made as a res.lt of explicit dis- 
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eussions in terms of the common mental frame are subject 
to two difficulties. Direct allusions to mental struct- 
ures and processes have in such instances as we have in 
view two clear disadvantages. The relation is already 
undergoing some degree of strain great or small as a re- 
sult of the opposition, explicit or potential, which is in 
need of adjustment. (a) In such circumstances direct 
allusions by another person to one's mental structures and 
processes, slightly embarrassing at ally time, are likely to 
be somewhat uncomfortable. (b) Any relation is likely to 
be given a jolt by any admission of a divergence of be- 
liefs, tastes or standards, and, in circumstances of 
opposition, a joint recognition of such divergences is 
particularly difficult. Even when a relation between A 
and B is working quite smoothly the rejection of one of 
A's preferences by B may be taken in very bad part. Thus 
if they be sharing a meal and if B dislikes one of A's 
favourite dishes, it may be exceedingly difficult for him 
to refuse it without giving offence to A. Tolerance of 
differences of taste and opinion is curiously difficult to 
.ost peo -ple, and tact and good manners aim not at making 
such differences clear in order that they may be allowed 
for, but at minimising them and if possible pretending that 
they do not exist. Thus if I go with a friend to a 
restauraAnt and he proposes such and such a dish, I must 
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not say that, because I dislike it, I shall choose some- 
thing else: I must profess a mild enthusiasm for it and 
a still greater enthusiasm for something else, and order 
the something else - and all this pother is quite 
illogical as there is no real opcosition involved, since 
each of us can be haply with his own preference without 
interfering with the other. Similarly if he praises Keats 
I must not say what I think of Keats's diction, though I 
may damn him with faint praise and then become lyrical 
about Shelley. Only if we know one another pretty well 
and are both capable of a more than average degree of 
detachment, can we start from the fact of our contrasted 
preferences and proceed to try to discover the reasons 
for them. 
272 The statements "I like this" and "This is good" 
are philosophically and psychologically distinct pro- 
positions, but in colloquial speech they approximate to 
being equivalent phrases. Thus it may be a toss up 
whether I express my meaning on a particular occasion by 
saying "I like these grapes" or "These grapes are good ". 
Now, apart from the sophistication of some degree of 
philosophical reflection, each of us will assume that the 
things he likes are the things which are good in an 
absolute sense, and therefore that they are the things 
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which someone else ought to like. To refuse or dispraise 
the dish that my companion likes, and would have Me enjoy 
also, is to frustrate his intentions for my pleasure, but 
it is also to impugn the oodness of his judgement; and 
to say outright "I do not like it" is very nearly the 
equivalent of saying "I do not like it; that is, it is 
not good; that is, your taste for it is a mistaken one ". 
However far this may be the explanation, it is quite 
clear what tact and good manners require of us in such 
cases - and also that there are consequent difficulties 
in making adjustments of a relation in terms of explicit 
references to elements in its common mental frame. 
273 Such adjustments are therefore much more likely to 
be discussed and made in terms of the common frame of ex- 
/39 
pression than in terms of the common mental frame. By 
doing so we avoid statements of a quasi - psychological 
chartIcter, and this is why, when my friend suggests X as 
an item in a joint plan, I (if I dislike it) praise it 
mildly and counter with a suggestion of. Y. I do not then, 
as might have happened had I professed an aversion to X, 
receive an impassioned harangue - niy dear Sir, not like 
X!!! Why,X is... ". Instead I get some criticism such 
as the mention of an advantage which belongs to X but not 
to Y. I can then think of and suggest an alternative to 
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Y, such as Z, which will suit me equally and has for my 
partner the same advantage as X, perhaps making !)oth 
these points clear. If Z is still unacceptable to my 
companion, he will make a further suggestion, and in this 
way agreement may finally be reached: and this procedure, 
and not that of the discussion of elements in the common 
mental frame, is the usual method of bringing about such 
adjustments. 
274 When an adjustment of the relation is made by such 
a discussion of a common form of expression instead of by 
direct reference to elements in the common mental frame of 
the relation, the difficulties we have noticed are avoided. 
Nevertheless the adjustment is an adjustment of elements 
in the common mental frame. If, feeling the wind a 
little chilly while my partner. '-..oints out to me the ! laces 
in which some of his favourite bulbs are beginning; to gut 
up shoots, I say, "It is pleasant in the garden: now let 
us go in and play these new gramaphone records ", my re- 
mark may lead to a concordant adjustment of my desire for 
the fireside and my partner's interests in gardening and 
in music, an adjustment of mental structures, an adjust- 
ment of the common mental frame of the relation. An ad- 
justment of a common form of expression is necessarily an 
adjustment of the common mental frame to which it is re- 
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lated. 
275 As an exam.;,le the cooperation of two minds in pro- 
ducing a work of literature may be considered. Such co- 
operation may take place, no doubt, in a number of ways 
but all of them will, I think, exemplify the same 
principle. The analysis of an actual experience of co- 
operation in writing a play may be briefly summarised as 
follows: The two writers were very much in one another's 
company and, in the course of varied and lively con- 
versations(often during a meal and usually on questions of 
literature and scholarship) many literary schemes were pro- 
jected, some more or less fantastic and some of a practical 
kind, one or two of which were actually worked out and com- 
pleted. Such a discussion would begin with a suggestion 
for a poem or a play or some other type of work from one 
partner, followed by a suggestion from the other amplify- 
ing it, and this suggestion would then immediately be 
modified or amplified by the first: and so the game would 
go on until the initial conception was elaborated into 
something like a working plan. 
It should be noted that at this stage two minds were 
working together in a very intimate way, and that their 
common activity involved this continuous adjustment of 
each to the other. Every suggestion was either a concord 
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(that is, it was, first, the expression of a group of A's 
dispositions ana, when apprehended by B, became immediately 
the expression of a group of B's dispositions) nr an 
opposition, and as such a challenge either to maintain in 
face of it the suggestion previously agreed to (the status 
quo ante of the opposed suggestion) or to overwhelm it 
with one which would be accepted by both as superior to 
it (that is, either to secure the dominance of those dis- 
positions which determined B's prior suggestion (a.) 
over those dispositions which determined A's new suggest- 
ion ( which was not acceptable to A, or to put forward 
a third suggestion ( ') which was superior to, or at 
least as good as, the first suggestion ( oL) as an ex- 
pression of the relevant dis ositions in B, and which was 
Superior to the second suggestion (() as an expression 
of the relevant dispositions in A, thus making an end of 
the opposition by resolving it in a concord backed by 
stronger motives in the minds of both). Throughout the 
whole of this procedure ( a) mental structures and pro- 
cesses in both minds were in continual and lively inter- 
action; ( b) a common mental frame which was of an 
elaborate, subtle, and highly integrated and highly in- 
dividualised character was being constructed in the course 
of these concords and op ositions; and (c) most important 
of all, there was no reference to these processes as such 
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in any of the conversational interchanges, and very little 
consciousness of them on the part of either partner: but 
every remark was a remark about the imagined characters 
and situations, and the imagined characters and situations 
were for both the central object of attention throughout. 
When the actual writing of a scene was proceeding the 
same principle held true. It would be preceded by the 
joint planning of the action in outline by a process of 
cooperation similar to that already described. Then the 
composition of the dialogue would begin, one of the r,rt- 
ners writing it down. One would suggest a sentence or 
two of a speech. The a 
and this would bring about a situation of concord, or a 
situation of op_.osition presently resolved as before; and 
so the work would proceed. In this way every speech and 
every sentence, and sometimes every phrase, would be 
amended and re- amended until its final form was the con- 
cordant expression of determinants in both minds. 
276 The processes of agreement may be analysed as 
follows. (a) A suggestion of A's might be immediately 
accepted by B as the expression of his view as to what 
the character would say at that moment (and vice versa 
for B's suggestions); (b) a suggestion of A's might be 
immediately amended by B so as to express more fully in 
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the amended form B's ideas as to what the character would 
say, and this amendment immediately accepted by A as more 
fully expressing his view than his own first suggestion 
(and vice versa for B's suggestions); (c) a suggestion of 
A's might be opposed by B and this opposition followed by 
some explanation from A of its relation to the character 
or to the rest of the play, or a defence of its diction if 
that was challenged, and this explanation or defence might 
result in B's accepting it (and vice versa for B's suggest- 
ions); (d) a suggestion of A's might be immediately amend- 
ed by B and A might oppose the amendment until B's ex- 
planation defence of it led him to accept it (and vice 
versa for B). As a rule no speech would be adopted until 
in this way both partners were satisfied with it. 
Occasionally, however, an opposition would not be re- 
solved and (to prevent the occurrence of a deadlock) one 
or other partner would give way, the form pressed for by 
the other would be adopted; then, later on, possibly a 
day or two later, the partner who disliked the form adopt- 
ed would raise the question again, and a form satisfactory 
to both would be found. This would be done in one of two 
ways: (a) the partner who desired an alteration would 
state what he thought was at fault in the form adopted, 
asking the other for suggestions for itgamendment. The 
success of this method depended on his making the criticism 
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completely clear, for probably what the composer of the 
speech wanted, and thought he had secured in it, was not 
incompatible with the acceptance of the criticism when 
what the critic was aiming at was properly understood 
- that is, the speech as he put it forward embodied some- 
thing which he thought of value, he was really defending 
not the speech as such but this element of value in it, 
and once he grasped the criticism he coula suggest a 
modification which would retain the element of value and 
meet the criticism; or (b) his partner who desired the 
alteration would now make a suggestion so much better than 
the speech as it stood, that this suggestion would be 
immediately accepted by the other as supe-:ior to his own 
contribution, and adopted by both as the expression of 
what they both had in mind. 
Thus throughout the whole process of cooperation 
every word spoken referred to elements in the common form 
of expression which was being constructed, and there was 
seldom any object of attention before either mind but 
elements in that form: yet the process of constructing it 
was a process of the intimate interaction of two minds, a 
series of similar and complementary responses, and as a 
result of these responses an elaborate and highly special- 
ised common mental frame was being constructed of which 
/ot{D 
the text of the play was the expression. 
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277 It has been said that, when a mnvemont of. A's is 
met by an opposition on the part of B, the dis ositiora 
in B's mind which determines that opposition is brought 
sharply to A's notice; and this principle was assigned 
as an important cause of the uevelopment of A's other - 
consciousness with regard to B. It must be noted that it 
leads also to an increase of self- knowledge on the part 'Of 
B. Thus B at all times, let us say, likes A. Hitherto 
he has, so far as X is concerned, had relations only with 
persons who like X. Accordingly he does not frame to 
himself any such proposition as "I am one of those persons 
who like X ", or "A liking for X is one of my character- 
istics", anymore than he does so in the case of breathing 
or having two legs. The proposition in which his liking 
for X is framed for him is "X is good ". If he by chance 
discovers that someone not an intimate - say an old person 
if he is young, a working man if he is of the middle class, 
a middle class man if he is a class -conscious proletarian, 
or someone of another nationality - dislikes X, then he 
adds to the proposition "X is good" another one "brut such 
and such a person has the peculiarity of not liking X ". 
If, however, A, a person to whom he has a developed re- 
lation, makes a movement implying a dislike of X - imply- 
ing in fact the proposition "X is bad" - then his own 
liking for X is sharply brought to his mind as a charact- 
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eristic of his own. It is to a considerable extent out 
of such situations that our self -knowledge develops. It 
is, for example, when a Scot crosses the border that he 
becomes aware of his national peculiarities of r ro- 
nunciation, idiom and vocabulary. Until he sneaks to a 
Sassenach of a "dub" or proposes to "snack" a door or 
make a ball "stot ", he may be innocently unaware that he 
is not using expressions familiar from the Shakespeare 
Cliff northwards to Cape Wrath. 
278 It is very important to notice that no such develop- 
ment of other -consciousness or of self -knowledge follows 
upon a movement of A's which is met by a concordant move- 
ment on the part of B. A proposes joint action with re- 
gard to X which implies the proposition "X is good ": B 
concurs, with the same implication that "X is rood ", that 
is, that a particular quality is possessed by a particular 
object: there is nia reference at all to any characteristic 
of either A or B, and therefore no hint of any increase of 
either other- consciousness or self -knowledge. Thus the 
concords which form the very essentials of the 'common 
ment4l frame of a relation may go entirely unrecognised 
- unless they are tastes or sentiments of an uncommon kind, 
in which case A and B will frequently have them brought to 
their self -knowledge in the course of relations with C, D, 
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E,... who do not share them, or unless there is present 
an interest of a directly psychological kind. Otherwise 
they remain in the words already quoted from :Professor 
Lévy- Bruhl, things plutot vécues quo pensées. 
279 The obvious corollary is that the elements in 
those common mental frames which are most general are not 
readily or usually recognised - and that not only in the 
world of everyday life, or in the work of those who as 
directors or administrators, teachers or pastors, are con- 
cerned with the adjustment of social relations, but in 
the sciences concerned to find an explanation of social 
bonds - the sciences which have gone astray after theories 
based on fear, or habit, or self -interest, or herd-instinct 
or some other special piece of mechanism stuck onto human 
beings to fasten them together into a society, as couplings 
are stuck onto railway coaches to fasten them into a train. 
And, I suppose, it is also the reason why in those writers 
to whom the real relation of man to society - his complete 
oneness with it - has been perfectly clear, there has 
been lacking any very determined attempt to show this in 
concrete terms, instead of being content with a very ab- 
stract demonstration of it, which, while quite convincing 
to some minds, seems to have failed in the case of others 
to make it even intelligible.¡ 
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280 Such is the normal process by which minds work in 
cooperation - the object of attention and of explicit re- 
ference is, in the overwhelmingly preponderant number of 
common or complementary responses, some element in the 
common frame of expression. And this is true whether we 
have two people ordering a meal, chosing a piece of 
furniture, discussing a poem or a picture, making rules 
for their behaviour of someone else's, planning or arrang- 
ing anything whatsoever. Still more so is it true of 
larger groups such as committees. 
This principle is not surprisin,, when we see that it 
is the principle of indiviuual as well as social behaviour. 
In composing a letter one does not first examine oneself 
in terms of one's mental structures and then devise a 
verbal formula which will adequately express them: but, 
on the contrary, verbal forms appear in one's conscious- 
ness and are accepted or rejected; or alternative forms 
occur to the mind, and one is chosen as the more suitable; 
or a form of words is written down, and its inadequacy or 
unsuitability appears, is considered and a móre adequate 
or suitable form is adopted in its place when it occurs to 
the mind. The object in the focus of attention is through- 
out some part of the form of expression which is being 
worked out, and seldom or never the mental determinants of 
it, the mental structures or mental processes of which it 
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is the expression. 
281 In exactly the same way a committee may discuss 
and amend phrase by phrase the wording of a resolution. 
In the course of the discussion constant reference will be 
made to other external facts to which the resolution has 
reference: but the members of the committee do not dis- 
cuds their own or their fellow members' mental structures 
and processes, that is, they do not discuss their common 
mental frame. If two different and partly or wholly con- 
flicting mental structures or processes are determining 
the attitudes of the members to a particular clause or 
phrase, each party, in endeavoring to persuade members 
of the other to vote with it, will speak in terms of ends 
to be realised by the form of words in question or results 
which it is feared will follow from it; that is a mental 
structure or process is referred to or named by the end 
to which it is related. 
282 There appear to be several reasons for this. In 
the first place it is, as we have seen, the way in which 
our minds work, as much when we are making up our own 
minds as when we are seeking to integratelthemi with those 
of others. Whether the individual mode of thought condi- 
tions the social or is conditioned by it may be regarded 
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as doubtful: both have probably grown up together. But 
so far as social integration is concerned such a procedure 
has two clear advantages. 
First, it conduces to the formation of relations of 
the cooperative corn lementary tyre (section/3/ ) . We have 
seen already what difficulties there are, even in the 
case of a relation of friendly intimacy, between two 
persons in recognising differences of experience or motive: 
and such difficulties are much increased with the increase 
of numbers and the circumstances of debate, and are con- 
sequently fruitful in misunderstandings. Secondly, it 
still more facilitates the formation or relations of 
common or complementary ends (sectionS13a -4): and politic- 
al action, whether on the smallest or on the largest scale, 
is to a large extent based on such relations. In either 
of these cases a discussion of the elements in the common 
mental frame which is being formed would separate instead 
of bringing together. Indeed it is only a common mental 
frame based on similar determinants that could be 
strengthened by such a discussion: and such a discussion 
in usually unnecessary, for those members of a committee 
who are already responding in concord are as a rule al- 
ready working together for a common object, the next step 
to which is the attraction to themselves of someone who is 
not making such a response but who can be brourht in in a 
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relation of one of the other types. And thus it easily 
comes about t.at elements in a common form of exrr.essi n 
- for example, the adoption of a resolution by a committee 
- are determined by different beliefs and motives in the 
minds of different members who have cooperated in securing 
its adoption by the group. 
In cases in which a product of an individual mind 
is related to a series of systems of determinants it is 
usually described as over -determined. This term applies, 
for instance, to a dream in which a single element may be 
determined by more than, one system of dispositions, each 
of which sets upon it a different meaning or value. In 
cases in which a social product is related to dissimilar 
determinants in the minds of the different persons concern- 
ed, I propose to describe it as multi- determined. This 
term will then apply to the resolution of a committee 
which is supported by different members of the committee in 
consequence of dissimilar beliefs and motives, and to an- 
alogous social acts and products. 
284 The determinants involved may be roughly class- 
ified in three groups: - 
(a) There are first those which are openly expressed; 
and which are therefore consciously apprehended by those 
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who give them expression, and by those to whom they speak. 
They include all the beliefs and motives openly alleged in 
the course of debate which are actual beliefs and motives 
of those who express them. 
I should not include motives and beliefs which are 
merely alleged for tactical purposes. Such pretended 
mental structures and processes have no existence as de- 
terminants, though they may be related to actual determ- 
inants in two ways: (i) they are themselves determined 
by the motives and beliefs in consequence of which they 
are put forward as stalking horses, the motives and be- 
liefs with actual psychical existence which they are in- 
tended to disguise; (ii) they may operate upon the actual 
beliefs and motives of those to whom they are addressed -so 
as to turn these, as springs of action, towards the policy 
which is really aimed at by those who are engaged in this 
little game of deceit. Such tactics may be well- intention- 
ed and altruistic, as when used in the guidance of child- 
ren, or in seeking to influence foolish persons for their 
good. Or they may be self- seeking and corrupt. It is 
perhaps easy to exaggerate the frequency of such tactics; 
and occasions on which they are suspected or alleged arc 
- 
certainly more frequent than occasions on which they are 
actually followed. Thus the perfectly honest profession 
of a sentiment shared with one's opponents is frequently 
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met by them with suspicion and a charge of hypocrisy. It 
is however necessary to distinguish alleged beliefs and 
motives actually operative from beliefs and motives assert- 
ed but with no psychical existence. 
Determinants openly expressed and therefore conscious- 
ly apprehended by those who held them and by those who do 
not, may be called expressed determinants. 
285 (b) A man may support or oppose a resolution as a 
result of beliefs or motives which have wei= ht with himself 
but which he does not think it politic to express, as he 
thinks they will not have weight with others. They may be 
beliefs which the others do not share, and to which they 
are not likely to be persuaded. This may be because they 
are too well -informed or too intelligent to entertain such 
beliefs. It may also be because they are too ignorant or 
too stupid to understand them. They may be motives which 
the others do not share because they are less well- intent- 
ioned and public- spirited, or because they are more public - 
spirited and of better intentions. Such determinants may 
be called unexpressed determinants. The man in whose mind 
they operate may know quite well what they are but they, are 
not "before the meeting ". 
286 Unexpressed determinants are known to the man in 
whose mind they operate. Even though unexpressed they 
may be known to others who may in consequence regard him 
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as unpractical, or as a man moved by interests other than 
those they stand for, or seeking a personal and corrupt 
advantage. 
The same unexpressed determinànts may operate in the 
minds of some other members of the group. i'hese members 
will readily understand, from slight indications in one 
another's attitudes as expressed, that there is community 
of belief and motive between them. They will therefore 
readily come together in a common policy. It is frequent- 
ly the aim of the "hypocritical" tactics described above 
(section 284) to mimic such a situation by throwing out 
hints of a community of belief and motive which does not 
really exist. Where there is genuine community of belief 
and motive, the body of members who actually share such 
unexpressed beliefs and motives will readily come together 
as a sub -group. Meeting as such informally, they will ex- 
press these beliefs and motives to one another with a 
greater degree of freedom, varying from the explicit avow- 
al of them to hints and nods and ambiguous phrases which 
are well understood but commit no one. 
When such a sub -group reaches some degree of organ- 
isation and is recognised as such by other members of the 
group it constitutes a tarty. 
287 (e) Thirdly, psychical determinants may operate 
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without open expression, and without coming to the con- 
sciousness of the minds in which they operate. The 
thoughts and bliefs of these minds, and the verbal forms 
in which they are expressed, either publicly or privately, 
may be, and almost certainly are, related to endo- psychic 
processes (sections111 -115). These processes, and the 
mental structures related to them, may be cál led the 
unwitting determinants of social acts and products. 
In calling a social act or product multi- determined 
it is then meant that it is related to (a) expressed 
determinants, (b) unexpressed determinants and (c) un- 
witting determinants; and that the determinants in one 
mind which .are expressed through it may not be similar to 
those in another mind which are also expressed through it. 
288 The processes of multi -determination and the de- 
velopment of parties out of partial oppositions may be 
illustrated by an example. Op,_ositions arise out of the 
mental heterogeneity of a group. If a group is mentally 
homogeneous in relation to a situation which it has to 
meet, the relevant determinants in the minds of its 
members will be similar, and each member will make a 
similar response to that situation. If there is not such 
mental homogeneity the relevant dispositions will be dis- 
similar, the responses will be dissimilar, some degree of 
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opposition will result, and there will probably be an en- 
deavour to reach agreement through discussion and delib- 
eration. 
The process of deliberation involves the expression 
of soe of the determinants related to the opposition. As 
we have seen, not all the determinants so related will be 
expressed but each member who takes part in the discussion 
will seek to communicate to his fellows some part of his 
understanding of the situation and his Man for dealing 
with it. 
289 If we could have a knowledge of the structure of 
the relevant determinants in the mind of each person con- 
cerned we should see that these persons fell naturally 
into groups. Thus, if there are ten individuals concern- 
ed, there will not be ten entirely different readings of 
the situation, or ten distinct plans to meet it. Rather, 
if we examined each of the individual responses by itself, 
before the individual has a chance to be influenced by 
his fellows, we should find that they could readily be 
classified under a smaller number of types. The determin- 
ants in each might be different, but some would be, let 
us say, timid (with different degrees of timidity), some 
rash and impetuous, and some wise and prudent. Similarly 
some would represent different balances of the purposes 
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involved, one being willing to sacrifice one aim, and an- 
other a different aim common to all, for the assured 
attainment of a third purpose which he held to be more 
important. Differences of intelligence and relevant 
knowledge and experience would also result in different 
individuals favouring different plans. Thus immediately 
discussion begins in such a group, in such a situation 
there appear parties wit .in the group favouring different 
plans. 
290 A group of walkers, on meeting with unexpected 
difficulties on the mountains from a threatened change in 
weather, might break into three parties, each with a 
different plan. Of these, one party might favour an 
immediate return. It might consist, let us say, of one 
weather -wise climber who read the signs of the sky from 
long experience, of one timid member of the party ready to 
beat a retreat at any hint of danger, and of another member 
in whom a former unpleasant experience on the hills, de- 
termined, perhaps unconsciously, a preference for the 
prudent course in all cases. 
Thus the same plan (form of exTression) would be 
accepted by three persons for very different motives. It 
would have determinants in all three minds; but these 
would be far from identical. Similarly, a second party 
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might contain a man experienced- and prudent who believed. 
(perhaps with good reason) that the weather signs were 
less threatening than was alleged, and who, from his know- 
ledge of the particular walk in view, was confident that 
the party might safely proceed upon the next stage of their 
adventure and then either retreat in safety, if the storm 
still threatened, or proceed to the summit, if the sky 
had (as he expected) by that time cleared. Someone as 
prudent, but inexperienced in mountaineering might back 
him up upon a judgement that his sagacity and experience 
would lead him to a wise decision. Two others might back 
him up, one out of eagerness and the courage that enjoys 
danger and habitually defies it successfully; and the 
other because he was a fool and ready to face a danger 
which he was too stupid to understand, although he would 
be the first to fail in courage and determination upon 
actually meeting it. 
291 So far we have considered conflicts involving no 
diversity of ultimate purpose. All the seven men whom 
we have described -share the aim of climbing a particular 
summit, though they pursue that aim with different degrees 
of determination (i.e. the shared tendency has.different 
degrees of strength in them and other considerations com- 
pete with it with different degrees of relative strength). 
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Let us now suppose that three other members of the party 
originally advocated a different plan, the less ambitious 
project of climbing to a less difficult shoulder of the 
mountain. In the discussion of plans on the previous 
evening, they yielded to the other seven and agreed to 
unite with them in the more arduous and enterprising under- 
taking. Let us further suppose that their original plan 
has in the interval been put out of their minds entirely. 
Now, however, when they stand at the Partin;_: of the ways, 
the more ambitious project hangs in the balance and their 
former project revives in their minds. They urge it again 
with new weight, as involving less risk than an attack un- 
on the summit and less disappointment than a retreat. 
There is here something like regression, the process where- 
by, when in the individual mind some tendency is balked 
and defeated, an older and long repressed tendency re- 
asserts itself and begins again to determine thoughts and 
action. 
292 There are several points to be made in reference 
to this example. In the first place, we may note the 
complexity of the determinants which, in even a very small 
group pursuing a very simple project, lie behind its plan 
of action. John Smith wants to spend his fortnight's 
holiday at Zermatt. That statement is clear and short 
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and accurate. But if we ask why - that is, if we ask for 
an account of the determinants of this resolution - we may 
cover pages with an analysis of the motives leading to it. 
The group intends to climb a certain peak tomorrow. If 
there are ten members in it we may have to give an account 
of its motives ten times as complex as that of the motives 
of John Smith's holiday plans. 
In the second place, we may note that, although there 
is a common form of expression, there may be a consider- 
able variety of motive, and, as a result, we may h':ve in 
response to changes in the frame of external circumstances 
very great changes in the groupings of the mental dis- 
positions involved. Thus, thirdly, there are formed with- 
in it parties, sub- groups with a common loyalty (that is, 
with a common mental frame) which none will break, though 
there may be very pronounced conflict between them. Thus, 
if our walkers are divided so that one party .wishes the 
group to proceed and the other wishes the group to retreat, 
we have one psychological group with two parties within it. 
There is conflict within the group as to what the group's 
plan, or common form of expression, is to be; but there 
is no disintegration of the group, if either will accept 
the other's plan rather than secede. There may be very 
acute conflict of parties without disintegration of the 
group - conflict which may even in a nation go the length 
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of civil war. In Great Britain there was in 1914 party 
conflict so acute that intelligent foreigners reckoned 
upon disintegration of the body politic in face of the 
European crisis. Yet no such disintegration occured, for 
the common mental frame of all parties was (except in the 
case of some negligible minorities) atronger than the dis- 
integrating forces. Where this is the case we may proper- 
ly speak of such sub -groups as parties, implying by that 
term a common mental frame which, while admitting of 
serious conflict of aim or belief, secures the grout from 
disintegration. If, on the other hand, our mountaineers 
are divided so that one sub- group says: "We shall go on 
whether you come or not ", and the other: "We shall go 
back whether you go on or not ", then we have, not a group 
with two parties, but two separate groups. 
293 Such processes of deliberation and discussion as 
we have been considering are necessarily carried on verbal- 
ly. Agreement is reached when a verbal description is 
made of a form of expression acceptable to all. This 
verbal description is not itself a form of expression, or 
it is a form of expression of a special and limited kind. 
The real form of expression is the pattern of the action 
to be taken, and it is of this pattern that the verbal form 
adopted is a descri tion. The verbal form is then not the 
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form of expression but an instrument by means of which 
the form of expression may be better realised - it is in- 
termediary between the common mental frame and the common 
form in which it is to express itself. Such a form of 
words I shall call a verbal formula. 
294 A verbal formula is necessarily an imperfect re- 
presentation of an actual form of expression to which it 
is related. It cannot anticipate every future circum- 
/,3 
stance to which it may be related. It almost inevitably 
involves some degree of ambiguity. It cannot excite in 
anticipation the determinants which would be excited by 
the acttal circumstances it contemplates. It is the 
letter and not the spirit. 
It can however be so contrived as to admit of a high 
degree of multi- determination. Agreement of a kind may be 
reached by the adoption of a form of words to which two 
opposed parties agree, each privately putting its own inter- 
pretation upon it. Such are the devices of statesmen met 
in conferences to explore avenues until they "find a form- 
ula". 
A verbal formula is clear -cut; its definiteness is 
in sharp contrast to the shifting variety of its determin- 
ants, expressed, unexpressed and unwitting, which change 
in some degree with every phase of experience. In com- 
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parison with the mental structures out of which it arises, 
it is r.el:tively simple, relatively known, and relatively 
fixed. 
295 Some such formulae are, like the plan of the walk- 
ing party, related to a special occasion. which is not re- 
current. Some are intended to regulate a relation through- 
out an undetermined period of time, and therefore to be 
related to a number of occasions of a particular type. 
Such formulae are usually called institutions, they 
have the same characters of definiteness and fixity in 
contrast to their Mental determinants which can n,ver be 
more than partially known, and which show the continuous 
growth and change characteristic of living things. 
296 The relation between an institution and its de- 
terminants may now be considered. Let us su -p :ose two 
persons to decide to dine together every Saturday evening. 
That decision follows, let us say, upon a sudden dis- 
covery of a common interest in literature or rhiloso hy 
and a consequent enthusiasm for one another's com_,any. 
The weekly dinner is a common plan instituted by 
their common decision. It is an institution. It should 
be noted that it is the verbal formula to which both 
persons agree which is the real institution. This term 
Chap VIII Sect 296 501 
does not refer to the recurrent occasions of dining. 
Meeting and eating and talking are actions, and we may 
refer to the sequence of actions can any one Saturday 
evening as the act of dining together. The mental de- 
terminants in either person may be loosely called a habit 
of dining with the other; or the determinants in both 
minds the custom of dining together. The institution is 
the verbal formula to which act, habit and custom are re- 
lated. Its purpose is to give definiteness to the whole 
procedure, to let each partner know where he stands with 
the other and perhaps to make this evident to other persons 
also. 
The decision, having been made, is acted upon and con- 
tinues to be acted upon. Until it is reconsidered, it 
remains a definite and unchanging factor in the relation 
between the diners. But the mental processes and struct- 
ures out of which this institution arose have no such fix- 
ity. They remain fluid under the rigidity of the 
institution which has crystallised out of their flux, and 
which brings into it elements of greater stability. Thus 
no sooner has the institution of dining together on Sat- 
urdays been set up than the interests which have led to it 
begin to change. It may be that the common topic of in- 
terest which brought the diners together has such possib- 
ilities of growth that its exploration engages their con- 
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versation throughout their meetings for many months, leads 
to other relations between them relative to it, and 
possibly to some piece of research or writing undertaken 
in common. On the other hand it may occupy only a part 
of the time they are together; other and more absorbing 
common topics may be discovered, and these may oust it 
entirely. The original common interest may h -.ve been 
some aspect of literature or history; the final one may 
be philosophy or religion. Again, many other currents of 
interest may be drawn into the main stream. The insti- 
tution no sooner exists than it gives rise to a whole 
series of sentiments which owe their existence largely to 
it. Thus it determines very largely the nature of the 
sentiments of the diners for one another. The sharing 
of pleasu2able experience, good food and good wine, the 
intimacies and confidences that result from such circum- 
stances, the exploration of one another's characters and 
interests - all these foster the growth of sentiments 
which would otherwise remain relatively undevelcrred. Further, 
sentiments grow up for the place of meeting, for particular 
foods or wines, for the etiquette or order of the meeting 
and so on, and for the institution itself, the weekly 
dinner. Thus if we were to analyse in one of the diners 
the mental determinants of the dinner as an institution, 
first, at the moment of its inception, and, second, after 
Chap VIII Sect 296 503 
a year of its history, we should find a very great differ- 
ence indeed; whereas the institution itself might present 
little, if any, appearance of change. It was ah agree- 
ment to dine together on Saturday nights: it remains an 
agreement to dine together on Saturday nights. 
297 On the other hand, changes in the determinants of 
the dinner as an institution mi;_:ht just as well have gone 
in the opposite direction. The diners might not have dis- 
covered in one another a series of developing common inter- 
ests. Having agreed to dine, they might have gane on 
dining, having nothing better to do, and no one more inter- 
esting to meet; but the institution might be gradually 
deserted by the active interests that led to its inception. 
It might linger as a mutual regular engagement of two 
persons who,'having nothing else to do, have no pressing 
reason for breaking it until finally it lapses painlessly, 
or, giving rise to boredom and irritation, is finally 
dropped and abandoned by one of the partners to it. 
298 The more vigorous is the life of a group or a 
society the more numerous, and the more clear -cut, will be 
the institutions which it establishes for the furtherance 
of its life. Because of the fixity of such institutions, 
and the continuous processes of organic chante of their 
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determinants, they will of necessity become rapidly multi - 
determined. An institution may therefore be unchanging 
in the sense that there is no change in its verbal form, 
while in another sense it is changing rapidly - in the 
sense that it is related to ever changing determinants 
capable of rapid growth and delicate adjustment to ever 
varying circumstances material or mental. It is in this 
way that institutional development normally takes place. 
Some determinants of an existing institution cease to have 
any vitality; other determinants which have become 
focussed upon it express themselves through it. The em- 
phasis has changed from the old determinants to the new. 
This process is somewhat similar to the process in in- 
dividual minds which is called displacement, and that 
term may therefore be used for it. We may say then that 
institutional development takes place by multi- determin- 
ation and displacement. 
299 Since an institution has no power to produce social 
results apart from such determinants, its existence as a 
factor in the life of a group, so long as it continues to 
have such an existence, shows that it continues to be re- 
lated to living determinants in the minds of the members 
of the group. A mere verbal formula has no power. It 
has in fact no existence, except as an object of thought. 
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As an object of thought it may or may not be a focus of 
determinants which express themselves vigorous11y through 
it. If it is not a focus of such determinants in my 
mind, it will have no effect upon my behaviou °, however 
clearly I may apprehend it. If it is the focus of such 
determinants, I shall no doubt behave in accordance with 
it - a situation described by saying that I believe it, 
or that I accept it, the belief or acceptance being the 
relation to it of the determinants which express them- 
selves through it. Apart from such belief or acceptance, 
it is for me an object of thought in the same sense as the 
proposition that seven times eight is sixty four or that I 
should rub my nose against that of a colleague when I meet 
him. I can apprehend it with perfect clearness, and also 
with complete disbelief and refusal to act urön it. 
What is true of one person is true also of the group. 
An institution has no influence upon the activities of the 
group apart from determinants in the minds of members of 
the group, determinants which express themselves through 
it: or, in other words, the strength and stability of an 
institution are the strength and stability of elements in 
a common mental frame to which it is related. 
300 It is perhaps partly because a principle can be 
apprehended apart from acceptance or belief that it may be 
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felt as having an existence independent of the mind or 
minds that apprehend it. Whatever the reason may be it 
is certain that the principles implied in verbal formulae 
related to forms of expression are "felt" as having such 
existence. "I like this" and "This is good" may be used 
as equivalent expressions; but the second is, as we saw 
(section 272) "felt" as having wider application than the 
first. In the same way "We always drink coffee at break- 
fast" and "Coffee is the thing to drink at breakfast" are 
very near to being equivalent expressions, and they may be 
used as such; but 1,he second carries with it a vague 
implication that (a) it is a principle, independent of my 
or my partners' tastes, choice or experience, that coffee 
should be drunk in the morning, a principle which would 
be true if no one of us had ever tasted coffee in his 
life, (b) that I and my partners have become aware of this 
principle, and (c) that we have conformed our habits to it. 
Whereas, I suppose, on reflection we should all say that 
coffee having such and such effects upon human sense 
organs and physiological processes, and I and my partners 
having such and such native and acquired responses to it, 
the dispositions out of which these responses arise have 
become organised in a common mental frame of similar re- 
sponses, related to the common form of expression of 
coffee for breakfast, reached through the verbal formula 
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"Let us have coffee at breakfast ", and maintained through 
the acceptance of that formula, and through the continued 
vigour of the native and acquired dispositions related to it 
- an order of events almost exactly, the op_ osite of that 
which we have seen to be Vaguely implied in the usual manner 
of formulating the principle implied in any institution. 
301 That human reason can apprehend principles the truth 
and value of which is independent of the characters of the 
minds apprehending them, I have no desire to question. It is 
however necessary to see that the principles implied in in- 
stitutions do not necessarily have this independence: some 
mag have, some certainly do not. If two civilisations 
arising independently out of barbarism adopt the principles 
of the bath, that may be due to the similar mental and phy- 
sical constitutions of both races. If two civilisations 
arising out of barbarism discover independently the theorem 
of Pythagoras, or the theorem in which physics formulates 
the phenomena of gravitation, that seems to be due not mere- 
ly to their mental similarity but principally to the fact 
that the universe is of such a nature that these theorems 
are true of it. In the same way, of the principles implied 
in institutions some seem to be dependent upon subjective 
conditions, and some independent of them; but the "feeling" 
on the part of its upholders that an institution implies 
a principle independent of their tastes, habits, sentiments 
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and interests may be entirely deceptive, and admit of a 
complete explanation in psychological terms. Whereas, 
if it had such an independence, its explanation would lie 
mainly outside the field of psychology and within that of 
metaphysics. It is clear that all of the rrincir.les im- 
plied in institutions cannot be objectively valid, since 
contradictions can be found among them. Thus if in another 
circle the accepted principle is "Tea is the thing to 
drink at breakfast ",either the tea principle or the coffee 
principle must be without such objective validity. 
302 The principles implied in institutions are moral 
principles. As such they must come for judgement before 
the court of ethics not that of psychology. It is 
possible that ethics may show some of them to be morally 
true principles, which are, furthermore, as independent of 
the psychological structure of individual minds as the 
principles of geometry and logic, and which carry with 
them also an obligation or duty to act in accordance with 
them. It may show others to be dependent on the part- 
icular structure of particular minds, and so "true" and 
obligatory of these minds only. It may show others to be 
dependent on particular minds and morally indifferent 
- de gustibus non est disputandum. And yet others it may. 
show to be dependent upon the structure of particular minds, 
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and to be "false ", either in the sense that there is for 
these minds a moral obligation to act contrary to these 
principles, or that such a moral obligation is universal. 
These distinctions are not for psychology: nor for 
social psychology. For psychology there is however the 
problem:. In consequence of what mental processes does 
the impulsion of an appetite, an instinct, a sentiment, a 
taste, a habit or any other psychical structure come to 
be apprehended as a principle independent of the mind 
which apprehends it; and how does such a principle come 
to be apprehended as also an obligation upon the appre- 
hending mind or upon others? And for social psychology 
there is the corresponding problem: How do princi -les 
apprehended by individual minds as obligatory come to be 
socially recognised as obligatory, and embodied in in- 
stitutions which regulate social activities in accordance 
with them. These are much easier problems, and one to 
which observational and descriptive studies should in 
time afford adequate answers. 
303 On the first of these questions I have no more to 
say here than that, as a simple matter of observation, an 
impulsion when it reaches a certain intensity may be ob- 
served to acquire, quite irrationally, an accompanying 
"feeling" of obligation and, on rarer occasi(ms, an 
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impulsion when it reaches a certain intensity may be ob- 
served to acquire, quite irrationally, an accompanying 
"feeling" of obligation and, on rarer occasi'ns, an 
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additional "feeling" that the obligation extends to others, 
or to the universe in general; and finally to the Deity, 
who will be "blamed" or "cursed" if the impulsion in 
question is balked or defeated; and these "feelings ", 
which are intense and unmistakeable as experienced, have 
no necessary correspondence to the duties which ethical 
theory, or the moral tradition, would recognise, and no 
necessary correspondence to the duties and obligations re- 
cognised by the individual himself on other occasions. 
my own ethical views are perhas s irrelevant to this 
argument but I do happen to hold (perhaps on inadequate 
grounds, as I cannot claim an expert knowledge of ethical 
theory) that the mind can reach a knowledge of moral 
principles which are independent of the accidents of its 
own structure, and that it reaches them through the 
rational systematisation of its own immediate moral judge- 
ments in particular situations. I hold, that is, that in 
a particular situation an immediate judgement, of the 
form This is right or This is a duty, may be an immediate 
apprehension of moral truth, in the same sense that I hold 
that in a particular situation the judgement This is 
beautiful may be an immediate apprehension of aesthetic 
truth. False moral judgements, and false aesthetic judge- 
ments, may, I think, at least in some cases, be detected as 
false on purely psychological grounds. Thus, in either 
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case, I may be the sport of my instincts or emotions, and 
my judgement may not be a moral or aesthetic one at all: 
I am self -cheated. This poem or this picture gives me a 
thrill which I mistake for an aesthetic ex erience, and 
which results merely from my physiological condition, or 
from some unusual state of excitement of some instinct cr 
sentiment: I return to normal and see it for what it is. 
In the course of my aesthetic experience I sort out my true 
and enduring aesthetic judgements from the false judgements 
which have mimicked them; and in this way original 
aesthetic judgements and reflection together reach aes- 
thetic principles in the validity of which I can have con- 
fidence. In a similar way some moral judgements are 
immediate apprehensions of moral truth, and some are the 
result of psychological processes wriich can be analysed so 
as to show that they are not processes of moral judgement 
at all, and experience and reflection enable us to dis- 
tinguish between the true and the counterfeit. False or 
inadequate moral princi:les may then successfully mimic 
true ones, but they may be of such an origin that a purely 
psychological criticism will display the processes of their 
genesis and demonstrate their falsity. Claims to "rights" 
are frequently of this kind; and imagined duties may be 
eçually illusory: and a process of psycho -analysis (or 
simple self examination) may dissolve either of them. But 
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to detect a forged five pound note is not to deny the ex- 
istence and solvency of the Bank of England and_ I do not 
wish the opening sentences of this section to be inter- 
preted in the sense that all moral judgements are the self - 
deceptions which some pseudo -moral judgements can easily 
be shown to be. 
304 Forged bank notes are happily much more rare than 
genuine ones. Pseudo -moral judgements seem to me on 
the contrary to be more common than true ones, and the same 
assertion may be made of the principles implied in in- 
stitutions. The principles implied in institutions will 
therefore in different instances have a different ethical 
and psychological status according to the nature of their 
determinants. There are three possibilities:- 
(a),An institution may be related to determinants 
which involve no principle at all since they are the 
accidents of the personalities concerned. Thus in the 
example used above (section 296), the engagement of 
two persons to dine together on Saturdays is determined 
by their sentiments, habits and tastes and no principle 
is involved. 
(b) An institution may be related to determinants 
which are equally the accidents of the personalities 
concerned; but these determinants may be "rationalised" 
in the form of a principle which is "felt" as having 
obligatory force. 
(c) An institution may imply a princirle the ob- 
servance of which is a necessary condition of social 
life, or of the realisation of moral values, and there- 
fore a duty.1$' 
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The first type of institution can then be explained 
entirely in the terms of psychology and social psychology. 
The same is true of institutions of the second type: but 
the help of ethical theory may be necessary in order to de- 
tect them as suitable objects of Psychological reduction. 
The principles involved in institutions of the third type 
are primarily objects for the normative sciences. 
305 In the case of some institutions there is felt to 
be an obligation to maintain them, to conform to them 
and to enforce such conformity upon others. Such an ob- 
ligation will not be felt with regard to the first of the 
above classes of institutions: it is felt with regard to 
the other two; and felt as strongly in the case of 
principles of the second kind as in the case of principles 
of the third kind. Now it is clear that such principles, 
even when they are principles which ethical criticism would 
regard as obligatory, are not first arrived at by and of the 
procedures of ethics and then enshrined in institutions. 
By what psychological and social processes do they come to 
be accepted? 
306 It is clear that the process by which a principle 
becomes embodied in an institution is not one in which it is 
first arrived at by processes of philosorhic reflection, 
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then communicated to others and accepted by them, and 
finally given legal or social sanctions which secure con - 
JJ0° 
formity to it. The error of lOoking at institutions in 
this way led to the quite unreal problem: By what means 
is an institution (for example, political sovereignity) 
imposed upon a community? and to such answers as that it 
is imposed by fear in the first instance, and afterwards 
obeyed from habit. Institutions are not imposed upon a 
group from outside but developed from within. Doubtless 
an institution developed by one group or sub -group may 
be imposed upon another: but this is a secondary process, 
and it is not the origin of the institution so imposed. 
And the revolt against an institution which has been so 
imposed (or, which is more frequent, against an institution 
which has in consequence of social and psychological 
changes ceased to be related to and supported by the de- 
terminants to express which it came into existence and, in 
ceasing to be so related, has come to be "felt" as if it 
were imposed) has as its aim not merely the abolition of 
this institution but the setting up of another in its place 
which has its origin in the mental structu :es of the group 
and is an instrument of its common mental frame. 
307 The' "principles" which an individual "feels" as 
obligatory mayas we have seen5be rationalisati :ns of his 
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impulses. A number of such rationalisations arising on 
separate occasions are not likely to constitute a self - 
consistent system. He is therefore compelled to subject 
them to some degree of criticism,in proportion as he is 
self- conscious and self -critical enough to suffer dis- 
comfort from inconsistencies of belief or conduct. A 
self -consistent system of principles is not necessarily a 
morally valid system: but,si ice some of his princirles 
are likely to be morally Valid, there is the probability 
that his system may come nearer to being morally valid 
as it comes nearer to being consistent - provided he does 
not throw overboard the moral principles in favour of the 
immoral ones, or try there all on the Procrustes bed of a 
premature generalisation, and provided his system is a 
working system related to his everyday conduct. Valid or 
not, his system will bear a very different appearance from 
that of a series of particular, and inconsistent, ration- 
alisations of momentary impulses. 
308 When a similar process takes place, not in a single 
mind, but in a number of minds in interaction with one 
another, there are further factors at work which make for 
consistency. The degree of consistency reached will of 
course be related to the powers of reflection possessed by 
the members of the group, the extent to which they can free- 
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ly express their criticisms to their fellows and the ex- 
tent to which such criticisms result in modifications of 
the institutions which are accented. But a greater degree 
of consistency is likely to be reached by the group than by 
the individual, since the inconsistency to which one mind 
would turn a blind eye may be a glaring error to anoter: 
a greater consistency is the almost inevitable result of a 
variety of points of view. 
309 Principles implied in institutions accepted by a 
group will have a greater feeling of obligation attached 
to them.in consequence of that acceptance. There are 
three reasons for this. Firstly, they are possessed as 
we have seen cf this greater consistency. Secondly, they 
are probably as a result more in accordance with valid 
moral judgements. Thirdly, they derive a rrestige from 
their social acceptance" As we have seen (section 277) 
a judgement, really valid for an individual only, is easily 
supposed by him to be of universal application: the fallacy 
is one still easier to fall into if the judgement is con- 
curred in by his fellows and elevated into a principle 
jointly with them. 
310 Institutions, as the instruments of common mental 
frames, are, as we have seen, possessed of some of the 
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chartIcters of organic life - they grow or develop, they are 
I{q 
not fabricated. They have this character in two way's. 
Firstly, the changes they undergo are the resultants of 
changes in the common mental frame of which they are the 
instruments - and these changes are organic chancies, pro- 
cesses of mental growth and mental adjustment and readjust- 
ment. Secondly, they change in consequence of processes 
of reflection. These processes are not processes of re- 
flection which begin with the first principles of the 
scientist and the philosopher - they are processes of re- 
flection which begin with the principles already implied_ 
in institutions, and which have as their starting - -ints 
either a problem in the application of one of these 
principles or (less frequently) some inconsistency between 
/S0 
these principles as accepted. The result is minor 
modifications - changes in interpretation or increased 
multi -determination. The cumulative effect may be very 
great but the process is one of gradual develo__ment. It 
is a process which may be observed equally in the nursery 
and in the history of jurisprudence or constitutional law. 
311 The common forms of ex ression which are the ob- 
jects of explicit group discussion may be classified as 
(a) those which are relatively ends in themselves, (b) 
those which are the means to the realisation of further 
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forms of expression, and (c) those which have as their aim 
the regulation of the acti vities of the group in pursuit of 
(a) and (b). Forms of expression of the first two classes 
(a) and (b), have already been. discussed. Forms of ex- 
pression of the third class (c), I shall call regulative 
forms of expression, and I shall discuss them shortly. 
312 Ethics may classify ends as mediate and final: and 
for the purtoses of ethics I am quite prepared to regard 
such a classification as possible and necessary. I do 
not think that such a distinction can be maintained in 
social Isychology. For social psychology ends are not 
separate achievements of assignable value: they aré mere- 
ly events in an endless causal sequence which social 
psychology seeks to disentangle, and in which the sequence 
passes continually from mental structures to mental pro- 
cesses, from mental processes to forms of expression 
imaged or externally realised, and back again to mental 
processes and. structures. To trace out these causal 
sequences is not to attempt to reach absolute or relative 
value judgements with regard to any of them, and an event 
which is for ethics an event the value of which may be 
at least discussed, is for social ysychology a form of 
expression mentally represented and thought of as having 
value, or a form of expression realised in action; and 
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such an event is causally related to succeeding events 
which are its consequencs as well as to preceding events 
which are its causes. 
The different points of view may be illustrated from 
the parallel aesthetic case. A picture (or a poem) is 
for the critic an object to be judged relatively or 
absolutely: for aesthetics it is one of a class of objects 
which may or may not possess a certain kind of value, 
aesthetic value; and aesthetic theory seeks to discover 
the meaning (in conceptual terms) of this statement. But 
for social psychology, it is a forro of expression which has 
during a period of time developed in the mind of the art- 
it (or poet) , being determined in the course of that 
development by ce:tain mental structures and modes of ex- 
perience in the mind of that person, and in the minds of 
other persons; and which has in consequence of its em- 
bodiment in paint and canvas (or in words) a further life 
in the mind of its creator, and/in the minds of all other 
persons who look at it. The picture (or poem) is there - 
fore for its creator an end striven for, and (more or less 
perfectly) attained; for ethics it is, like any other end, 
an object for valuation. in möral terms; for aesthetics 
it is, again, an end for valuation, but in aesthetic terms: 
but for social psychology it is a starting point for a 
positive inquiry which moves both backwards and forwards in 
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time from the act in which it was created. 
313 For social psychology therefore a form of express- 
ion is not an end, although it may be necessary to note 
that it is, or has been, cognised as such by the agent or 
agents seeking it. The first two classes into which 
forms of expression may be divided may then be differ- 
entiated as (a) forms of expression which are regarded as 
ends by the agent or agents seeking them, and which are 
so regarded in consequence of their being felt to have 
value in themselves; (b) forms of expression which are re- 
garded as means to such ends and pursued upon this account 
only. It should be noted that this distinction has no 
reference to the characters of the forms of expression s 
distinguished: it refers solely to the attitude towards 
a form of expression of the agent from whose action it 
results. The same form of expression may thus on differ- 
ent occasions fall into either of these classes. Thus a 
ploughman ploughs a field as a means to a crop of wheat 
or as a means to a wage: but he may take a pride in 
ploughing a straight furrow, and as he holds the stilts 
he may be thinking bf the ploughing and not of the wheat 
or the wage. The same form of expression may indeed fall 
into both classes at once, if it is related to both 
attitudes of mind. Thus a picture ..ay be to the artist 
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who is painting it both an end in itself as the expression 
in form and colour of an aesthetic impulsion and also a 
means to a whole series of further ends as something to 
be made and sold. 
It has been necessary to make this clear, because 
the distinction which marks off the third class of forms 
of expression from the first two is not (like the dis- 
tinction which marks off the first from the second) in 
subjective terms. The first and second are distinguished 
as being thought about in a diffe ent way by the part- 
icipants in the processes which determine them: the 
regulative form of expression is distinguished by the 
fact that it performs a function of a particular kind in 
reference to the regulation of such processes. 
314 The common forms of expression to which the 
activities of a group are or may be directed are of in- 
definite number and variety. They are as inexhaustible as 
are life and mind themselves for they are the expression of 
a continuous process of living and thin'hing. As such they 
cannot be anticipated any more than the picture can be 
known (even to the artist) before it is painted or the 
Lc/ 
poem repeated to an inquirer before it is composed. Each 
is therefore related to an act which brings it into being 
as a unique pattern presented to external observation and 
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which is determined by a unique pattern of psychical 
determinants; and the total event is unique in the 
history of the universe, such that it can neither be 
anticipated nor repeated. 
There is therefore in the institutional structure of 
the group no prescription of the forms of activity ih 
which its common mental frame shall be expressed. We have 
seen that in the army anticipatory organisation is carried 
as far as it can be carried in any group. But no company 
commander whether in a home station or on active service 
can predict in what activities his company may be engaged 
when the ordinary course of routine is broken through in 
consequence of some unexpected emergency; no committee 
can know beforehand what manner of scheme will be the out- 
come of its deliberations. 
There is however in the institutional structure of 
the group a prescription of the order in accordance with 
wriich the comwon mental frame shall find expression in 
activity. The company mdy be doing police work during a 
riot or helping to get in a belated harvest or conducting 
salvage operations after an earthquake or a fire, but the 
relations of subordination between its commander and its 
officers and other ranks will be the same as if it were on 
the parade ground; it will have the same discipline, it 
will be subject to the same code of regulations. Whatever 
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delibcr.ated upon and consciously and voluntarily adorted. 
These are processes readily observed and studied. 
Such explicit awareness is however by no means an 
essential concomitant of the operation of such a regulat- 
ive principle. Such a principle maybe operative in 
regulating the activities of the group without being form- 
ulated in the minds of the members of the group. 
316 The last sentence employs a common mode of speech 
which is capable of leading to a serious misunderstanding. 
In what sense is there a principle at all if that principle 
is not apprehended? What existence can a principle have 
except as a conceptual object cognised by a mind or minds? 
And if it is not cognised by some of the members of the 
group (but only by some person or persons outside it) in 
what sense can it be said to be operative in the group? 
The common locution which was used must be translated into 
more realistic terms. Its meaning may be expressed more 
accurately by saying: The activities of the group are of 
a form or pattern in accordance with such a principle, 
although no such principle has been apprehended by any of 
the me::bers of the group. 
We are all quite clear that in response to external 
circumstances an individual may modify his activities on a 
pattern which is adapted to those circumstances, that he 
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may do this without first formulating to himself the 
principle involved,.and that, after experience of the 
effectiveness of the pattern, he may state to himself the 
principle involved in it. In a way exactly parallel the 
responses of the members of a group to one afiother may 
come to be modified on patterns which facilitate the 
pursuit of ends which they have in common. Such modifi- 
cations are elements in the common mental frame and they 
may be modifications which have resulted from the inter- 
actions of its members without the intervention of their 
conscious processes. As such they are regulative mental 
structures (section 155); they are not apprehended, and, 
as they are not formulated in conceptual terms, they can- 
not be cognised in such terms. Such regulative mental 
structures modify the activities of the members of the 
group relative to one another, and modify them in accord- 
ance with a form or pattern which is not necessarily 
cognised by them though it might presumably be cognised 
by someone ab extra (for examle, by a scial psychologist 
engaged in the study of the group). On the basis of such 
observations such a person might seek a conceptual formula 
to describe these obse_ved modifications of the behaviour 
of the members of the group; and such a formula if he 
stated it would be his (not the group's) formula. It 
would be his way of ordering or summing up his observations, 
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not a principle of action regulating the activities of the 
members of the group in consequence of their cognisingit 
and conforming their acts to it. He would not be just- 
ified in saying "The group acts upon this principle ". He 
would be speaking accurately i_' he said: "This princi le 
sums up my observations of _ast occasions of such action, 
and it enables me to make predictions about future ones ". 
He would be speaking ambiguously as between these two 
meanings if he said "The group acts as if in accordance 
with this principle ". 
317 Now just such observations may be made from inside 
the group. One or more members may formulate a principle 
related in this way to occasions of the operation of a 
regulative form of expression. This is most likely to 
hap en when one of the members of the group anticipates 
from another a response in accordance with the regulative 
form of expression and is disappointed in his expectati ̂n. 
On such an occasion of apprehending f ''r the first time the 
principle involved in a regulative form of expression he 
not only apprehends the principle involved but experiences 
3-A 
strong conative states with regard to it. His apprehers ion 
of the principle is in fact only the conceptual aspect of 
a frame of mind in which the central factor is a powerful 
conation directed to the end of securing from the other the 
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desired response. The principle is therefore not first 
a conceptual process, and, secondly, the same conceptual 
process supported by a conative disposition which has be- 
come attached to it for some further reason still to be 
explained. It is a conative state first; and a conative 
state accompanied by a conceptual formulation of its end 
in a generalised form, only at a later stage. As we have 
seen, all conative states of sufficient intensity will 
tend to express themselves in such generalisations (section 
303). In most cases they cannot readily do so because 
such a generalisation will not be socially accepted1; but, 
in this case, because of the existence of the regulative 
mental structure (which has given rise to this situation) 
in the minds of other members of the group, these other 
members may share in putting pressure upon the innovator, 
and, in doing so, they express a conation arising out of 
the regulative mental structure as a part of the organ- 
isation of their own minds. In the discussion which is 
inevitably involved, that conation expresses itself in 
their minds in the same or in similar conceptual terms. 
Thus the princi,le, as apprehended by the group in con- 
sequence of such occasions, is not a conceptual object to 
1We may observe its social acceptance on the art of an 
child mother and a spoiled hd ancd pcon "sequent 
erection of appetites and desires into principles within 
the system of this twofold relation. 
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which somehow conative support must come to be attached 
before it can be effective in determining group action. 
The apprehension of the principle is rather the concept- 
ual aspect of a predominantly conative frame of mind; 
and the conative dispositions involved are conative dis- 
positions directed to the achievement of forms of express- 
ion of which the observance of the principle is a con- 
dition, not to the assertion of the principle for its own 
sake. The principle is thus from the beginning the ex- 
/.S3 
pression of powerful conative dispositions. 
318 The statement and criticism of a principle of 
action in consequence of conative states which seek ex- 
pression through it is the social process out of which all 
statement and recognition of conceptual rules governing 
social conduct arise. It is to be noted that, in the 
simplest and primary case, the principle involved is acted 
upon before it is stated or socially recognised. 'Then so 
stated it is from the first a focus of conative dispositions 
and its social discussion is not an "academic" proceeding 
(that is, it is not a scientific or philosophic inquiry 
directed to the discovery of truth for its own sake); it 
is a process directed to the social adjust_,_ent of powerful 
dispositions. It is for these a necessity that, if the 
principle hitherto implied in social action is impugned, 
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it shall be defined and imposed upon the delinquent. 
Out of such a necessity develop systems of law whether in 
small groups or in great associations or in a community 
which develops a political structure. The political 
structure has from this point of view a double aspect. 
It is primarily a means to the construction, maintenance 
and administration of such systems; but it is itself a 
form of order of exactly similar origin and nature. The 
group legislates in order to regulate the relations of 
its members to one another: it also legislates to set up 
a constitution to regulate the procedure of its members 
as legislators to that end. 
319 This argument has now been pursued far enough for 
the present purpose. Pushed beyond this point it would 
become an examination of the development of institutions 
which belongs properly to historical jurisprudence not 
to the present inquiry. Such studies have of course a 
psychological aspect, and the examination of that aspect 
is a part of the whole field of social psycholo-'y (section 
21) ; but it is a part of that field in which the primary 
equipment or the worker must be the techniques of history 
and of jurisprudence, a part of the field in which the 
worker must be a specialist in jurisprudence using the 
technique of psychology as an ancillary method of study. 
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It is enough to say that the development of his 
Science has its origin in this social process which we 
have been describing. It is essentially the discrimir -. 
ation and formulation of ' principles implied in the common 
regulative mental structures of a society, the detection 
of their implications, the systematisation of them in 
codes as free from ambiguity and inconsistency as may be, 
and their harmonisation with the accepted moral princi-les 
of the community. The pursuit of jurisprudence is a 
science, but it is also a social process. No social 
science can be detached from its object as is a physical 
science or a biological science. Every social science 
is itself a social process and its formulations are at 
once social products and operative social principles. 
This is perhaps clearer in the case of jurisprudence than 
/5z{ 
elsewhere. 
310 In the study of the small group the principles 
worked out in this chapter with regard to institutional 
structure are obscured by the fact that such a group 
takes most of its institutional structures from outside. 
The rules of procedure are similar in every public meeting, 
and in every committee: they do not require to be invented 
again in the course of the life of every group. Instituticn- 
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al forms are t :'ansmitted from group to group, and are 
the- 2efore a part of the subject matter of Chanter X. 
In watching a group at work in adapting regulative forms 
of expression for its purposes, we are usually watching 
a combination of the process of transmission and the 
processes here studied. Whatever be the share of each 
process in the result, the regulative form of expression 
adopted has social existence and social efficacy only 
in so far as it is determined by elements in the common 
mental frame of the group. In so far as these elements 
are perceptions of moral principles of absolute validity 
(if there are such) the group approximates to Tithe Heaven- 
ly City". But the discussion of such principles belongs 
to philosophy and not to either social psycholo_-- or 
jurisprudence. 
Chapter IX 
Group structure in relation to initiative 
...Will and reason (Reason also is choice)... 
Nowe there are diversities of gifts,... 
The best is he who of himself doth know; 
Good too is he who listens to the wise; 
But he who neither knows himself nor heeds 
The words of others is a useless man. 
Chapter IX 
Group structure in relation to initiative 
321 In some primitive groups corporate action appears 
to be possible without formal organisation and without 
leadership. Its basis seems to be in similar and com- 
plementary responses of the members of the group arising 
out of a common mental frame, without debate, and without 
the intervention in the process of regulative forms of ex- 
pression previously arrived at as a result of debate. 
However this may be it is certainly true that 
analogous phenomena can be found in small groups of civil- 
ised persons which can be explained in that way. Two or 
three or four persons are in one another's company walking 
or travelling or climbing; there is no recognised leader, 
there is no explicit organisation; but this person under- 
takes on behalf of the group this function and another that; 
this burdensome task is taken in turns, that advantage is 
passed from one to another; and each member of the group 
contributes some element to its common life - some element 
of skill or knowledge or talent - which the others do not 
command. In this way there results a high degree of in- 
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tegration of responses; but it all happens "naturally ", 
that is, without discussion or consideration, without 
conscious adjustment. It results from a series of com- 
plementary responses and a consequent organisation of 
them in a common mental frame as they issue in action. 
There is no discussion, and the adjustments of one to an- 
other are things plut8t vécues que penseés. 
It is in such groups that the simplest phenomena of 
leadership may be observed and studied. They may be seen 
to be related on the one hand to individual differences 
and on the other to the similar and complementary responses 
out of which a common mental frame is built up. 
322 In any situation to which two or more persons are 
in a condition to make similar responses, these responses 
are likely to differ from person to person, (a) in the 
quickness with which they follow upon the event the - -)er- 
ception of which initiates them (and there may also be 
differences in the quickness of the perception), (b) in 
their vigour or persistence, and (c) in the degree to 
which they are nicely differentiated and adjusted to the 
particular facts of the situation. 
The simplest case is that in which in a common 
situation an event takes place which is of such a kind that 
on being perceived it will be responded to similarly by two 
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or more persons. If one of them perceives it before the 
others, his response may direct their attention to it, and 
the kind of response which he makes may influence them to 
res_:;ond in the same way. If these persons are walking to- 
gether and one of them sees a bird rise from the water and 
cries in excitement, "There's a heron:" the attention of 
the others will be directed to it. The response of the 
first shares therefore in determining the responses of the 
others. In consequence of it their responses may be made 
sooner; or they may be made in cases in which they would 
not otherwise have been made at all; or they may be made 
different degrees of intensity. Furthermore the 
whole situation to which their responses are actually made 
is a situation in which the response of the first is an im- 
portant element, and is to that extent different from a 
situation in which the bird is noticed indeendently of 
such prompting. The nature of their responses will un- 
doubtedly be affected by this. Exactly in what way they 
are affected is a question of a highly specialised kind and 
the subject of highly specialised inquiry, and I shall not 
pursue it. It is enough to suggest that it may involve 
the excitement of feeling through the operation of 
primitive passive sympathy; that it may be related to the 
excitement of the self- tendencies and coloured by a wave 
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of negative self feeling followed by a quick return to 
equilibrium by the way of the emotion of opposite polarity; 
that the first person as an e1eent in the situation as 
presented to the other persons is related to the central 
element in that situation as an associated. stimulus. I 
believe that all three processes may be detected. 
323 The last of these is probably of more importance 
than the others in leading to a permanent modification of 
the relation to the first person of the others. It is 
easy to see that by becoming in this.way an element in the 
situation that stimulates a certain tendency or range of 
tendencies these tendencies may come to be more readily 
stimulated in connection with him on future occasions; 
and possibly also less easily stimulated apart from him. 
A little conside ation will show that an exactly 
parallel argument could be set out in reference to cases 
in which an event in a common situation is perceived 
simultaneously by all the members of a group but one of 
them resonds to it more quickly than the others (a), or 
more vigourously and persistently than the others (b), or 
with a response more nicely differentiated and adjusted to 
the circumstances than that of which they would have been 
capable in the absence of his response as a cue (c). Should 
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one member of a group on any occasion in any one of these 
ways determine or share in determining the res- ronses of 
the other members of the group, he ;!ill, in consequence, 
when a similar situation occurs again be more likely to 
determine, or share in determining, the responses of his 
fellows; and this likelihood will be again increased on 
each such occasion. This facilitation of initiative is 
a result of the modification on each such occasion of the 
mental organisation of each person concerned, these modi- 
fications forming part of the common mental frame of the 
group on subsequent occasions. 
324 Let us now suppose a common situation to which two 
or more responses may be made and two or more persons on 
the point of responding to it, one in one way and another 
in another. One for example may be about to retreat from 
motives of caution, another to advance from motives of 
curiosity. It may, for example, be three persons walking 
in the country who see some living, thing move under a tree, 
approach it and, when it instead of fleeing approaches, 
perceive it to have the ac; :earance of a stray ferret. The 
situation may then become one of conflict between the im- 
pulse to a further approach and the impulse to retreat. 
Let us suppose this conflict to be in the case of two of 
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the persons an unstable equilibrium of impulses and let 
the third respond strongly in the direction of retreat, 
giving ground and saying, "It's a nasty, biting thing: 
don't go near it ", or in the direction of advance, approach- 
ing and allowing it to rub itself against his legs, while 
saying "Look, it is quite a friendly little thing ", then 
his words and action will probably determine the solution 
of the conflict in the minds of the others in the direction 
of his own response. It should be noted that trais does 
not necessarily imply a relation of primitive -passive 
sympathy whereby the mode of feeling of the third e son 
evokes a similar mode of feeling in the others: in each 
of them two groups of dis=positions are seeking expression 
in incompatible patterns of activity, one of these patterns 
is seen to be embodied in the action of another, and the 
sight of it gives that pattern an emphasis which settles 
the conflict in its favour. Such an influence of the 
mind of the one on the other may however be reinforced by 
primitive passive sympathy as a result of which a primary 
emotion of fear or tenderness may be induced in the others, 
the impulse of which shares in determining the conflict. 
And if there is considerable rashness or timidity on the 
part of one or both a tone of voice strongly coloured wi_ h 
fear or implying confidence and tenderness may be the most 
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effective means of determining their responses in one's 
own direction. Also a confident approach on the part of 
the third person upsets the equilibrium of the self ten- 
dencies in the minds of the hesitant: if the fear is 
strong enough, negative self feeling, and the self seen as 
lacking the courage of another may, of course, simply be 
accepted; but if the issue between advance and retreat is 
in the balance, the momentary loss of equilibrium of the 
self tendencies may issue in an impulse of assertion which, 
by reinforcing the motives of advance, effectively de- 
termines the conflict in the other direction. I have 
purposely chosen an example which permits of the illus- 
tration of such intervention of primitive passive sympathy 
and the self- tendencies. I believe them however to play 
the part of accessories merely, to the more fundamental 
process by which, when an individual hesitates between two 
patterns of activity, the exhibition of one of them in the 
response of another person may result in his conflict being 
decided in favour of that pattern. 
325 The effectiveness of these processes whereby the 
response of a member of a group determines the responses 
of the others (whether this determination turns upon 
priority, vigour, persistence, appropriateness, the em- 
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phasis given by example to one pattern of activity over 
another, primitive passive sympathy, the a peal to the 
assertive tendency, or any combination of them) de-oends 
upon that member's becoming at the critical moment an ob- 
ject of the attention of the others: ftr upon such an 
attention each of these processes dey;ends.1 It may there- 
fore be of decisive importance that he should act and speak, 
con atto e voce d'espedito duce... 
/sr 
Such action and speech must above all convey no suggestion 
of doubt or hesitation; and if they are marked by grace 
of body and beauty of voice so much the better. A certain 
emphasis of gesture or tone may also attract and hold the 
attention; but mere intensity or excessive emphasis may 
defeat their purpose. In some cases mere bodily size may 
be of value. 
326 The influence and value of such factors in attract- 
ing and holding the attention are easily observed. e 
1Thus at Gallipoli when a body of troops seemed to 
hesitate a gallant officer led their advance with a 
cane in his hand; and on more than one occasion a 
piper has acted in a similar way in the case of Scottish 
troops. In either case cane or pipes presumably played 
a part in causing the officer or the piper to be imitated, 
because they helped to attract attention to him. A 
single rifleman advancing would presumably not have 
attracted the same attention. 
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should not allow this to blind us to he fact that they 
are only accessories to the :.o -e im- or. Cant p-yocesses which 
were first described. Thus, if, in a group of five persons 
one, in a situation in which three tend to respond in one 
way, responds quickly, emphatically and with such ad- 
vantages as we have just enumerated, but in another and in- 
compatible way; and if the fifth with equal readiness and 
emphasis but without such advantages responds in the 
direction to which the other three are tending; it cannot 
be doubted that their responses will be determined rather 
by the fifth than by the first. A cumbrous object in 
movement may be given a very effective push in the direct- 
ion in which it is already going when all the force of 
one's body, exerted upon it in the other direction, is 
without any result. 
327 Let us now return to the example of the stray 
ferret and let us suppose that there is a fourth person 
present with the perty who has some knowledge of this 
animal. Let us. suppose him to give no sign so that a 
course of events follows upon the sight of the beast such 
as we have already described and leading either to advance 
or retreat. Let him then intervene by saying: "It's a 
stray ferret. There'll be trouble if it gets among the 
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pheasants. We must catch it and give it Over to the 
game keeper. Be careful: they bite." and with the 
assistance of the others proceed to catch it and pick it 
up in an expert manner. Is there any doubt that his 
lead will be accepted as soon as it is realised that he 
has special knowledge and experience? Or that this 
acceptance will be de endent upon this realisation? 
Let us how suppose the first determination of the 
group's action whether in the direction of retreat or 
foolhardy approach to have had all the accessory ad- 
vantages which hve been noticed; will not the realisation 
of the fourth man's special knowledge and experience out- 
weigh these altogether, and as immediately as decisively? 
Let us even suppose him to be not really a member of the 
group at all but in the position of a servant, let us say 
the chauffeur carrying the picnic basket; or, to go a 
step further let him be not only a servant but a boy and 
the others adults; the result will still be the same 
- knowledge and experience, recognised as such, will in a 
situation of doubt outweigh the advantages of age and 
prestige. 
328 In so far as we judge this to be generally true 
we must say that the principal factor in enabling one 
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member of a group to give a lead which will be accepted by 
the others is his ability to provide an acceptable .pattern 
of action, a' form of expression upon which the d isrositions 
of the other members of the group readily focus themselves. 
The emphasis must be upon the acceptability of the form of 
expression which he offers. Its acceptability will depend 
upon (a) its relation to the tendencies in them which are 
active or can be readily stimulated to activity, (b) upon 
its being made at a favourable moment in relation to these 
factors, and (c) upon its appropriateness to the external 
factors of the situation. The appropriateness of a plan 
of action is not however a guarantee of its being accepted, 
since its acceptability is not proportionate to its effect- 
iveness or probable effectiveness, but to the degree in 
which it appears to the other members of the group as like- 
ly to be effective. The acceptability of the --:lan which 
is in fact the appropriate res onse to a particular sit- 
uation depends therefore on the ability of the other 
members of the group to judge it as such; acid this depends 
upon their intelligence and relevant knowledge. This as- 
pect of the question will be discussed presently (sections 
34f-35-7). The principle is further 
limited in the case of 
organised groups by the fact that their organisation puts 
certain persons, the recognised leaders, in 
a specially 
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favou_ able position to give a lead. The value of such 
organisation is that, if the persons placed in su.ch 
positions are wisely chosen, they a--e. the persons most 
capable, in most of the situations that will arise, of 
giving an effective lead. In so far as this can be 
achieved, and in so far as their special relations with 
the other members of the group as its recognised leaders 
give an added acceptability to their proposals (even, in 
the case of a disciDlined body, to the extent of their 
being accepted without question), their leadership is 
rendered independent of the limitations of intelligence 
and relevant knowledge of the other members of the group. 
329 Where there is no such organisation, implicit or 
explicit, initiative may pass readily from one member of 
the group to another to the advantage of all. A pretty 
example may be quoted fr,m Major A.J. Evansts account of 
his escape from Germany where he had been a prisoner of 
M1 
war. Initiative seems to have been very evenly divided 
between him and his companion, between whom there was an 
agreement that they "would always take the counsel of the 
more cautious of the two at any moment". He records his 
indebtedness to the latter, during a period of extreme 
bodily and mental strain, in respect of "these little 
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extra exertions which mean so much - such as climbing a 
few yards down a river bank to get water for both, and 
being the first to suggest starting; again after a rest" 
(my italics). The second of these quotations may also 
be considered in relation to a principle, noticed above 
but not illustrated (section 318), the relation of 
effective initiative to the vigour and persistence of 
impulses. 
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330 In an unorganised group in which the members re- 
gard themselves as being on a footing of equality in- 
itiative may in different situations 
members of the group and in each case exert its influence 
and pass. This may be seen also among animals. The 
pack is at fault: one dog picks up the scent, gives the 
appropriate cry and is followed by the others. And on 
another occasion it may be a Jiff e7ent dog that gives a 
lead in this way. In the case of human groups situations 
are more varied, and, when similar situations recur, there 
will accordin;_;ly be some degree of increased power of in- 
itiative on the part of the member who has previously 
given an effective lead in a situation of that particular 
kind. Such facilitations of initiative - an increased 
readiness on the part of some individuals to give a lead 
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in particular situations and an increased readiness on 
the part of the others to follow him - come to be organ- 
ised as part of the group's common mental frame. 
Analogous phenomena may be observed in the working' 
of committees. Initiative may lie for the most part with 
the chairman, but it may pass, as different problems fl.rise, 
from one member of the committee to anot.hr who is recog- 
nised as having special knowledge or ex:erience, or who 
displays at the moment special gifts of persuasiveness. 
The formal organisation of the group gives to the chairman 
special powers with regard to the ordering of the pro- 
cesses of debate; it cannot give him special powers of 
initiative with regard to the matter of the debate, but 
he has probably been chosen for the power of initiative. 
which he has already shown as a member of committee, and 
so combines in his person both of these conditions of 
effective leadership. 
331 In groups without ex licit organisation there may 
be a beginning of implicit organisation when different 
members of the Croup come to possess a special power of 
initiative in different types of situation - 
a special 
power of initiative based primarily upon the process 
by 
which they have become specialli associated. 
with the 
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central elements in such situations, and secondarily upon 
their being recognised by their fellows as possessing 
special ability, knowledge or experience in respect to 
such situations. This recognition may be in different 
degrees a conscious process in the minds of individuals: 
when there is conscious recognition by one or more of them, 
it may be expressed in conversation so that conscious re- 
cognition on the part of the others follows. And in this 
way the group a ,roaches the condition of explicit organ- 
isation - the formal recognition of specific relations 
between individuals and the rest of the group. 
Thus in an unorganised group one member may quickly 
come to be recognised as the leader in sing- songs, another 
in sports and a third in mischief. Now the leader in 
one type of activity has in consequence a certain pro- 
minence in other activities, so that the acknowledgeLleader 
in musical activities will, on account of his consequent 
"popularity ", take, if he w:.sh.es, a more prominent place 
in athletic activities than would otherwise have been 
open to him; and the leader in athletics will have an 
influence with the group through which he can set limits 
to the activities of the mischief maker. quite parallel 
is the influence of the novelist's, the sportsman's or 
the scientist's reputation if he enters politics or the 
scientist's if he makes public his views on philosophy 




332 In an unorganised group of moderate size it is 
sometimes _ ossible to observe a further development of 
leadership. One member begins to have a general fr.e- 
dominance over the others. His predominance begins, 
through the processes we have discussed, first in one 
field and then in another in which he is able to provide 
acceptable patterns of action. In other fields he attains 
an equal prominence, which is partly dependent upon the pro- 
minence he has attained elsewhere, and partly on the absence 
of a competitor with powers of initiative in these fields 
sufficiently greater than his own to counterbalance the 
advantage that he has from his leadership elsewhere. And 
now in connection with yet otner matters - matters in re- 
spect to which he has no special qualifications - there 
will be a willingness to hear what he has to say, or he 
will be loudly called upon. Conjoined with this will be 
a tendency on the part of members of the grow who do not 
have, and do not hope to have, its ear but who would like 
to see the action of the group guided in this direction 
or that, to put their knowledge and their suggestions at 
his clic:osal. And, if he judges well in choosing this 
or that pattern of action which they suggest to him, he 
Chao IX Sect 332 
549 
may make his leadership effective in these matters also. 
We have then a group with a single leader. 
333 As such his power may quickly become very much 
greater than the sum of the powers of the leaders of a 
similar group each of whom has a sphere of influence 
limited to one aspect of his groupt activities. For his 
prestige becomes so great that his pronouncements have in 
consequence a very great suggestive power. The beginning 
of this we have already noticed in speaking of the develop- 
ment of his influence in fields in which he has no special 
knowledge or ability. It is enormously enhanced when he 
has come to be recognised as a leader in all sections of 
the group's activities. Accordingly, whenever he takes 
the initiative, the patterns of activity which he suggests 
are rendered acceptable, not merely by the extent to 
which they focus tendencies specific to that activity or 
their apparent appropriateness to the situation and the 
purpose in view, but by the mere fact that they emanate 
from him, that each of them is his ipse dixit. If his 
predominance is to continue, it must rest upon a nice 
adjustment of the patterns of activity he puts forward to 
the tendencies of some members of the group; and this 
adjustment may result in part from a fortunate coincidence 
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of his mental processes and theirs, but, althou.c-h it may 
have begun in this way, such good fortune is not likely 
to last indefinitely, and, if such an adjustment is to be 
maintained, it must be done through processes of other - 
consciousness - through an awareness on the part of the 
leader of the movements of the minds of others and of a 
judgement as to which patterns of activity will in con- 
sequence be acceptable, accompanied by a judgement as to 
which movements of opinion, which sub -groups, it is 
necessa y to conciliate in this way.1 He cannot rule by 
prestige and consequent power of suggestion alone: but 
these relations may go a long way to make his leadership 
absolute so long as it has its main supÿort in the solider 
foundation of relations of the kind out of which we have 
seen that it grows in the first instance. When he fails 
to do this his prestige rapidly falls and a little 
revolution follows. 
334 So long as he maintains his position, members of 
the group will in each new situation tend tT look to him 
for a lead, some on account of the mental structures just 
described, and some because they know his leadership- will 
1The dictum of Lord Fisher, in which this ,.rinci le is 
given a wider a :placation, may be quoted here: "The 
art of government lies in the intelligent anticipation of 
agitation.'1O 
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carry the majority. The pattern of activity which 
emanates from him will be generally adopted and harmonious- 
ly acted u', :on. But the spontaneous responses of the 
members of the group to the situation will be released and 
expressed only in so far as this pattern of activity allows 
of their expression, and they will be denied expression in 
so far as it does not do so. Considering the variety of 
response of which a human being is capable it is clear that 
there will be some degree of suppression in the case of 
every, or nearly every, member of the -group: and in the 
case of some there will be what aears to the man himself 
as a greater degree of than release. What we 
have said so far implies that there is no acti.Ye sedition 
in the group. Should someone seek to displace the lead- 
er it is by offering patterns of activity which focus 
these suppressed tendencies that he may hope to do so. By 
offering such patterns he organises these tendencies as the 
common mental frame of a party within the group (section 
292). 
335 The case of the wiring party (sections 257 -262) may 
be considered again in the light of these principles. A 
platoon is of course different from the groups which we 
have been mainly engaged in considering, in that it has a 
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formal organisation, and consequently a leader with a 
defined relation to its other members. The circumstances 
were however such that this structure had practically broken 
down, or at least was in abeyance to such a degree that 
the g :oup was approximating to one without formal organ- 
isation. In consequence there was a complete dissimilar - 
ity in the responses of the leader to the situation and 
those of the men, the attitude of the leader being marked 
by a firm intention to get the wire up by one means or 
another, a considerable grasp, thro_.gh other- conscious 
processes, of the movements of the minds of the men, and 
the knofledge it was best for all concerned that they 
should be led to make a start with the work. 
It was a situation in which it was necessary to re- 
vert to leadership of the simplest kind - leadership based 
upon a response in anticipation of the responses of the 
members of the group, in this case a hearty "grouse" at 
the night's task. The choice of a response for t`_is 
purpose depended on an appreciation of the trend of thought 
and feeling in the group, that is, on other -consciousness. 
Foremost among the advantages of the response chosen was 
its effect in compelling attention. When attention was 
secured use was made of it to transmit to the men's minds 
the patterns on which. it was desired that they should act. 
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This also was done with the same appearance of simple 
leadershi._ by proceeding as a member of the group to set 
about the work, the only difference from such simple 
leadership (so far as appearance went) being in the rather 
dramatic way in which it was done. The outward form of 
the behaviour, the appearance it bore to the men, was that 
of simple leadership, of giving a lead, of going in front 
or setting about the work first; in other words initiative 
based on similarity and priority of response. Actually 
this appearance covered motives and processes not at 
work in the platoon at all, including the other- conscious 
processes. 
336 The continuance of the life of a grow.;., like the 
continuance of the life of an or, ,anism depends urn a 
continuous process of adjustment to an ever -changing 
environment. In the words of Samuel Butler, "Nothing 
will ever die so lonL as it knows what to do under the 
circumstances,... "'61In the case of the group the patterns of 
activity by which such an adjustment is reached must come 
from individuals - from all of the members of the group, 
or from some of them. We have hitherto distinguished 
patterns originating with different members of the group 
in terms of their acceptability, that is , in terms of 
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their relation to those conditions within the group itself 
which are relevant to their acce.tance. We must now con- 
sider them from the point of view of their electiveness, 
that it, in terms of their relation to those conditions both 
within and without the group which are relevant to the 
attainment (with a reasonable economy of effort or of the 
sacrifice of other ends) of the ends to which the activity 
is directed; in other word:, in terms of their fitness to 
secure an adjustment of the group to its environment so as 
to secure the ends which it is seeking. It is obviously 
of the greatest importance to the group, as well as usually 
to its members as individuals, that the pattern with great- 
est effectiveness should be adopted. 
337 Every situation is a new situation and therefore 
every response perfectly adapted to a situation must have 
some degree of novelty. If, however, situations never 
repeat themselves absolutely, types of situations recur 
to which routine responses are, with a little adjustment, 
the sufficient answers. In the case of the group the 
same structures that determine effective individual re- 
sponses may determine effective group responses. One 
individual .perceives an enemy and takes to flight; a 
number of such individuals perceive such an enemy and fly 
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together; it is in either case a routine response based 
upon innate tendencies, or if the enemy is one the fear of 
which has been learned, upon a combination Of innate and 
acquired tendencies. It is a simple case of similar re- 
sponses to a similar situation. In the case of the 
group we must add a third type of routine response - that 
which is based upon rrinciples which have come to be re- 
cognised by the group as a whole. 
338 We may distinguish these from the routine responses. 
which operate in individuals singly by calling them group; 
routine res onses. We may then distinguish two classes 
of group routine responses. First there are those based 
upon innate and acquired dispositions which are organised 
as parts of the common mental frame of the group so that 
they fu-nction in response to the situation to which they 
are relevant as immediately as do the routine responses of 
the individual. Secondly, there are those each of which 
depends upon the mediation of so ,e principle recognised_ by 
the group and organised as a part of its common mental 
frame in the form of an element of the institutional 
structure based upon it. 
339 In cases in which a situation is such that a 
routine response is an effective answer to it, no more is 
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requiréd of the leader than that he should give the signal 
for the appropriate response, and that in doi: ,g so he 
should act quickly, vigorously and with persistence. In 
cases in which a situation is such that a relatively novel 
response (or a relatively novel combination of accustomed 
responses) must be devised in order to meet it effectively, 
effective action requires that the leader should devise an 
effective response and that it should be accepted and acted 
upon by the group. Effective action in novel situations 
depends therefore upon two factors, (a) the ability of some- 
one to devise an effective pattern of action and (b) its 
adoption by his fellows. We have now to con.sider the con- 
ditions of effective group action from this point of view. 
340 Effective responses to novel situations may be 
the result of "trial and error" or of processes of rational 
thought. In the first case the organism, animal or man, 
having made one ineffective response, makes another re- 
sponse and another at random, until the desired end is 
achieved, or fatigue or the distraction of another purpose 
brings his attempts to an end. In this way a dog, locked 
up in the garden shed, when he wishes to accompany the 
family on a walk, barks, jumps and scratches at the door, 
sniffs round it, whines, jumps at the window, squeezing 
himself against the glass and moving excitedly back and 
forward. If no result follows, these responses will recur 
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in irregular order until he is tired and lies down: but 
it is possible that one of them will be effective. His 
barking may be such a nuisance that someone will come and 
let him out; the door may be insecurely fastened and his 
jumping against it may burst it open; or an open window 
may have been forgotten and he may leap through it. Such 
is the procedure of "trial and error". It consists of a 
series of random endeavours unrelated to any reflection 
issuing in a considered judgement as to their probable 
success. If an effective response is made it is hit u;^- 
on by chance. 
341 There is little possibility of the discovery by 
"trial and error" of an effective res; onse by a group to 
a novel situation, if we think of the group as going 
through a series of random responses to the novel situation 
until by good luck one of them fits it. The_-e are, how- 
ever, two kinds of group behaviour which are in some degree 
analogous. In the first case, a group faced with a novel 
situation may as a group be unable to respond to it effect- 
ively; but, if it be a situation of a kind which con- 
stitutes a problem for an individual as well as for a 
group, the group may in effect resolve itself into a number 
of individuals each attackinej the problem by the method of 
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trial and error. It is easy to see that in such a case, 
by the operation of the law of chance, a solutin, if it 
can be reached by this method, is likely to be reap hed 
sooner because there are more persons engaged upon it: 
and, if it is of such a nature that its effectiveness is 
readily demonstrated, it will be rapidly adopted by the 
other members of the group, who, in applyin;, it, will re- 
constitute the group as a corporate body. 
In a case of the second kind, a series of patterns of 
group activity originating with the same member, or with 
different members in turn, may be tried out in succession 
by the group acting as a body; and this may continue until 
an effective res onse is found. But processes of thought 
and judgement are likely to have a part in both the devising 
and the acceptance of such patterns so that the prcess is 
not entirely one of trial and error. 
342 Let us now consider the behaviour of an intelligent 
boy in similar circumstances - let us Suppose him locked up 
in a room and wanting to get out. There are two possib- 
ilities; to begin with he may behave very much as the 
dog does - he may shout, throw himself against the door 
and behave in a way commonly described as "unreasonable ". 
But, sooner or later, he is likely to do something that 
the dog is incapable of - he will sit down and think. If 
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he is very reasonable and self controlled, he will do this 
at the beginning, without behaving at all as the dog does. 
When he begins to think, he directs his attention in turn 
to each of the factors of his problem. He examines the 
door, considers its strength, the possibility of breaking 
it, the possibility of picking the lock, the possibility 
of getting someone to alien it for him. He considers in 
the same way the window, or any other means of getting out. 
As he thinks about each of these, he forms in his mind a 
plan of escape, considering different possibilities and re- 
jecting one plan after another as he sees it to be im- 
practicable, until he has made up his mind which course of 
action will give him the best chance of success. For ex- 
ample, he may decide that it is just possible to escape 
through the window, by waiting until it is dark, breaking 
the catch and making a rope of his clothes. He tests 
each step of his plan in his imagination, and, when he has 
thought the whole thing out as exhaustively as he can, he 
waits calmly until the time comes to put it into action. 
This is very different from the behaviour of the dog. 
The solution is reached, not by action at random, but by 
an act of thought, in the course of which every relevant 
aspect of the situation is considered, and a plan is made 
on the basis of these considerations. If this has been 
done successfully, when action is taken, each phase of it, 
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from the first movement tc the last, forms. a part of an 
integrated and unified pattern of movements, adjusted to 
the purpose in view, adjusted to the outer circumstances of 
the action and adjusted to the bodily strength or skill, and 
the capacities and moral qualities, of the agent. If on 
the contrary the plan has been the- - result of inadequate 
processes of thought, it will break down at some point when 
an attempt is made to put it into action. The particular 
difficulty met with will then have to be considered and a 
new plan made to meet it: or there may be recourse to 
random attempts in this direction and that. The superior - 
ity of an effective plan to the procedure of "trial and 
error" is clear enough. It is also clear that the effect- 
iveness of a plan depends upon its being thought out in 
reference to all the factors of tale situation, inner and 
outer. 
343 When a group has to meet a novel situation, effect- 
ive action depends upon a suitable response being devised 
by processes of reflection. Such processes are essential- 
ly the processes of individual minds, so that we may say 
that, in such situations, an effective response depends 
upon processes of reflection in the mind of an individual 
(or, in some cases, in the minds of individuals) leading 
to the discovery of a pattern of action suitably related 
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to the circumstances, and upon its adoption by the tir -op. 
This topic involves the consideration of three principles: 
(a) I d tviduals differ. in their ability to devise effective 
novel patterns of action. (b) The special knowledge or 
capacities of one may be used in cooération with the 
special knowledge or capacities of others. (c) The adopt- 
ion bj the group of a pattern of action so devised may take 
place in a number of ways. 
344 The discovery of an effective response to a novel 
situation depends upon factors of two kinds. It depends 
in the first instance upon the possession of relevant know- 
ledge or skill - in more general terms upon the possession 
of responses relevant to the situation although not com- 
pletely adequate to it. Thus to s)1ve a rider in geometry 
which is new to me I must be acquainted with the theorems 
most relevant to it. The same is true of the development 
of a new element of manipulative skill: if I am to devise 
a new way of putting screw on a tennis ball, or a new shot 
on the billiard. table, I must already have some skill with 
the tennis racquet and the billiard cue; and the same 
would be true of the -manipulative skill of the surgeon or 
the dentist. New knowledge or skill grows out of what 
is possessed already. 
The second factor is the individual's powe ° of in- 
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vention. To some extent this may, if it be great enough 
make up for lack of knowledge. A mathematical genius, 
ignorant of the theorem from which a.rider can easily be 
deduced, might invent the theorem on his way to s ,lving the 
rider. Someone else with a knowledge of the theorem might 
solve the rider with lesser powers of invention. The 
greater the relevant knowledge the less the powers of in- 
vention required, and vice versa. 
In any actual situation the ability of a particular 
individual to devise an effective response will de end upon 
both these factors. 
345 The members of a group will differ in respect 
both of their knowled e and their powers of invention: 
they will consequently differ in their abilities to dis- 
cover effective responses to novel situations. These 
abilities will be differently distributed in different 
groups. 
This is, in the case of knowledge, sufficiently ob- 
vious to ordinary observation. Six persons in a railway 
carriage, one of whom hap_ens to be a dental surgeon, and 
six dental surgeons dining together, would obviously ex- 
hibit highly contrasted distributions of dental knowledge 
and manipulative skill. The six dental surgeons might 
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again show very great differences in respect of knowledge 
of other subjects - let us say horse racing or music. 
Whatever kind of knowledge or skill we consider, it will 
be found to be very unevenly divided throuLhout the 
community, to be unequally possessed by the different 
members of any group whatsoever, and least unequally 
possessed, though never equally, by the me:bers of some 
group the formation of which is relevant to that particular 
kind of knowledge and skill. Thus dental knowledge and 
skill will be unevenly distributed in a gathering of 
dental surgeons, but the variations in dental knowledge and 
skill will be very much greater in, let us say, an assembly 
of golfers of whom a few happen to be dental surgeons. 
Apart from the possession of s : :ecial knowledge or 
skill it is popularly held that individuals differ in 
their ability to devise new and effective res onses: and. 
this ability is usuall called intelligence, though a less 
/ 
ambiguous term is general ability. This vies:- has been 
given a basis of scientific observation and measurement 
I 1` 
with the invention of intelliençe tests, and their 
application to problems of the distribution of intelligence. 
Such evidence supports the view that individuals differ in 
this way, and that these differences are independent of 
their experience. It shows that the distribution of 
intelligence in a community is (like the distribution of 
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height and other biological measurements) in accordance 
with the normal curve of distribution. It also shows 
that the distribution of intelligence in smaller groups 
varies from group to group. It may vary in range, all 
the members of one group being near o the average of the 
community, all the members of another being above it, all 
the members of another well below it. It may vary in the 
position of the median or average value for the group - thus 
a group might contain values ranging from very low in the 
scale to very high up upon it but, if the greater number 
of values were very low or very high, the median value for 
the group would_ be low or high accordingly. 
346 Since relevant knowledge and intelligence may be 
distributed in these various ways, it is clear that grou s 
will differ markedly in the processes by which they may 
make effective responses to novel situations, and also in 
the extent to which they are capable of such responses. 
In so far as knowledge and intelligence are evenly dis- 
tributed, a novel response may approximate to a response 
of the group based upon the similar responses of its 
members: in so far as they are unevenly distributed, the 
members of the group will respond dissimilarly, and, if 
the group is to be guided by the responses of the member 
or members capable of devising the most effective resronse, 
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it is necessary that the pattern of action which they have 
devised should be in some way or other adopted by the group. 
347 If by the intelligence of an ind ividlial we mean 
his ability to make effective responses to situations to 
meet which he is unprovided with a routine response, we 
require a term by which to refer to the power of a grown 
to make effective responses to situations to meet which 
it is unprovided with a routine response. This power 
may be called (not very happily) the intelligence of the 
group or Eroup intelligence. It is at once evident that 
it is related to the degree of intelligence possessed. by 
those members of the group who can take the initiative 
effectively in it. Or we may say that it is limited by 
the intelligence of the most intelligent members of the 
group and also conditioned by the mental structure of the 
group. Since the minds possessed of the greatest degree 
of intelligence repesented in the group are likely to be 
in a minority, the plan of action which they devise is not 
likely to be immediately acceptable to a large proportion 
of the members of the group. Yet it is clearly a con- 
dition of the effectiveness of the group's responses that 
plans which co:ae from such a minority should be accepted 
and acted upon. Group intelligence is thus related not 
only to the degree of intelligence possessed by the most 
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intelligent members of the group but also to the extent 
to which patterns of action of their devising are accepted 
by it and acted upon; and this possibility depends upon 
the mental structure of the group. 
348 At this point we must return again to a consider- 
ation of the twofold relation. What has just been said 
is as true of the group of two as of larger groups, and 
by taking_, the group of two as the example for consideration 
it is easy to see what possible situations may arise. 
There are two main possibilities. If two persons 
are presented with a common problem they may be or 
less ea ally equipped for discovering a solution to it; 
or they may be relatively unequal in special knowledge or 
special experience, special capacity or general ability. 
349 If they be relatively equal in these respects 
their separate consideration of their common problem may 
lead them to conclusions so similar that harmonious and 
concordant action easily follows. Either each will see 
for himself what should be done; or, if there are differ- 
ences in their view each is able to explain to the other 
his reading of the situation in such a way that the points 
which each has missed and the other has appreciated become 
intelligi:Dle to both. Thus a common :elan may have been 
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arrived at by each separately; or it may be one to which 
each has contributed. Such a cooperation requires such 
qualities in each as enable him to follow the processes of 
thought by which the other has arrived at his view. In 
either case a common problem has been followed_ by an equal 
understanding of it (reached separately or conj oin1y , a 
common solution, and concordant action; and the conceptual 
determinants of this action in the two minds are similar. 
350 It is otherwise if two persons are unequally 
equipped in respect of knowledge, experience, special 
capacity or 'general ability. Where there is such in- 
equality a concordant solution may be reached in a number 
of different ways according to the degree of inequality 
and according to the nature of other factors in the 
structure of the relation between them. We a.:ve now to 
examine a series of such cases. 
In each cage let us suppose A to be the better equipped 
for the discovery of an effective plan of action for the 
attainment of an end which they are both bent upon achiev- 
ing. It must also be assumed that the Troblem is one 
which admits of rational analysis. This is not true of 
every _ractical problem of everyday life, since in many 
cases a decision has to be made in the absence of knowledge 
that makes possible an assessment of the consequences of 
the various possible lines of action. In few cases, if 
`puti :T oft. mTU paT -aasqo 
stu 3uTou ,To aouari6aäuoo uT 
al1.e11 uoTUM su Ta.uJsaptsuoo aIn pure uoTl.nTos sTU 8: oq. uTeTdxa 
oq_ aTgu act 'um ä aUo U UOttis uI Sl V puTLTag au; .gaoA 
q.ou sT maTgoad auq. DuTpuua.saapun aor q.uamdtnba slg UotuTm 
uT .veua. sT uoTq.uaaptsuoo ao,T asUo q.SaT:T aUI (u) Tç2 
53uTpuuq.saapun jo 
saaMOd sTtt puo.gag 0T`4-TT aaU q.T aUTaaagaad ao; suosuat 
auq- ttaUM uUTd t14Tt.1 UT TTU.T oq. Uosaad 2utonput jo 
ATnoT;dTp 070, SaST;aaoUT sTUI samTg. A,TT; uT aou0 fl-tt2,2t a 
pu'e eTqtTTe.T attq. t4TM TallaT uo ,?o q.no saur.Tg. au-ttt 
q-u3T1 4.n0, aTqTTTe; `Ta.naT uo Tn saTgTTT'eg TT'e q-nf- 
a,zo,TaaaU; Otim puu TT'eq-ap uT sa2saooad sa.t MOTTO; 1.0uueo 
ot,M asoq$ ,To sa1_a aUT UT anTu.n. sTt sasTn2sTp `S^ssaoons 
su TTaM su saoaaa uT sa.Tusat RT`autpa000u `saTg_uTt;q.aao 
ueu aauq.ua sat;TTtTeqoad spTaT.g sTs.ETuuu TuuoTa.ua eons 
jo sa2ua.uuApu atrq_ 2uTveTnoTso pus Slutu2Tam 
pu'B `ITa.7,tTTun au; mot,T -gTaDTT aua- 'IuTUsTn9uTg-stp `ssaoons 
,To q.oadsoad aaq.qaq ti du uado troTUM saau4o ;17,2TT og .`:uTaq 
puu SluTsTmoaúun su SuoTa.sa24ns amOS apnToxa a.oU TTTM aTpaT 
-MOUD ,To T.ZOToruoTT(á.íiB a.ua2TTTaa-uT aT;T UozuM uT sU.oTo.un;Ts 
TuoT ;.ouad me; aaU aa:auq ssaTauqtaAag aTqeTnoT'so 
-uT auq. jo q.uamaTa uu aAToAuT uoTsTOáp TuoTq.orad ;o sas'Go 
TTe os ao auTT stu4 2utsooUo ;o vTnsaa atm. 
livutuq.aao agnTosqu u1.TEi a.otpa.zd aTgTssod T sT `fue LIT 
89g 0g2 ToaS XI o-eU8 
Chap IX Sect 351' 569 
lions and following the steps of his reasoning, B may be 
ready to adopt it. If the explanation and consequent 
understanding are complete, there is, as a result of this 
process, a common .plan the determinants of wiich in the 
two minds are exactly similar, so far as the structures 
and processes relevant to this argume nt are concerned. 
But B's mind could not by itself have reached a formulation 
of this plan by an independent integration of these struct- 
ures and processes. It may be compared to a question of 
arithmetical calculation: two people have got different 
answers to the same problem, and the one whose answer is 
correct can discover and point out the error which the 
other has made, so as to convince him that he has gone 
wrong, and bring him to an acceptance of the proper 
arithmetical process and the true result. 
The sur_:eriority of.A's solution to B's may rest u--on 
some piece of knowledge relevant to the problem and possess- 
ed by A but not by B. In such a case the acceptance of 
A's solution by B, with full understanding of the reasons 
for preferring 
' it, may turn upon the communication to him 
of this piece of information. In actual cases in every- 
day life the superiority of one solution to another is 
likely to turn upon factors of both kinds: it may take 
account of a greater number of factors in the situation a 
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relevant to it; and it may integrate them more success - 
fully with reference to the end in view. This is as true 
in petty instances as in ones in which interests of the 
highest importance are at stake. A hushand and a wife 
who differ as to the advisability of certain expenditure 
may by such process s come to an agreement that they can, 
or cannot, afford something that they both desire to 
possess. Or two general officers, with alternative plans 
of campaign, may argue each for his own plan as the one 
more likely to attain the result aimed at by both of them, 
and one may finally, through these perfectly rational p: -o- 
cesses, convince the other of error and persuade him to 
the adoption of-the alternative plan. 
It is of course unfortunately true that such a haTupy 
result does not always follow upon such a consultation: 
but, when that is the case, either there is not such a 
rational superiority of the one pan over the other as we 
are here supposing, or there is too great a difference in 
knowledge or insight, or then e are other fac2Gors at work 
- such, for example, as a sentiment for the less effective 
plan at work in the mind of its .maker, a preference for it 
not on rational grounds but simply because it is his own. 
In a true case of the resolution of an opposition in 
the way considered in this section - that is by the 
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communication to B of A's special knowledge or the steps 
of his reasoning - the concordant action which follows is 
directed to the achievement of a common form of expressiaa 
the determinants of which in the two minds are, as a re- 
sult of the process of communication, identical so far as 
these determinants are conce-tual. 
352 (b) A concordance may be arrived at in a second 
way. A's decision may be accepted by R even although he 
does not a_preciate the steps by which it has been reached, 
and accepted on rational grounds: he may accept it on the 
basis of a judgement that A is in this matter more likely 
than himself to reach a just decision. In a prolonged 
relation between two people each may learn to rely in this 
way upon the judgement of the other in some matters, while 
relying on his own in others. We commonly adopt this 
attitude of submission to someone else's judgement when 
seeking professional advice. Thus a doctor and a lawyer 
of equal ability and prestige might seek one another's 
professional advice and in turn submit to one another's 
judgements. 
In cases of this kind B accepts A's judgement, and 
is willing to act upon it as if it were his own, not be- 
cause he understands the processes by which it has been 
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reached, but because of his own judgement, based upon a 
rational appreciation of their comparative knowledge,ex- 
perience and qualities of mind., that A's solution of the 
problem is li_=ely to be more effective than an attempted 
solution of his own. Concordant action follows; but 
the conceptual determinants in the two minds, though they 
may include some common elements, are different at least 
in part. 
353 (c) There is a third possibility. If B is in- 
capable of seeing the problem as A sees it and grasping 
A's reasons for the decision to which he has come, and if 
he does not appreciate A's superiority to him in such 
matters he may be brought to accept A's decision for 
reasons which appear adequate to him but which would not 
have seemed adequate to A. In such a case A and B are 
agreed as to what they shall do - they have adopted a 
common plan, a common form of expression; but the 
determinants of it in their two minds are partly similar 
and partly different. They may desire the realisation of 
the same end (being determined in this by similar or com- 
plementary dispositions as we have seen before); but the 
conceptual processes by which they assess the relevant 
factors in the situation are different, and in the case of 
B less adequate than in the case of A. 
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354 This may come about in a number of ways.,ach of 
these ways probably involves an element of suggestion. In 
the simplest case the simple announcement of A's decision 
may, in consequence of his tone of assurance, or because of 
the prestige which he has in B's eyes, result in the 
appearance in 3's mind of conceptual processes of a 
specious character supporting; it. He thinks he under- 
stands, but he does not; he thinks he shares A's pro- 
cesses of thought, b t essential factors in these pro- 
cesses are unknown to him; he may even imagine that A's 
answer to the problem is the very one he himself was 
about to offer, that A has taken the very words oat of 
his mouth. 
At the other extreme is the case in which A, aware 
not only of the conceptual processes by which his decision 
has been reached but aware also of the way in which 3's 
mind is moving, leads him tactfully to his own conclusion 
by another path than that by which he has himself 'reached 
it, giving him reasons which will appeal to him in place 
of the real ones which he cannot appreciate. The de- 
pendence of this process upon some degree of other -con- 
sciousness is sufficiently obvious. 
Between these limiting cases there is a range of 
'possibilities in which various degrees of sug_estibility 
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on the part of B are combined with various d e rees of 
other -consciousness on the part of A. In all of them B 
is unaware of what is really happening. IIe is quite 
likely to think that the decision is as much his own as 
A's. He is quite unaware how he has come to accept it, 
and it will have for him the emotional value of a decision 
made by himself. 
335 In cases in which a relation depends for its success 
upon this one sided intellectual initiative there will be 
effective concordant action so long as both partners are 
in contact, so that the more able may supply the necessary 
guidance on each occasion which requires a novel response; 
and the less able will be in fact a useful subordinate. 
But they will be less successful in cases in which in- 
dependent action on the part of each of them is called for, 
and the less able is called upon to make decisions on his 
own behalf, or on behalf of both, when his partner is not 
present to suggest to him what to do. The subordinate 
partner will in fact be, in consequence of the relation, 
less capable of independent action than if he had not been 
a partner to it: for, all decisions having really been 
made over his head, 'he has lacked the training and discipline 
of responsible decision followed by an e_<<. erience of the re- 
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suit, and he is accordingly less capable of decision than 
he would otherwise have been; and, at the same time, he 
is likely to have an excessive confidence in his own 
judgement, in consequence of the frequent success of 
decisions which he believed to be his own. 
356 (d) If it should be of importance that joint action 
should be taken in accordance with the superior plan of 
action and if concordant action on these lines cannot be 
secured in any one of these three ways, there is a fourth 
possibility: A's decision may be forced upon 3 in spite 
of B's unwillingness to accept it. 
Here again we have a range of varying possibilities. 
The relatì. or between A and 3 :]ay be one in which A is 
generally the dominant partner (section 152). In such a 
case B will accept A's intellectually su erior decisions 
for the same reason that he accepts all A's decisions, 
including those in which there is no such rational 
superiority - those, for example, which are mere matters 
of taste or. personal preference: the determinants in B's 
mind of the superior plan which he has accepted are then 
entirely unrelated to its superiority. 
On the other hand, if such a submissive attitude to 
A is not a factor in the situation there is the possibility 
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of bringing some degree of coercion to bear upon him. Such 
Coercion may vary from brute force or the threat of bodily 
pain to the most delicate and subtle suggestion of a 
slight disharmony in an otherwise,pleasantly toned inter- 
course. Or it may take the form of playing upon other 
motives and other aims for the attainment of which B is 
dependent upon 1_, Or it may take the form of a bargain by 
which _B gives way on this question in return for concession 
by A with regard to some other matter. 
357 We may not turn. from the twofold relation to a con- 
sideration of larger groups. Here the same problem is re- 
peated but in a more complicated form - if one member of 
the group has reached by processes of reflection a better 
understanding of the situation than the other members, and 
if he has reached it in consequence of mental equipment 
which they do not share, how cah that unde °standing, and 
the plan of action devised in consequence of it, become the 
common form of expression of the group? 
The modes in which such a plan of action can be 
accepted have been considered in the preceding sections in 
terms of the twofold relation. All these modes of accept- 
ance may be reproduced in a larger group: there is no 
difference in principle, but there is the difference that. 
all these modes of acceptance may be present on the 
same 
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occasion, one in the case of one member or sub -group of 
members, and each of the others in the case of another in- 
dividual or sub -group. This is both a matter of observa- 
tion and a simple deduction from the princile that in any 
group special knowledge, special experience, and special 
and general abilities are unevenly distributed (sction 
345). 
358 When a plan of action devised by the highest 
degrees of relevant knowledge and ability represented in 
the group is accepted by the group there may therefore be 
distinguishable sub -groups, in each of which the conceptual 
determinants of its acceptance are different, and different 
according to the modes distinguished in sections 348 - Z56. 
Such groupings are subordinate to groupings according to 
the aims which are pursued, or the forms of expression 
which are accepted, the groupings which were designated 
a rties. (sections 289 and 292) . In the case of the group, 
as well as in the case of the individual, the ends to 
which effort is directed are Of primary importance, and 
"tendencies are... more important than... capacities, how- 
ever important the latter may be ". These groupings will 
appear within each party. That is, the supporters of a 
common form of expression are likely to differ in the con- 
ceptual determinants operative in their minds according to 
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their degree of understanding of it. 
This relation of the groupings according to forms of 
expression to the groupings according to modes of concept - 
¡log 
ual processes is so important that it should _erha-os be 
stated more precisely. The primary mental structure of 
the party is the common mental frame in which the dis- 
positions of its members are organised in reference to its 
common form of expression. It is upon this that its 
cohesion as a party depends. It is in this that it has 
its existence. But, in the case of each member, the 
conceptual processes by which his dispositions have come 
to be organised as d terminants of its common form of ex- 
pression are, in different degrees, the active rational 
processes óf their own minds, or processes to which they 
have been led by other minds; and these conceptual pro- 
cesses are in different minds of different degrees of 
adequacy. 
359 This principle will apply to different groups in 
different degrees according to their degree of mental 
homogeneity. In highly selected groups it will be 
least a- npa.rent, whether the selection be in the direction 
of a high or a low degree of relevant knowledge and 
ability. In large groups it will usually be more evident 
th A.T1 p ri 1 1 rVV1 P.S'' _ 
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360 The very exceptional group - the small group of 
persons of high intelligence and similar experience may 
solve its problems of conce; tv.al adjustment by similar 
conceptual processes, or by conceptual cooperation (section 
349). Assuming that its members are agreed as to the aim 
which they have in view, continuous debate as to the steps 
which it is necessary to take to secure it may result in 
the acceptance by everyone of a plan which is a synthesis 
of the conceptual processes of all the members)of the group 
- an acceptance which is consequent upon an understanding 
by each of the processes of reasoning by which this plan 
has been formulated. Either each mind has separately 
worked out the steps of that reasoning, or each mind has 
made some contribution to it and has understood the con- 
tributions which have been made by. the others. 
This is completely possible only in the case of a 
small group of sl)ecialists, in, for example, a group of 
scientists engaged upon some problem of apìlied science, 
or a group of general officers working out detailed plans 
for a military operation. In such cases the result of a 
process of deliberation may be a common plan which is re- 
lated to similar conceptual determinants in the minds of 
all members of the group. 
361 Closely allied_ is the case of a group of s7ecialists 
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each of whom is equipped for some part of the common in- 
tellectual task, but not necessarily .possessed of the 
abili :y to appreciate fully or critically the contribution 
of the others. The cooperation of a group of scientists 
may also be of this kind. A dental surgeon, a specialist 
in endocrinology and specialists in other departments of 
medicine might together decide upon the treatment reguirerl 
by a particular patient; but in doing so each need n^t 
master the specialisms of the others. In the planning of 
a military operation a similar intellectual cooperation is 
more likely than a procedure by common and equal under- 
standing. Thus a. general officer of artillery must ex- 
plain what it is possible and what it is impossible for 
the gunners to do. An officer of supplies must express 
his judgement as to the possibility of rroviding material, 
and an officer of transport must express his judgement as 
to whether it is possible to maintain a stream of reinforce- 
ments, ammunition and food under the conditions contemplated 
by the officers controlling operations. And all -plans 
must be worked out in the light of the information as to 
the enemy's position, strength, munitionment, defenses, 
morale and probable movements, which will be supplied by 
the various specialist branches of intelligence. On each 
technical Question as it arises there is a member of the 
-tv,m n+hPrC i e i:ha.t of fl!?f?AY1i'_ 
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ance of his view as a contribution to the process of co- 
operative thought which he is the ,-e to make on behalf of 
the group - just as, if two persons have a piece of 
arithmetical work to do, they may divide it, each sum the 
columns of figures allocated to hirq and check them, and 
each accept the results obtained by the other without do- 
ing the addition of the figures over again for himself. 
When each specialist has carried his own argument a certain 
length there is the problem of integratinL into one scheme 
the results so obtained and this is the main task of the 
group when it meets to deliberate. 
362 A common plan with similar conceptual determinants 
in all minds can be reached only slowly and with difficulty. 
Agreement based on the acceptance of the judgement of the 
man whose business it is to know, can be reached much more 
quickly. Hence, where ra id decisions are necessary, as 
in the case of military operations, and indeed in all cases 
of practical decision, this is the method which must be 
used. In cases of theoretical decision it is otherwise. 
In the field it may be more important to act promptly than 
to wait for the working out of the best plan which military 
knowledge could suply in conditions of leisure. In the 
study there is no such urgency, and, in the case of the 
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problems of pure science and of philosophy, the debate may 
go on for unlimited tige, until agreement is reached on the 
basis of the com7le te thrashin5 out of the wroblem by 
everyone concerned with it. In the case of a particular 
cancer patient a decision must be made wit' in a certain 
lirrit of time as to he treatment to be prescribed. In 
the ca ;_e of inouiry into the aetiolo-h: of cancer, an ex- 
haustive examination and discussion of all relevant 
phenomena cannot usefully be cut short in favour of a 
premature decision in favour of one theo °y or another. 
363 The decisions of a group of general officers in 
the field are made on behalf of and for the directin of 
a larger boca;, the nilita ;y force of which they are the 
executive. These decisions are acted upon by that body 
without further question in consequence of its organisation 
and discipline. In case of large bodies a similar 
friction of deliberation and decision is performed by a 
small executive "roa p on behalf of the whole body but the 
results of these processes are not accepted automatically. 
The deliberations of the executive may exemplify the same 
processes of intellectual cooperation: the acneptance of 
the results of them may be a very complex process according 
to the extent to which the deliberative body exercises a 
recognised authority, or the organisation of the whole is 
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democratic. 
Where the organisation of the whole is democratic 
there is likely to be, in any body the life of which is 
of any length, a develorment of parties in consequence of 
differences of aim or interest, and in consequence of 
rivalry among those who are ambitious to exercise in- 
itiative and executive power (section 334) . The most 
evident sub- groups are therefore parties. Within each 
party we find a structure which results from the necessit 
of securing the acceptance of executive decisions by 
methods a-epropriate to varying degrees of knowledge and 
ability: and that structure will reproduce each of the 
modes of acceptance distiii wished in secti-ms r48 - 356. 
364 The most obvious case is that of a political issue. 
The government of a modern state involves decision and 
action related to problems of a very complex and highly 
technical kind. If we consider any one such problem, it 
is at once clear that there are only a few peo.le who are 
in a position to know the facts upon which a rational 
judgement can be based. This is :tartly because some of 
the facts 
- involved are of a confidential character, partly 
because the appreciation of others demands a degree of im- 
partiality impossible in the greater number of the citizen 
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because their interests are to be affected in one way or 
another by any action that is ta)ren, and 7 ar. tly, and 
principally, because the facts themselves are of a 
character which requires a secial training; for their 
appreciation, and their complexity requires prolonged study 
before they can be grasped at all. Thus the question may 
be an intricate economic problem, the comi)lete study and 
understanding of which (in so far as the limitati ns of 
economic science permit such understanding) is possible 
only to a very small number of exert economists and civil 
servants who have been in touch with it throughout the 
greater part of their lives. The discussion of it has 
been carried on in technical monographs and in special re- 
ports,made for or by the officials of the government depart- 
ment concerned. It has perhaps been summed up in a blue 
book, and in this way made available to a larger public. 
A member of the uublic cannot hope to obtain an acquaintance 
with the facts comparable with that of the officials and 
experts who are in immediate touch with them; but a certain 
number of citizens will attempt to reach su: h a knowledge 
as is obtainable from such publications. This is at best 
an acquaintance at second -hand: it is a knowledge which is 
already coloured by the views and conclusions of those who 
have done the preliminary work. The number of citizens 
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who attempt as much as this is a very small proportion of 
an electorate. Althou :h their number is small their in- 
fluence may be considerable. Many of them are in a 
_position to influence considerable numbers of their fellows, 
through processes which are partly rational ana partly 
based upon the other rational and non -rational modes of in- 
fluence distinguished. 
A still larger group, with less leisure for study, 
less ability to grasp the problem at issue and less interest 
in it, studies the Question at third hand, through the 
medium of articles of a more popular character written by 
the expert or. the semi-expert. Here we are more in the 
region of opinion and less in that of reasoned conclusions, 
and the acceptance of this view or that depends very largely 
upon the respect which the individual attaches to the name 
of a particular writer, or a on the prestige of the news- 
paper or journal in which his article is printed. 
The 1.;.rgest boa: of voters will however be -rpersuaded 
by processes which are rational only in a very small degree, 
or not rational at all. They are -persuaded by specious 
appeals, which may be rational in form, but which advocate 
a sound policy with inadequate, or even with discreditable 
reasons; 'or which advocate an undesirable policy by an 
appeal to respectable and creditable motives. And this 
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may be inevitable because the real reasons are beyond 
their grasp, or because they make no appeal to them. It 
is a case of a public organised by an exploiting body 
(sections 243 -245). 
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365 If the deliberating and directing group is well 
equipped for its tasks, it is -possible for the .:rove; to 
act effectively. The best plans which the intelligence 
of the group is capable of devising arelthen formulted, 
and their acceptance depends upon each of the -irocesses 
distinguished in sections 348 - 356, so far as a section 
of the group is concerned. There is first of all a sub- 
group which has formulated them by cooperative conce,tual 
processes. This group may or may not be identical with 
the official directing body: most probably some of its 
members ':.re within that body and some outside it. There 
is next a group which is capable of following critically. 
the conceotual processes by which a decision has been 
arrived at, though its -ieu:bers have not contributed actively 
to that discussion: and members of this roue will have 
made a critical study of the question in various degrees. 
Next there is a larger group who accept the decision on the 
basis of rational judgements as to the ability and good 
faith of those who have contributed to it. Beyond are the 
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larEer grouts who must be persuaded by such an explanation 
of the C.ecision as they can eras_:, and by an arpeal to 
sentiments which will sup1y a sufficient motive in support 
of it. there are the very stupid, and those not 
of a good will in the matter, who can be brought in only 
by the methods described in section 356. 
366 3ecause such a social structure of cul- ort for the 
decision of a directing group depends so largely uron non - 
rational __rocesses, it is 'fear t`cn it may be c'nstru.cted 
in su_ ort of decisions which are made in c ,nsequence of 
inadeqi;.ate concetual processes, o, in pursuit of aims 
which are undesirable. The best intentioned and most in- 
telligent :members of the :-;roua may be neither members of the 
directing body nor in a position to influence it effe,Aively. 
In such a case the Brou_ will show a low degree of group 
intelligence in consequence of its organisation, and in 
site of the fact that high degrees of knowledge and ability 
are to be found in some members of it. The rroblem is an 
old one. 
Until philosophers ave kings, or the kings and 
princes of this lir,r10 have the spirit and power of 
philosorhy, and political greatness and wisdom meet 
in one, and those c- mmoner natures who pursue either' 
to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand 
aside, cities will never have rest fr 'm their evils, 
- no, nor the human race, as I believe, -and then 
only will this our State have a possibility t of life 
and behold the light of day. /7° 
Chapter X 
The transmission of forms of expression 
A wise man's words are like goads, and 
his collected sayings are like nails driven 
home; they put the mind of one man into 
many a life. 
The moral of the tale is the power of 
reason, its decisive influence on the life 
of humanity. The great conquerors, from 
Alexander to Caesar, and from Caesar to 
Napoleon, influenced profoundly the lives 
of subsequent generations. But the total 
effect of this influence shrinks to insig- 
nificance, if compared to the entire trans- 
formation of human habits and human mental- 
ity produced by the long line of men of 
thought from Thales to the present day, men 
individually powerless, but ultimately the 
rulers of the world. 
Cha-,,ter X 
The transmission of forms of expression 
367 The term imitation is used in both ps_;rcholof:ical 
anc_ sociolocical senses with a considerable resulting con- 
fusion. Used in a sociological sense it refers to a 
certain range of phenomena 
7/ 
When these are examined from 
a psychological point of view they are immediately seen to 
be related to mental processes so different as to require 
/7 
different names by which they may be distinguished. Used 
in a psychological sense the term imitation may be applied 
to any or to all of these processes. In order to avoid 
this confusion I shall speak of the transmission of social 
forms of expression or, more shortly, of social transmission; 
and I shall distinguish by the use of different terms the 
different psychological processes by which it can take place. 
There is an additional reason for doing this. It is 
desirable to use a general term to cover all forms of 
social transmission including the transmission of literary 
and artistic forms of expression. In literary criticism 
and aesthetic theory the term imitation has a long and com- 
plex history from the /Liut Ìc`5 
of Plato and Aristotle to 
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the complete confusion of thou -'ht in Pore's line 
To copy Nature is to copy them. 
590 
In general psychology there is little danger of misunder- 
standing from this cause; in social psychology the 
possibility of it ought to be avoided.. 
368 The immediate object of sociological observation is 
a form of expression - the rattern of an action or of the 
product of an action - a pattern, that is, of bodily move- 
ments, a pattern of words, or a pattern of material objects 
shaped or arranged so as to embody a desired system of re- 
lations. Now two such forms of expression produced by 
different persons may resemble one another and the second 
of the two (in order of production) may be like the first, 
because its producer has had knowledge of the first and has 
consciously or unconsciously adopted some feature of it. 
I shall apply the term social transmission to all instances 
in which two forms of expression, which are products of 
different minds, are so related that the second would have 
been in any way different if the first had not occurred. 
369 It is, I suppose, obvious that two forms of express- 
ion may resemble one another and that there may be causal 
relation between them - that, to take an actual instance, 
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a man may playfully christen a sporting car Tarquin (on the 
grounds that it is a super -bus) and he may afterwards find 
a popular writer doing the same in a novel, and yet have no 
reason to suppose the two incidents to be causally connected. 
What one man's mind ha s done another's may do also; though 
the more highly individualised the form expression the 
smaller, we imagine, will be the possibility of its re- 
production apart from such a connection. So that we do 
not suppose it possible that two men wishing to call up a 
picture of the dusk should write independently, 
or, 
or, 
Light thickens, and the crow 




low came still Eevning on,... 
370 gases in which Elie re is no such causal relation are 
not cases of imitation. Theoretically the line can be 
drawn quite clearly. In practice it can be drawn only 
wi ;h difficulty. In a particular case it may be shown 
that B could or coula not have know of the form of express- 
ion produced by A at an earlier time, or that he actually 
Chap X Sept 370 592 
did or did not know of it: and either of these negatives 
would make the instance clearly not one of imitation. To 
show that he could have known of it, i.e. that the evidence 
is indecisive as to wheth,.r he did or not, is inconclusive; 
to show that he did know of it is still not absolutely con- 
clusive though it supports a higher degree of probability 
in some cases than in others. Thus if John. Smith in- 
scribed his initials on a school desk with the date 1900, 
and James Brown his with the date 1910 we cannot be sure 
whether James Brown would have raised himself this mono ,ent 
less enduring than brass in the absence of John Smith's 
exam :le, the desire for immortality, even in such a 
temporary form, being apparently a birth of the mind itself; 
whereas, when brass is mentioned in such a connection, 
exegi mohumentum is the indubitable fons et origo. 
Thus the line cannot be drawn with absolute certainty 
unless we have access to the mental rocesses of the 7erson 
concerned: and we cannot assign a similarity between two 
forms of expression to social transmission without first 
making an inquiry which is concerned at least in part with 
psychological Processes. 
371 If we now consider all the phenomena which we are 
to call instances of social transmission it is easy to 
see 
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the conditions of the _ z oduction of a (a) in that the 
determinants of the form (outwardly the same in both cases) 
may be different - and this difference in the determinants 
of the form may be no more than the difference we have just 
noticed as a necessary condition, or it may extend to an 
entire difference of the determinants of b and a; and (h) 
they may differ in that, even when the determinants in the 
two. cases are as like as may be, A and B may have arrived. 
by different processes at a similar integration. 
372 It is clear that, from a psyc olo -ical point of 
view, we may classify instances of social transmission 
according to the degree of likeness between the determinants 
of a and b, and the degree of likeness between the mental 
processes whe:. eby the minds of A and B reach such an inte- 
gration as determines that pattern. It will be best to 
begin with instances in which the determinants are as like 
as may be. 
While I sat contriving a shade for my lamp (section 80) 
it is quite possible that, in another room not far away, a 
man in a similar situation was contriving from similar 
materials a shade exactly similar. No one who has watched 
a succession of subjects attempting the same intelligence 
test will regard it as at all inconceivable. Let us then 
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comfort while sitting at his fireside, and while glancing 
at a -book which he desires me to look at; I direct my 
attention to this increased comfort, and refer it to the 
lighting and to the shade; I note the materials of the 
shade and how they are put together. I resolve to ma' -e 
a similar shade and do so when I return to my room (S ) 
376 In e-ch of these four cases the processes by which 
the appropriate form of expression is reached are in some 
degree different. In each of the cases the determinants 
of the form of expression when it is achieved are similar 
- except for the possibility, indicated in the third case, 
of my making some improvements upon my friend's design. 
The processes by which the form is reacnea differ in that 
the effective solution may, in different degrees, be the 
products . of my owhl mind, or a suggestion received from an- 
other mind: but the processes which make it acceptable as 
a suggestion from outside, the determinants which fasten 
upon it and make it their expression, are the same processes 
and determinants which might nave reached it witnout any ex- 
ternal suggestion. Tnere is tnus no neea to assume any 
tendency or process specific to such cases, to whicn the 
name ins -&inc -c of imitation might be given. The connection 
oetween 'bile e auipie (a) and the imitation (b) is not a 
Chap X Sect 376 598 
specific tendency to imitate stimulated by the former. In 
two cases, f and á , a consideration of the exam le 
facilitates an integration of determinants -,i_ on it as a 
form of expression, thät is, it brings cyuickly to a con- 
clusion a programme of mental processes which has already 
begun; and in the fourth case, S , the same programme of 
mental processes is similarly facilitated, but from a much 
earlier stage. 
When two acts result in forms of expression which have 
similar elements, when their similarity is the result of a 
causal connection, and the result of such mental processes 
as we have just analysed, I stall call it a case of re- 
production by similar determinants. 
377 It is clear that reproduction by parallel invention, 
if we exclude the possibility of a lucky accident, results 
from similar understanding, that is from similar processes 
of analysis and synthesis. It is also clear that in the 
cases we have considered reproduction with reference to a 
model results from similar processes. In the three cases 
the model serves in different degrees to su-._'est a solution, 
of a problem of which there is awareness in different de- 
grees. It does so in so far as the problem and the motel 
are analysed, and this analysis -may be either in perceptual 
or in conceptual terms, or partly in each. A roem. may be 
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for example irritated because the imitator's TTearTT has 
caught its rhythm , and because he "feels" its emo'. Tonal 
and aesthetic values: or he may mane a h: ghly technical 
analysis of its form and content, which plays a Part in 
determining his imitation of it. I suppose Scott's 
imitation of the traditional ballad is an exam-.1e of the 
first process. Swinbv.rne's imitations of Greek tragedy 
/h'9 
or the late I,:îr. Bridges' metrical inventions - English 
quantitative verse based upon the study of the classical 
poets, and syllabic verse based u_ on the study of Milton 
- would be an example of the second kind. Instances of 
reproduction based on processes almost ent_'_rely perceptual 
may be found in the copying of a pattern of movements of 
the limbs in acquiring some bodily dexterity, or in the 
catching of a pose, or a composition, or a pattern of colour 
or form or lighting, in the case of drawing or painting. 
In either case understanding may be directed to the 
form of expression itself and to the in er- relati )ns of 
its parts or aspects - for example to the relation of the 
parer shade to the position of the flame of the lamp; to 
the relation of the form to its determinants - for example 
to the relation of the height of the shade to the desire to 
have the page of a book properly illuminated or the eyes in 
shadow;- or to the relations between the detc,,rminants - for 
example, to the relation between the desires just mentioned, 
Chap X Sect 377 
or between them and the desire to assume a comfortable 
attitude in the chair. 
600 
378 Reproduction by similar determinants does not 
necessarily follow with mechanical accuracy the details of 
the form of expression which is imitated. The example of 
the lampshades was chosen to suggest two men as like one 
another as might be in situations as like one another as 
might be. Such general similarity of character and 
situation is not however a necessary condition of the pro- 
cess. What is necessary is two situations similar in 
some relevant particulars and two characters similar in 
some relevant elements so that the second may, in examining 
a mental product of the first, discover in it a form of 
expression related to some determinants in the mind which 
produced it which are similar to some determinants active 
in his own mind in pursuit of expression. 
Situations differ, men's characters differ, even when 
there are important similar elements. Reproduction by 
similar determinants will therefore result in the trans- 
mission of forms of expression with change and adaptation 
to new circumstances inner and outer. The analysis of the 
model, whether this analysis is perceptual, will separate 
out elements which, by perceptual or conce.tual synthesis, 
are combined with other elements to form new unified wholes. 
It is of the very essence of reproduction of similar de- 
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terminants that it should. be reproduction ty similar corn - 
bined with dissimilar determinants. 
Thus the original design of the lampshade is related 
in this way to lampshades previously seen, to other uses 
of paper or paper fasteners or wire, and to other occasions 
on which a lamp, a chair and a fire have been arranged on a 
pattern conducive to comfort. Each of these relations in- 
volves the reproduction in the present form of expression 
of an element in a former form of expression, and a com- 
bination of some determinants related to that element with 
others related to the present form of expression, but not 
to the former one. 
379 It is equally evident that reproduction by similar 
determinants does not imply an exact similarity of mental 
processes. It implies in fact analysis where there was 
previously. synthesis. I find it awkward to use my type- 
writer on my desk, which is too high and a on which it gets 
in the way of my papers. Of the small tables in my room, 
one is too low, and oné too unstable. I also suffer dis- 
comfort from being unable to fix the. book or manuscript 
from which I am copying so that I can read it easily while 
I type. Conscious of these and other difficulties I ilan 
a special table for my typewriter, of the right height to 
suit the chair in which I sit at my desk; on castors so 
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that I can readily pull it towards me when I want it, or 
push it into a corner out of the wayT; T, r ov id e d. with a 
support for the book o_ manuscript from which I am working; 
and in other ways suitable to my pur_ ores. T thi :zk out all 
the details of its construction. I consider what it may 
cost and discover how I may h ve it made most cheaply. 
When it has been made, and is in use, it is a forro of ex- 
pression which is the focus of all the determinants in my 
mind related to the act of type-writing. If now my friend 
comes into my room while I am at work, and if he also uses 
a typewriter, and has experience of the discomforts to 
avoid which my table has been made, the table will attract 
his attention. It is for him a form of exrression uon 
which come to be focussed all the determinants connected 
with his experience of using. a typewriter on an ordinary 
desk or table. He may of course at once see how he thinks 
this or that feature of it could be improved, or on the 
other hand he may miss the point of this or that device in- 
corporated in it. Let us however sup ose that there are 
no such complications; that his attitude to the problem of 
typing in comfort is similar to mine a week before when I 
first began to think about it; that, point by point, the 
different aspects of the table become the focus of de- 
terminants similar to those in my mind which have led me to 
design it and use it; and that he resolves to have a 
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similar one made for himself. We should then have a case 
of reproduction by similar determinants: in two minds 
similar dispositions have come to be organised in similar 
systems with reference to the same form of expre sr ion. 3ut 
the two minds have reached this similarity of organisation 
by different routes and from different starting points - his 
by working back from the completed form of expression to its 
determinants, mine by working forward from the determinants 
to the invention of a form of expression with reference to 
which they can be integrated. 
380 The effective transmission of a form of expression 
from one person to another requires that, as a result of 
the process of transmissión, it shall be in the second mind 
the focus of similar determinants il_ so fár as it is to be 
reproduced in a similar situation (similar and dissimilar 
determinants in so far as the situation has points of dis- 
similarity as well as similarity), but not that this result 
shall be reached by a similar programme of mental processes. 
Indeed it is desirable that that programme should be 
abbreviated in every possible way, so only that there is no 
detriment to the final result. To find the shortest route 
to the desired final result in the case of any branch or 
knowledge is the business of pedagogy, the department of 
applied psychology concerned with education. 
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331 The transmission of a form of expression in the 
ways described implies understanding - a grasp (perceptual 
or conceptual accoTd.ing to the nature of the case) of the 
inter -relations of the elements in the form itself, and of 
their relations to their determinants. This understanding 
may be complete, or, in various degrees, incom fete. When 
it is incomplete, the incompleteness may be some degree at 
failure to grasp the inter -relations of the elements in the 
form of expression, or the relations of these to their 
determinants, or the relations of the determinants to one 
another. It is perhaps unnecessary to illustrate these 
three possibilities with examples, and it may be sufficient 
to point out that the result will be some degree of 
deterioration of the form or, when the form is per.fect17 
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reproduced, of its expressiveness. 
382 It sometimes happens that a form of expression be- 
comes the focus of an additional determinant or group of 
determinants, that the determinants of which it was origin- 
ally the focus cease to require expression, and that the 
form continues to serve as the expression of the additional 
determinant or determinants. This possibilit requires to 
be distinguished from that of reproduction with incomplete 
understanding and consequent deterioration. Examples in- 
volving only two persons are in this case more difficult to 
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find, as the process usually requires the passa; e of time 
in order that the earlier group of determinants may cease 
to require expression. An example involving a longer 
chin of transmission may therefore be used. In the days 
when the pound Scots and the pound sterling were different 
in value, it was necessary, when a value in sterling was 
intended, to write that word after the sum of money. This 
is no longer necessary, but it is still customary in Scot- 
land to write the abbreviation sue. on a cheque after the 
statement in words of the sum to be paid; and this serves 
to prevent a fraudulent alteration of the cheque by the 
addition of a further amount in shillings and pence. Both 
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dress and architecture show numerous examples of forms, once 
essential elements of structure, which have been retained as 
elements in a visual pattern after their original function 
has been lost. In these cases it can however, usually be 
maintained that this relation is a case of the deterioration 
of the form. 
383 An opposite process is possible. Luring the years 
before the war in trie ordinary course of changes in women's 
fashions of dress a short skirt came to be worn in place 
of one sweeping the ground. Its retention (with minor 
variations) for day tile wear seems to have been the result 
of motives of hygiene and convenience -:.hich had possibly 
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little to do with its original adoption. It is probable 
that many other changes in feminine dress Burin the same 
period are similarly examples of the focussing upon a form 
of expression of more stable determinants that those of 
which it was at first the expression. The process is one 
of multi- determination and displacement analogous as already 
described (section 298). 
If a f rm is reproduced with incomplete understanding 
and consequent deterioration it is likely to disappear on 
account of the disappearance of its appropriate motives. 
In some such cases forms will be kept alive by a substitute 
group of determinants. There is therefore a combination 
of deterioration due to incomplete understanding and re- 
production with substitute determinants. 
384 A special type of transmission with substitute . 
determinants is that in which a form is reproduced with in- 
183 
appropriate determinants. This almost certainly involves 
a deterioration of the form in respect of the inter- relations 
of its elements, as well as a deterioration of its other 
relations. 
Thus a young; boy having seen his father go through the 
process of shaving himself, ma_; collect a piece of soap and 
a brush and a blunt penknife, and go through the motions of 
shaving himself, although he has no beard to remove, and 
Chap X Sect 334 607 
although his instruments .would be entirely inadequate to 
its removal if he had. In such a case, the form of an 
action is imitated, although none of the original de- 
terminants of it are present - no one of the motives 
present in the case of the father can be operative in the 
case of the boy. Nevertheless there must Tie ' d_e_termin.ants 
in operation capable of bringing it ab snit. The most ob- 
vious are the boy's memory images of the procedure of 
shaving as he has observed it. It is from these that the 
pattern of his action is derived. Yet why should he ha-e 
observed just this particular action with this degree of 
accuracy? Because as a mysterious and complicated pro- 
cedure it excites his curiosity: because as an act of a 
more powerful being it excites his submissiveness: because 
of the sensual attractiveness of a thick lather, and the 
perpetual fascination of the cutting instrument. Let us 
suppose it to be só; why then, having observed it, should. 
he reproduce it? Whether or not it is necessary to bring 
in an instinct of imitation, it is clear that each of the 
motives'which fastens his attention u2on the action is also 
a motive supporting his carrying out of his own version of 
it. To go through the motions is to obtain a fuller under- 
standing of the operation, and it is therefore a further 
expression of his curiosity: to perform in his own person 
the act which has excited his awe is to readjust the balance 
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between submission anca assertion, and it is therefore an 
expression of the latter - instinct also: to cover his face 
with lather and scrape it with a knife is to enjoy a new 
range of sensory experience, and a new way of using that 
dangerous instrument. Thus it is easy to find a rich 
group of substitute determinants, adequate to account for 
the performance o. the action, but entirely inappropriate 
to its purpose in the case of the model imitated. If we 
have to add to this a further motive .derived from an instinct 
of imitation, this would he, from the ,point of view of the 
classification of modes of reproduction, an additional sub- 
stitute determinant. 
385 Reproduction with inappropriate determinants is 
important, rather because it is a freçuent process than 
because it leads to results of social or individual value. 
The most frequent substitute motives seem to come from the 
self -tendencies. A person or a class possessed of some 
degree of power or prestige becomes an object of imitation 
through this process. The results may be of the most 
ridiculous kind, since it may lead even to the imitation 
of disabilities: the prince has a badly developed leg, and 
the courtier limps. Or it may lead to the imitation of a 
form of behaviour in circumstances in which it is in- 
appropriate or unnecessary. When this hap_-ens it results 
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in a reaction, healthy in itself but unfortunate in that it 
gives to such words as ttformtt, "formal ", and. "convention" a 
bad odour which interferes with their proper use. 
386 Deterioration in a form of expression in consequence 
of its transmission may be due to either external or in- 
ternal factors in the situation. It may be difficult 
to achieve a form of expression completely in adverse 
circumstances. A Dickensian Christmas cannot be 
celebrated at the Antipodes. The ministration of baptism 
at sea, or the order of confirmation under shell -fire at 
Gallipoli, is a ceremonial conducted as circumstances per- 
mit. A will made by a dying soldier upon the sole of a 
boot with a piece of chalk has, I believe, been granted 
probate: but it probably lacked the niceties of profession- 
al legal terminology. 
387 Deterioration due to temporarily adverse circum- 
stances may be followed by complete recovery when circum- 
stances are again favourable. It is otherwise when de- 
terioration is due to internal factors. The most usual 
cause in this case is inadequate understanding due to in- 
adequate experience or ability. In the case of any form 
of expression, a certain degree of knowledge, experience, 
special ability or general ability is necessary, if it is 
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to be grasped or transmitted.. There is therefore a limit 
to the extent to which a form of ex pression can be trans- 
mitted throughout a community at any moment of time. Only 
a small proportion of the members of a community can roaster 
the mathematical technique of modern physics: a lamer 
proportion can learn to use the calculus, a still larger 
proportion the multiplication table; but not all can get 
even so far as simple addition. And the case is similar 
with music or letters, with science or philosophy, with 
religion and morals, with pro:tessional and craft skill, 
manners, and with cookery. 
Professor Y. Rostovtzeff sug_ests that the decay of 
ancient civilisation was due to 
85- 
...the .gradual absorption of the educated 
classes by the masses and the consequent simpli- 
fication of all the functions of political, 
social, economic, and intellectual life,... 
and the series of works in which he examines the social 
history of the ancient world concludes with the question, 
/s6 
Is it possible to extend a higher civilization 
to the lower classes without debasing its standard 
and diluting its quality to the vanishing point? 
Is not every civilization bound to decay as soon as 
- it begins to penetrate the masses? 
Whatever the answer to this Question may be, it would 
seem that it depends on the principles just stated. The 
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determination of the standards in different specialisms, 
uLL on the maintenance of which a community depends in 
modern times, are capable of determination. The dis- 
tribution of the corresponding innate aptitudes and . 
abilities is also discoverable. The study of the relation 
of the one set of values to the other is the only means, 
either to an answer to this question, or to an effective 
determination of public policy. Underlying these questions 
is the further one - whether the" distribution of innate 
aptitudes and abilities is remaining constant or tending to 
a higher or a lower median value. A movement in either 
direction would have obvious consequences for the mainten- 
ance, the improvement or the decay of a culture. 
388 We may now turn to a r. ane of phenomena closely 
allied to those we have been considering, -nit marked also 
by features of their own. Each of the more primitive 
emotional experiences is accompanied by deep- seated_ 
physiolo -ical changes of a relatively specific pattern: it 
is also accompanied changes easily visible to an observer 
- changes ir the expression of the face, in the tones of the 
voice, in the posture of the body, and in the form and em- 
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phasis of the gesture. These visible changes, which con- 
stitute the expression of the emotion, have a double refer- 
ence. Not only are they related in the closest possible 
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way to the subject's inner experience, and to the general 
pattern of the organic changes which are taking place in 
his body, but they are immediate objects of attention - and, 
if the emotion expressed be of any degree of intensity, of 
an enforced attention to anyone within sound or sight of 
-them; and they are charged with meaning for him. Laughter 
and the smiling face of T 1eastrce, the cry of fear and the 
pallor and trembling which may accompany it, the character- 
istic tones of anger, or of disgust, of wonder or of tende - 
ness, the accent and carriage of elation, the posture of 
submission - these, and a few other types of emotional. ex- 
pression, are, I aap:ose, more immediately and universally 
intelligible to humanity than any other aspect of the 
universe whatsoever. Moreover this intelligibility extends 
not merely to some nine or ten distinguishable emotions but 
to the discrimination of their finest shades, as between 
this occasion and that of their occurrence, and every 
variation, every come and go, on any particular occasion. 
It goes even further, for we may distinguish them not only 
when they appear separately but when they appear in com- 
bination, or in conflict with one another. What infinite. 
'meaning may reside in lips and eyes, the tension of the 
facial muscles or the carriage of the head, we may see in 
the works of the artist ana the sculptor; the resources of 
the voice are exploited by the actor and the orator, and 
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verse and prose find in the rhyth,rn of speech, even when,_ 
upon a printed page, it is divorced from its accompanying 
variations of pitch and loudness, the most delicately re- 
sponsive and the most inexhaustible of all artistic 
mediums. 
389 In so far as the expression of emotional states is 
innately determined and understood in terms of innate 
determinants, the relation between one person, who is ex- 
periencing an emotion, and another °, .°rho responds to it, is 
based upon an innate common mental frame, the essential 
element in which seems to be the evocation in the observer 
of the organic changes typical of the emotion, and also tie 
evocation of their introspectable concomitants. We have 
then, on the part of the first person, a perceptual. pro- 
cess (for example the perception of something threatening, 
something mysterious, something disgusting, or something 
evocative of some other emotional state), followed by the 
experience of the appropriate emotional state, and the 
occurence of its concomitant organic changes (with which 
the observable events which we call the expression of the 
emotion may be classed). '!What the causal relation may be 
in the case of the perception, the emotion, and the organic 
/88 
changes, is unknown. ' ;;hen his attention is drawn to the 
expression, we have, on the part of the second ;person, 
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si :..filar organic changes, and similar emotional ex; erience. 
What is of more importance is that the sebond person seems 
to experience the organic changes and the emotional state 
in the very moment of observing the expression of them in 
the other. His experience of these changes as they occur 
is the basis of his understanding of the facial expression, 
tone of voice, posture and_ gestures of the other; it is 
the. meaning which he reads into them. 
390 If we confined_ our consideration to one;rou" of 
emotions to the exclusion of another it would be easy to 
sug_ est a biolo; ical ex-rlanation of the origin of the 
whole process. Fear and anger are the clearest i :îstan. es 
of this. It is of the greatest value to the floc'_ or 
herd, in the case of gregarious birds and animals, that 
the perception by one individual of a potential enemy' 
should_, by that individual's expression of fear or anger, 
arouse these emotions, and their accompanying impulses, in 
all the members of the group. It is easy to see that, on 
a rather higher mental level; the experience of fear follow- 
ing upon the fear cry of another, and the experience of 
fear accompanying a fear cry in oneself, must lead to the 
attribution to the other of the experience of fear: and 
similarly in the case of anger. And so the exrression of 
these emotions on the part of another would acquire the 
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meaning which they certainly have. On such a view the 
communicative aspect of the -,process is secondary; and, in 
the first instance, the cry of fear was merely one among 
the signs of danger which aroused fear directly. 
But, in the case of some of the other emotions, such 
an explanation is difficult, or impossible. In the case 
of the cry of the infant, the primitive response which has 
biological value is the act of protecting or the act of 
feeding - that is, a complementary not a similar response. 
There seems to be no biological value, primitiv :_. or other, 
in the spread of sorrow, yet an attitude of dejection, tears 
and tones of despair are as immediately understood as the 
signs of any other emotion. TLere is at least no such Ob- 
vious biological utility in the spread of disgust or wonder 
as in the case of fear or anger. It is difficult, then, 
to see in. these cases a secondary communicative function 
developed out of a primary function of stimulating a 
similar response of biological value. 
391 Such a line of argument would seem to suggest that 
the communicative function of the bodily expression of an 
emotion is much less of an afterthought than seems usually 
to be implied - that, just as, in the case of articulate 
speech, the vehicle of communication and. the meanings it 
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conveys have developed pari passu, so here all the fine 
shad s of facial expression, gesture and tone of voice 
have become differentiated as a language of emotion step 
by step as they have been discriminted in being observed. 
and reacted to in terms of similar organic changes and p° 
chical states. The starting points of such, a develo ment 
would of course be move Fteiits with a value wdic.h receded 
their communicative value - the suching movements, for ex- 
ample, from which the smile has developed. 
392. The term sympathy has come to be used in a technical 
sense for the process whereby the experience of an emotion 
follows upon a perception of the signs of it in someone 
i8R 
else. If it is possible to take such a view of it as has 
just been suggested, sympathy may be described in similar 
terms to the processes of. transmission already discussed. 
In a case of reproduction by similar determinants, we have, 
first, the perception of a form of expression, secondly, 
the focussing upon it of determinants similar to those of 
which it is the exp2essi n, and, thirdly, the expression 
of them in a similar form. In the case of sympathetic 
'interaction, we have, first, perception of a particular 
bodily, pattern, secondly, the activity of d.isositions 
similar to those expressed in it, and, thirdly, the 
occurence in some degree of the same bodily pattern; which 
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last may be, from the external point of view, the starting 
point of a similar process, but is, from the internal point 
of view, a complex of organic sensation and conative ex- 
perience, which gives meaning to the perceived bodily 
pattern. Thus, in both cases, the same form is the ex- 
pression of determinants in one mind and the occasion of the 
activity of similar determinants in an observer of it. 
393 The process of sympathy is, as we have seen, capable 
of conveying an infinite gradation of shades of emotion - a 
variety of experience as inexhaustible as our experience of 
colour, which, like it, may be described in terms of a 
small number of primaries, their gradations and combinations. 
It is however sharply limited, in that it cannot convey any 
perceptual or conceptual content - it can convey only the 
particular type of subjective experience of which it is the 
proper vehicle. 
394 This distinction is important in considering the 
part played by sympathy as a mode of social transmission. 
That part is a very important one. There are three ways 
in which it operates. (1) It leads directly to the 
transmission of emotional elements in the organisation of 
sentiments. (2) It may lead indirectly to imposing con- 
sequences by altering the balance between tendencies which 
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are in equilibrium. (3) It may suggest trains of thought 
and imagery for which it gets the credit but which are 
really the product of the mind which it is influencing. 
395 (l) Through sympathy an emotion felt for a 
particular object or situation may certainly be conveyed . 
from one person to another. From the emotional state so 
induced a sentiment structure may result, so related to 
that object or situation that its recurrence involves the 
recurrence of the emotional state. One'person, A, ex- 
periences fear or disgust when in the presence of a certaih 
object. He gives expression to this emotion on one 
occasion in the presence of the object, and of another per- 
son, B, who has no such tendency. B through sympathy 
shares his emotion on this occasion, and as a result the 
object in future calls out this emotion whenever he sees 
or thinks about it. 
9/ 
396 This is the origin of many of our sentiments. The 
most beautiful examples of it are to be seen in the re- 
lation between the mother and the young child. The mother 
may be observed to talk to the child about what it sees and 
hears and tastes and touches in language which it is quite 
incapable of understanding. But while the words mean 
nothing to it, the tones of her voice are conveying to it 
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every shade of the emotions which she experiences and in- 
ducing the same emotions in the child, so that it ex- 
periences tender feeling for this, disgust for that, wonder 
at the other, elation on this occasion and submissiveness 
on that, and so that sentiments are built up which will de- 
termine its attitude to these objects and situations when 
it meets with them again. 
397 Such sentiments may be very enduring and of very 
great social importance. Very valuable moral sentiments 
may be transmitted in this way, as well as elements of more 
doubtful value. In either case, the result is a powerful 
reinforcement of conservative social processes. A 
beautiful example of the strength and permanence of a 
sentiment formed in this way, and of the importance of the 
social results which may follow upon such a process, is to 
be found in the debate in the House of Lords on the proposed 
revision of the Book of Common Prayer. A powerful appeal 
against the introduction of change was made by a peer who 
told how, in his childhood, his mother had impressed upon 
him the fear that the Protestant establishment would be in 
danger when an Anglican congregation turned to the east to 
say the creed. It is unnecessary to comment upon the non - 
rational basis of this appeal to the House of Lords to 
accept, as the speaker apparently did, the judgement of his 
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mother as superior to that of the speaker himself, to that 
of the assembly which he was addressin,, and to that of 
scholarship and ecclesiastical authority. It was interest- 
ing to notice it as the conscious and public statement of a 
type of motive which must have much to do with shaping the 
views of public men and ordinary citizens on a great variety 
of questions, though usually without such explicit con- 
sciousness and avowal. 
398 By the same process but with less fortunate re- 
sults the mother's emotions are induced in the child on 
occasions when they are evoked in reference to some other 
relation to which the child is not by intention a partner. 
It seems to be an important part of the female tradition 
to control the expression of fear in the presenccof a 
child (cf. section 251). The value of such a tradition is 
not only in the prevention of the immediate shock to the 
child but in the avoidance of enduring consequences of an 
undesirable kind. In the view of the psycho -analysts 
very unfortunate consequences may follow upon an incident 
in which the child is present during manifestations of 
sexual feeling between its parents and this process would 
seem to be a factor in the aetiology of such consequences. 
399 The same process is made use of, with results 
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fortunate and unfortunate, by the advertiser and the 
political propagandist to induce positive or negative 
attitudes to this or that commodity, or to this or that 
person or policy, without attempting to show that there are 
/9,Y- 
rational grounds for such attitudes. 
400 (2) The, way in which a process of sympathy may 
lead-to impressive consequences by altering the balance 
between tendencies which are in equilibrium may be 
illustrated by a rather dramatic incident which I once 
witnessed. Three persons were concerned. Earlier in the 
day, A, who was strongly prejudiced against the teaching of 
the psycho -analysts, had been telling B how ridiculous it 
was to suppose that dreams had any reference t+exual 
matters; and he had related in confirmation of his view a 
striking dream of his own, of which he alleged that it was 
at once evident that it could have no sexual meaning what- 
soever. B, much impressed by this argument, was now re- 
capitulating it to C, and presently he began to relate the 
dream itself in order to clinch the matter. The dream 
was (in terms of the Freudian symbols) a rather elaborate 
dramatisation of the act of sexual union. The opening 
stage of it was sufficient to show this to C, who was 
familiar with Freudian theory. Having listened patiently 
to what' promised to be an unprofitable argument, being now 
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gratuitously presented with the material for its refutation, 
and contrasting the incongruous content of the dream with 
the serious character of the dreamer, he could not forbear 
to smile. The effect was surprising. B at once said: 
"I see what you mean. I'll finish telling the dream and 
then I'll interpret it; and you can tell me whether I 
am right." And he did, symbol by symbol, as if he had the 
book in his hand, to his own intense amusement. 
B had thus considered the same dream on two occasions. 
On the first, A's attitude - his resistance to a recognition 
of the latent content of his own dream - had presumably done 
something to strengthen in B's mind the inhibitory forces 
which, in any normal person unacquainted with psycho- 
analytic teaching, would operate to prevent the appearance 
in consciousness of the meaning of the dream symbols. On 
the second occasion, C's attitude, although expressed in 
nothing more than a slight change in the tension of the 
facial muscles, was sufficient to make an end of these in- 
hibitions. The revelation of the meaning of the dream on 
the second occasion was not due to the transmission from C 
to B of any knowledge of the meanings attributed by psycho - 
analysts to the dream symbols, or even of specific feeling 
attitudes to them. All that could possibly be communicated 
was amusement, with the implication of an attitude of 
scepticism. This was sufficient to set free active process- 
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es in B's mind, as a result of which the determinants of 
the dream in his own mind revealed themselves to his own 
consciousness. B's own mind thus did the work of in- 
terpretation, upon the slightest of cues afforded by C's 
facial expression, and quite a striking change of attitude 
to psycho -analytic theory resulted. 
401 Similar illustrations might be drawn from the 
education of taste. One man has looked at a particular 
poet but has not been sufficiently attracted by his work 
to give him further attention. Some element in his 
style - a peculiarity of his diction or his metrical form 
- is repellent, or perhaps merely without meaning. 
Some people admire the work of a Fool, 
For it's sure to keep your judgment cool; 
It does not reproach you with want of wits; 
It is not like a lawyer serving a writ. 
To meet with new work of any aesthetic value is like meet- 
ing "a lawyer serving a writ ": it makes a demand upon the 
powers of the mind. Suppose another man, who has a fuller 
understanding of the poet in question, to quote him in a 
tone of voice implying appreciation, and so as to convey 
the appropriate feeling of the lines he speaks, and this 
may be sufficient to made a bridge between the poet and 
the other, so that the latter may freely enter upon an 
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understanding and enjoyment of him. His own mind is then 
active in interpreting the printed words which before were 
without aesthetic significance for him. 
402 Political or religious conversion may appear to 
turn upon incidents as trivial. Actually it has probably 
been preceded by some process of mental reorganisation. 
Movements of the mind which have not come clearly to con- 
sciousness, or th the determination of action, have been 
shaping themselves in response to this incident and that, 
to this idea and that, and, at last, upon the cue of some 
apparently inadequate remark or maifestation of feeling, 
a very striking change of mental orientation takes place. 
403 (3) Sympathetically induced states of emotion may 
be of importance in a third way. They may be starting - 
points for trains of thought and imagery in the mind in 
which they have been induced; these trains of thought 
and imagery may be very much richer than, or largely in- 
dependent of those, the expression of which has given rise 
to them; and the mind in which they rise may be itself un- 
aware how much has come to it from outside, and how much 
it has itself contributed. 
This principle may be observed in a variety of 
phenomena some of them grotesque. It is difficult to 
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illustrate from every day experience since the points on 
which it turns are not easily recorded. A very beautiful 
example is however available in the famous passage in 
which Walter Pater described Leonardo da Vinci's 
In 
La Gioconda. 
All the thoughts and experience of the world 
have etched and moulded there, in that which they 
have of power to refine and make expressive the out- 
ward form, the animalism of Greece, the lust of 
Rome, the mysticism of the middle age with its 
spiritual ambition and imaginative loves, the return 
of the Pagan world, the sins of the Borgias. She 
is older than the rocks among which she sits; like 
the vampire, she has been dead many times, and learn- 
ed the secrets of the grave; and has been a diver in 
deep seas, and keeps their fallen day about her; and 
trafficked for strange webs with Eastern merchants: 
and, as Leda, was the mother of Helen of Troy, and, 
as Saint Anne, the mother of Mary; and all this has 
been to her but as the sound of lyres and flutes, and 
lives only in the delicacy with which it has moulded 
the changing lineaments, and tinged the eyelids and 
the hands. 
How much of this is communicated by "the unfathomable 
smile ", how much merely suggested? How impossible it is 
to draw the line between that which has come from Leonardo, 
and that which has its origin in the mind of the writer. 
How certain that in another mind the trains of thought and 
imagery suggested might have a very different colouring. 
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404 We may sum up the argument about sympathy- by saying 
that, as a process of social transmission, it is of very 
great importance but that it is subject to very narrow 
limits. The transmission of a culture is therefore de- 
pendent on the process of reproduction by similar determin- 
ants, and that in turn is dependent upon the special and 
general abilities of the minds through which the trans- 
mission takesplace. When these minds are inadequate a 
form of expression transmitted by their agency will de- 
teriorate, either in the inter -relations of its elements, 
or in its relation to its determinants; that is, it will 
deteriorate, either as a form, or in its expressiveness.g 
And, although transmission with substitute or inadequate de- 
terminants may preserve the form for a time, it is likely to 
result ultimately in its deterioration. On the other hand, 
if a form be transmitted without a deterioration in its ex- 
pressiveness, it is almost certain to be subject to improve- 
ment, unless it has already been brought to such a pitch 
that further improvement in it is not required; for the 
minds through which it is transmitted, being capable of an 
adequate grasp of it in all its relations, are of the same 
quality as the minds which produced it and may therefore be 
expected to prove capable of a further advance. 
405 The modern world has seen in the march of science, 
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and in the economic and social developments which have 
followed from it, a striking example of such advance. Its 
inevitable continuance has only recently ceased to be 
generally taken for granted. The doctrine of progress is 
supported not only by this very impressive social experience 
but by a fallacy, obvious enough once one's attention is 
drawn to it: If an age transforms its traditions in ways 
which seem good to it, it will necessarily appear to itself 
to be achieving improvements, even in cases in which the 
changes it makes are not advantageous; if it rejects 
elements which are ¿ood, it does so in ignorance of their 
value, if it introduces innovations of less value, they will 
still appear to it as achievements. By the time the evil 
results of the loss and the false gain are experienced, 
their origin will be forgotten, or thiese results will be 
ascribed to other causes. 
406 Nevertheless humanity seems to have been much more 
frequently impressed with the doctrine of inevitable de- 
terioration. 
Damnosa quid non imminuit dies? 
Aetas parentum, peior avis, tulit 
nos nequiores, mox daturos199 
progeniem vitiosiorem. 
Comparatively rare are such expressions of a different view 
Chap X Sect 406 6E8 
as that of Lucretius, 
Inque brevi spatio mutantur saecla animantum, 
Et, quasi cursores, vital lampada tradunt. 
or that of Dante in the prooemium of the De Monarchia, 
Omnium hominum quos ad amorem veritatis 
natura superior impressit, hoc maxime interesse 
videtur, ut quemadmodum de labore antiquorum 
ditati sunt, ita et ipsi posteris prolaborent, 
quatenus ab eis posteritas habeat quo ditetur. 
or, after a long interval, Pascal,at) 
Toute la suite des hommes, pendant le cours 
de tant de siècles, doit être considerée 
comme un même homme qui subsiste 
toujours et qui apprend continuellement. 
According to Lord Acton, it was from Turgot that our fathers 
began to learn a more optimistic view of human destinies f °3 
Whilst Montesquieu, at the height of his fame 
as the foremost of living writers, was content to 
contemplate the past, there was a student in the 
Paris seminary who taught men to fix hope and en- 
deavour on the future, and led the world at twenty - 
three... From Lucretius and Seneca to Pascal and 
Leibniz we encounter a few dispersed and unsupport- 
ed passages, suggesting advance towards perfection, 
and the flame that brightens as it moves from hand 
to hand; but they were without mastery or radiance. 
Turgot at once made the idea habitual and familiar, 
and it became a pervading force in thoughtful minds, 
whilst the new sciences arose to confirm it. He im- 
parted a deeper significance to history, giving it 
unity of tendency and direction, constancy where 
there had been motion, and development instead of 
change. 
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407 It may be supposed that external accident can 
destroy a society as external accident can destroy a 
single organism. But, though a tree may die of drought 
or lightning or volcanic eruption, we regard its con- 
tinuing life, if it is not subject to such a catastrophe, 
as dependent on the continuous fulfilment of a series of 
inner conditions, and the same may be thought to be true 
of societies. Of the continued life of a society the 
principal condition is the effective transmission of its 
culture and the conditions of such transmission are there- 
fore conditions of its life. These conditions are (ä) 
biological, (b) psychological, (c) social. 
408 (a) The principal biological condition relevant to 
this question is the maintenance of a population in which 
the innate special and general abilities upon which trans- 
mission depends are found in a sufficient degree. This 
principle is usually stated in a form which emphasises the 
need for the birth in each generation of a sufficient 
number of outstanding individuals. Such a statement is 
inadequate, unless it be taken to mean that, since the 
distribution of such qualities may be expected to be in 
accordance with the normal curve of distribution, the 
birth of a sufficient number of outstanding individuals will 
imply also a sufficiently high position of the median values 
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for the group in respect of these qualities. The trans- 
mission of any higher element in the culture of a society 
is dependent upon the existence of such outstanding in- 
dividuals, but it is also, as will be shown, dependent upon 
some degree of appreciation by others, and therefore upon 
the general level of the group. 
409 (b) The principal psychological condition is the 
transmission of forms with appropriate determinants and 
therefore with the retention of their full degree of ex- 
pressiveness. The higher elements in a culture can of 
course only have their full expressiveness for exceptional 
minds. This is equally true in science, in philosophy, in 
religion, in literature, in art, in music, in engineering, 
in medicine, in agriculture, in craftsmanship, in any de- 
partment of life. 
410 It is, however, obscured by the fact that forms may 
be transmitted with lessened degrees of expressiveness and 
with lessened degrees of adequacy and usefulness. Thus 
forms may be transmitted without understanding and still 
with a high degree of social usefulness. The right thing 
is done, not because its rightness is understood, but be- 
cause it has been done before. A form so transmitted is 
liable to deterioration. This is especially so if there 
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are alterations in the frame of external circumstances 
which require the alteration and re- adaptation of the form. 
Such alteration and re- adaptation will obviously be im- 
possible. A form transmitted in this manner may however 
preserve valuable elements which, when they meet again with 
capable minds, regain their expressiveness in these minds 
with the consequence that their development and re- adapt- 
ation become again possible. 
411 (c) To be socially effective in the fullest sense 
a transmitted form must have its fullest expressiveness 
at least for some minds. It cannot have such expressive- 
ness for all the members of a community and it is not 
necessary for its preservation or its social effectiveness 
that it should e.g. it is not necessary that every surgeon 
should have a command of the technique of law nor that 
lawyers should have a command of the technique of surgery. 
The social tradition implies specialisation. Each 
specialisation implies a succession of specialists for 
whom its transmitted forms have full expressiveness. It 
requires also a series of circles within the community for 
each of which its forms have a different degree of express- 
iveness. A highly specialised surgical technique may be 
fully grasped by only a few specialists. It is necessary 
that a larger number of specialists should have a theor- 
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etical understanding of it and an appreciation of the 
special command of it possessed by the smaller number who 
actually apply it. It is also necessary that the general 
practitioner should have a knowledge, though it must 
necessarily be a much less complete knowledge, of this and 
of other similarly specialised techniques. Beyond them 
a series of publics will possess in lessened degrees an 
appreciation of the possibilities of this and other surgical 
and medical techniques and theories, an appreciation fading 
out towards the periphery. 
412 Such related groups of specialists and publics 
are to be observed in the case of every department of know- 
ledge upon which a modern community depends. Similar re- 
lations are to be observed also on a small scale in the 
primitive group or in the small group within a civilised 
community. Upon such a social structure effective trans- 
mission depends in all cases except those of simple elements 
of culture which can be transmitted with full expressiveness 
to all members of a community. Such a structure is psy- 
chologically a parallel to that already described in Chapter 
IX (sections 350 -366). What have here been called degrees 
of expressiveness of a transmitted form, correspond psy- 
chologically to what in chapter IX were termed modes of 
acceptance. The essential social condition of the trans- 
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mission of forms of expression with unimpaired effective- 
ness and expressiveness is therefore a social structure 
which makes possible for each circle of the community the 
mode of acceptance of which it is capable, and which gives 
the necessary social prestige to the right persons and in- 
stitutions to secure acceptance of valuable and effective 
forms. 
413 Each of us occupies a position somewhere between 
the centre and the periphery with regard to each part of 
the tradition of our society. If it is a question of the 
aesthetic value of a poem or the scientific value of a 
theory in social psychology, I believe myself capable of 
arriving at an original appreciation and an original judge- 
ment in consequence of my own mental processes. If it is 
a question of the Socratic problem, I am glad to read John 
Burnet or Professor A.E.Taylor or listen to Professor W.D. 
Ross. If I require medical assistance, I shall not argue 
with my physician as to the form of treatment which I am 
to adopt: but I shall in the first place choose him in 
the light of such intelligence and such relevant knowledge 
as I possess and I shall be similarly guided in the con- 
tinuance of my adherence to him. How far, in fields in 
which I have no special competence, I may be bamboozled by 
processes of suggestion and persuaded by inadequate reasons, 
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I cannot say. But I modestly hope that I may have reached 
such a maturity as not to require coercion for my own good 
and that of others. Each of us is therefore related to 
socially transmitted forms of expression through more than 
one of these modes of acceptance. The position of the 
more able and the better educated (and, unless we identify 
education with schooling, these two classes are not very 
different in their personnel) will, however, be nearer the 
centre in the case of a larger number of departments of 
the social traditions. 
414 Since men are born and die, every element in a 
social tradition must be continually transmitted to new 
young minds and this transmission is the primary condition 
of its maintenance. This process is, from the point of 
view of these minds, a development through the processes 
described above (sections 94 -107) a development which has 
the society in which the elements of that tradition are 
being thought and felt and acted upon as its environment. 
These minds, in their innate tendencies and capacities and 
developmental forces are the correlates of that tradition. 
Its elements have been formed (though perhaps in somewhat 
different circumstances) by minds innately similar to them 
and tendencies and capacities which 
,..all antiquity and no decay... 
o'y 
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come into the world afresh with each new generation. 
Notes and references 
A bibliography should show a writer's indebtedness. 
I have found it very difficult to preserve a due 
proportion in this matter, partly because of the nature 
of my subject which is related to so many fields of study, 
and partly because much of the reading out of which the 
work has grown necessarily preceded the first conce.tion 
of it. Where I am basing on psychological positions 
which are accepted, I have not always thought it necessary 
to quote an authority. Where I have judged it desirable 
to do so I have confined my references to a comparatively 
small number of books. Quotations are in many cases in- 
tended to supplement statements in the text. Circumstances 
have made it difficult to show my debt to periodical 
literature. When writing I tried throughout to keep my 
attention primarily on social processes of everyday life 
which I could observe and formulate and observe again. As 
one grateful for a training in English Scholarship I have 
tried to be punctilious in my treatment of literary quo- 
tations. 
(The numbers attached to the notes are inserted in the 
text in red ink) 
The motto at the beginning of the book is taken from 
Bosanquet - The Philosophical Theory of the State (London 
1923), p.x. 
The sources of the mottoes to chapter I are: 
(a) W.H.R.Rivers - Psychology and Ethnology (1926), p.5. 
(b) C.G.Crump, Esq., in private correspondence. 
1 This double aspect of society, its presentation to us 
as social facts and as social experience, is well described 
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by O.v.Gierke, Das Wesen der menschlichen Verbände, p.22, 
q. Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence (Oxford 1923), 
p.132, 
What outer experience teaches us is confirmed by 
inner experience, because the reality of the social life 
of the community exists also in our consciousness. It 
is an inner experience for us to find the place for our 
Ego in a highly developed social life. We feel our- 
selves to be self-contained units, but we also feel that 
we are part of a whole which lives and acts within us. 
Take away our relation to nation and State, to religious 
bodies or churches, to profession and family and all 
kinds of unions and guilds, and we should not know our- 
selves in the miserable remnant that would remain. When 
we realize this, we understand that all these things do 
not mean mere chains and bonds for us, but that they re- 
present a psychic chain of experiences affecting our 
innermost life and forming an integral part of our being. 
We become conscious of the fact that part of the im- 
pulses directing our actions emanates from the sense 
of community in us, and that we are living the life of 
social beings. 
2 Cf. James Ward - Psychological Principles (Cambridge 
1920), I,7. The conclusion is with regard to the stand- 
point of psychology: 
...by whatever methods, from whatever sources its 
facts are ascertained, they must - to have a psy- 
chological import - be regarded as having a place in, or 
as being a constituent of, someone's experience... Psy- 
chology we may then define as the science of individual 
experience... 
3 The most recent definition of the scope of social psy- 
chology is that of F.C.Bartlett in Remembering, A Study in 
Experimental and Social Psychology (Cambridge 1932). He 
defines social psychology as: 
...the systematic study of the modifications of 
individual experience and response due directly to 
membership of a group. (p.239) 
This definition appears to conflict with the view expressed 
in the text. The writer however goes on to state a position 
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similar to that in the text: 
We seem forced to say that conduct springing 
directly from beliefs, conventions, customs, 
traditions and institutions characteristic of a 
group is material for social psychology. This is, 
theoretically speaking, rather troublesome, be- 
cause it seems to mean that everything in psy- 
chology belongs to social psychology, except 
idiosyncracies and such forms of reaction as are 
immediately and dominantly determined by physical 
stimuli. (pp. 242 -243) 
Cf. section 22 of this work. 
4 Cf. H.W.B.Joseph - An Introduction to Logic (Oxford 
1916), pp. 77 -78 on the difference between science and 
history. 
But history is interested in individuals in whose 
total being we find characters coincident, the con- 
junction whereof we can never wholly see to be 
necessary. 
...the historian attempts to trace connexions 
among the events that make the history of 
individuals, or groups of individuals, and so far 
to be scientific. 
The following quotation is from Vinogradoff - Historical 
Jurisprudence (Oxford 1923), p.72, 
Natural science has been contrasted by modern 
thinkers witn cultural science based on history. 
The aim of natural science is to discover laws, 
that is, abstract principles to which the actual 
facts may be subordinated without residuum. The 
aim of cultural science is to ascertain what is 
important in the concrete and the individual. The 
standard in this case is not the standard of re- 
currence, but the standard of value. 
5 The argument can be carried a stage further. cf. R.G. 
Collingwood - Speculum Mentis or the Map of Knowledge 
(Cambridge 1924), pp.186 -187. 
Science is the question whose answer is history. 
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To ask that question implies that history is 
already in existence; and thus we get a pro- 
cess of history - science - history. But 
history on its first appearance is implicit; 
it is not known for what it is, and is indeed 
despised as the mere world of empirical or 
sensuous reality. It is only when it has been 
distilled into terms of science and then re- 
stored to itself in the form of concepts or 
laws that it is recognised for what it really 
is. 
6 Cf. Bernard Bosanquet - op. cit. , pp.39 ._4o 
As every serious student of social matters 
knows by his own experience, it is impossible 
to touch a physical fact, or a statistical 
datum, or a legal enactment, in reference to 
its social bearing, without its at once, so to 
speak, coming alive in his hands, and attaching 
itself to an underlying relation of mind as the 
only unity which will make it intelligible, and 
correlate it with other experiences, by them- 
selves no less fragmentary. In statistics, for 
example, you touch a moving creature, as if 
through the holes in a wall, at this point and 
the other, and write down where you have touched 
him. But to see the creature as he is, and com- 
bine your information of all kinds in a just and 
complete idea, you must get him into the open. 
And that, when the question is of a life, you can 
only do by reconstructing his mind, for even to 
see a social unit with your eyes gives you a 
fragment only, and not a whole. 
7 The desirability of preserving a clear distinction be- 
tween these two stages of a sociological argument is well 
exemplified in W.H.R. Rivers is Kinship and Social Organ- 
isation (London 1914), in which the terminology of re- 
' lationship is discussed. His conclusion with regard to 
the methodological point is: 
In social, as in all other kinds of human act- 
ivity, psychological factors must have an 
essential part... These psychological elements 
are, however, only concomitants of social pro- 
cesses with which it is possible to deal apart 
Chap I 
from their psychological aspect. It has been 
the task of these lectures to refer the social 
facts of relationship to antecedent social con- 
ditions, and I believe that this is the proper 
method of sociology. Even at the present time, 
however, it is possible to support sociological 
arguments by means of considerations provided by 
psychological motives, and the assistance thus 
rendered to sociology will become far greater as 
the science of social psycholoy advances. 
I am not in agreement, however, with the implied definition 
of the scope of sociology (V. section 15 of this work). 
8 Alfred Marshall - Principles of Economics, p.169, 
The marginal utility of a commodity to any- 
one diminishes with every increase in the amount 
of it he already has. 
and on a later page, 
...the only universal law as to a person's 
desire for a commodity is that it diminishes, 
other things being equal, with every increase 
in his supply of that commodity. 
The subject is sufficiently important to be given 
separate treatment: here it is possible to give only a 
few points. (1) The statistical statement of the law of 
demand is independent of such translation into psychological 
terms. (2) This psychological interpretation of it is 
false, because the psychological processes involved are much 
more complex than it indicates. (3) Except in the case of 
such desires as those for food, drink, sleep and warmth 
there is no such regular decrease in the intensity of a 
conative state as it attains its satisfaction. (4) On the 
contrary a desire may "grow with what it feeds on "; and 
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some desires are therefore in a sense insatiable, e.g. 
those related to ostentation. (5) Most economic desires 
require just so much, and neither more nor less, e.g. I 
desire one co:,y of Marshall's book, for a second copy I 
have no shelf -room; a girl requires just this belt or 
piece of lace to complete a costume, and has no use for 
two of either; i.e. what is required in such cases is 
an element for the completion of a pattern. (6) Ex- 
penditure of money is related, not directly to the strengths 
of desires but to self -consciousness, other -consciousness 
(section 160), reason and will. Later writers on economics 
have given some attention to these problems but my know- 
ledge of the literature of the question is not sufficient 
to permit me to form a judgement how far it has been worked 
out to adequate conclusions. I am content here to use 
this statement of a classical writer on the subject as an 
illustration of the methodological point under discussion. 
9 On this question see F.C.Bartlett - Psychology and 
Primitive Culture (Cambridge 1923), Chap I, especially 
pp. 8 -11. Professor Bartlett emphasises in particular 
the neglect by some writers of the group itself and its 
mental structure in relation to such responses. 
10 We may no doubt except from this statement the 
patellar and papillary reflexes et hoc genus. As to how 
far social conditionings may extend to physiological pro- 
cesses, see notes and infra. 
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11 Cf. G.F.Stout - Analytic Psychology (London 1896), p. 
2, 
In saying that psychology is a positive science, 
we mean that it investigates matter of fact, in- 
stead of laying down canons of criticism. Ethics 
lays down canons of conduct, aesthetics aims at 
establishing canons of taste, and logic prescribes 
canons of reasoning. Among the sciences which 
inquire into matter of fact are to be ranked mathe- 
matics and all the physical sciences, together with 
certain moral sciences - theory of knowledge, 
sociology, political economy and psychology. psy- 
chology,like chemistry or physics, is directly con- 
cerned with what is: it does not like ethics or 
logic treat of what ought to be. 
12 Cf. R.M.Maciver - Community (London 1920), p.60, 
writing of society, 
Its essential forms have been shaped by men's 
purposes, and its development is wholly dependent 
on the development of these purposes. These 
purposes have all an ethical character. The very 
existence of society means ethical purpose in its 
members. The sociologist who has no ethical 
interest, no interest in social conditions as re- 
lative to values, is a dilettante. He is like 
a grammarian who studies the letters and syllables 
of words but never thinks of the words themselves 
as meanings. 
13 Cf. R.G.Collingwood - op.cit., p.224, 
The characteristic embodiment of concrete ethics 
is law. Law is nothing but the structure of 
society regarded as the source of an obligation on 
the individual to act in certain determinate ways. 
14 On non -rational factors which have influenced the 
development of the social sciences see J.A.Hobson - Free 
Thought in the Social Sciences (London 1926). 
Chap II 
The sources of the mottoes of chapter II are: 
(a) The Note -Books of Samuel Butler (London 1918), p.88 
(b) Entia non multiplicands praeter necessitatem. An attempt- 
ed rendering of 'the invincible Doctor' by a schoolboy. 
15 Cf.G.P.Thompson - The Atom (London), Chap.XV: 
Most of the laws of atomic physics are expressed 
as probabilities, which, of course, become certain- 
ties when a sufficient number of independent events 
are concerned to make statistics apply... There is 
an inherent uncertainty or power of choice in the 
world, but with this proviso, that the power of 
choice is exercised in such a way that, in the bulk, 
average laws are obeyed. 
16 W.Flinders Petrie - The Revhlutions of Civilisation 
(London 1912). 
17 Robert Byron - The Byzantine Achievement (London 1929). 
Cf. also Herbert Read - The Meaning of Art (London 1931), 
pp. 66 -69, whose conclusion is: 
...we surrender to this art with that immediate 
joy -in- perception which is theií'irst and final 
sanction of aesthetic experience. 
Personally I find that a keen delight in the work of El 
Greco and William Blake is not incompatible with a belief 
that Greek sculpture and the carvings of XIII century Europe 
bear the characters of a greater mental and spiritual 
maturity. 
18 James Dreyer - An Introduction to the Psychology of 
Education (London 1922), pp.9 -10. 
19 H.G.Wells - The First Men in the Moon, 
20 Cf.C.D.Broad - The Mind and its place in Nature ( London 
1925), Chapter VII, "The Mind's Knowledge of other Minds ". 
also Charles Fox - The Mind and its Body (London 1931), 
p.286 et.seq. 
21 The following sections apply to the problem of a group 
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mind a number of concepts derived from the discussion of 
the relation between the mind and the body and are indebted 
to a number of loci classici from Descartes onwards. 
Among recent writers to whom I am indebted here, I may 
mention G.F.Stout (A Manual of Psychology, 3rd. ed..1915, 
and 4th. ed., revised by C.A.Mace, 1929), William Mc- 
Dougall (Body and Mind, London 1911) and C.D.Broad (op.cit.). 
22 Cf. William McDougall - The Group Mind (Cambridge 
1920) p.30 et.seq. 
23 Cf. James Ward - op.cit., p.97, 
The word disposition means primarily an arrange- 
ment, as when we talk of the disposition of troops 
in a battle or of cards in a game; the disposita, 
that is to say, are always something actual. 
24 G.F.Stout - Analytic Psychology, Vol.I, p.21, 
...it is implied in the very conception of an 
individual mind that present conscious process is 
throughout conditioned by prior conscious process, 
and this is only intelligible if we suppose that 
past experience leaves persistent after -effects, 
which continue when the corresponding modes of 
consciousness have ceased. 
25 The following definition of a group mind appears to 
be of this type: 
We may fairly define a mind as an organized 
system of mental or purposive forces; and, in 
the sense so defined, every highly organized human 
society may properly be said to possess a collect- 
ive mind. (William McDougall - Psychology, London 
1912, p.229; also q. in the same writer's The 
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Group Mind,p.9) 
This statement turns on the definition of mind employed, 
and this definition is unsatisfactory ( ±-ana -55 ant-89) 
as not turning upon an adequate criterion of mind. I 
find it difficult to judge whether McDougall means in this 
statement any more than a system of minds in relation to 
one another (V.Section 174 infra) or a system of social 
forces (V.sections 57 -59 infra). Thus a few lines further 
on we find, 
...the society is rather constituted by the 
system of relations obtaining between the in- 
dividual minds Which are its units of com- 
position. (ibid) 
- a statement of absolute clarity, which I find entirely 
acceptable but not entirely consistent with that previous- 
ly quoted from the same passage. An unfortunate ambiguity, 
resulting from the employment of metaphorical literary ex- 
pressions, seems to afflict writers upon this topic, for 
when R.M.Maciver (Community, London,1917) criticises Mc- 
Dougall for entertaining the hypothesis of a supra -personal 
mind, the latter easily convicts him of using language 
which bears the same implication. 
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Chapter III 
The motto for Chapter III is taken from William Wordsworth 
- The Prelude, XI, 393 -395. ed.T.Hutchinson. 
26 A.V.Dicey - Lectures on the relation between Law and 
Public Opinion in England during the nineteenth century 
(London 1914), pp.9 -10, 
In England,... the beliefs or sentiments which, 
during the nineteenth century, have governed the 
development of the law have in strictness been 
public opinion, for they have been the wishes and 
ideas as to legislation held by the people of 
England, or, to speak with more precision, by the 
majority of those citizens who have at a given 
moment taken an effective part in public life. 
27 Ibid. pp.363-364 
..whilst our tribunals, or the judges of whom 
they are composed, are swayed by the prevailing 
beliefs of a particular time, they are also guided 
by professional opinions and ways of thinking... 
28 I am indebted to Charles Clay,Esq., Librarian, the 
House of Lords for the following information: 
"All bills are in print. But they are not sent 
to the King for his assent. The assent is given by 
Royal Commission. The King signs the appointment of 
the Commission, the terms of which include a list of 
bills for which the Royal assent is asked." 
I was desirous of knowing what was the actual operative 
document. 
29 A.V.Dicey - op.cit., p.363 
"The Courts or the judges when acting as 
legislators, are of course influenced by the 
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beliefs and feelings of their time, and are guided 
to a considerable extent by the dominant current of 
public opinion; Eldon and Kenyon belonged to the 
era of old Toryism as distinctly as Denman, Campbell, 
Erle and Bramwell belonged to the age of Benthamite 
liberalism ". 
30 Vinogradoff - op.cit.,p.119-120 
Laws are formulated in order to be enforced: 
so much is perfectly true. But is the sanction 
of law to be always sought in coercion by the 
Sovereign? We have seen that such coercion is 
in any case not the ultimate guarantee of legal 
order: it requires to be supplemented by the 
express or tacit acceptance and assistance of 
society at large, because, as has been said long 
ago, one can conquer by bayonets but one cannot 
sit on them. The hangman, the policeman and 
the soldier would not be strong enough to ensure 
social order and obedience to law for any length 
of time if the people at large were not disposed 
to back them. 
31 A.V.Dicey - op.cit., p.1. 
"True indeed it is that the existence and alter- 
ation of human institutions must, in a sense, always 
and everywhere depend upon the beliefs or feelings, 
or, in other words, upon the opinion of the society 
in which such institutions flourish ". 
Cf. also David Hume - Essays, IV: 
As force is always on the side of the governed, 
the governors have nothing to support them but 
opinion. It is therefore on opinion only that 
government is founded; and this maxim extends to 
the most despotic and most military governments, as 
well as to the most free and popular. The Soldan 
of Egypt, or the Emperor of Rome, might drive his 
harmless subjects like brute beasts, against their 
sentiments and inclination; but he must, at least, 
have led his mamelukes, or praetorian bands, like 
men, by their opinion. 
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31a It is pleasant to quote Hobbes: 
The value of all things contracted for is 
measured by the appetite of the contractors,... 
(Leviathan, Part I, 75) 
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Chapter IV 
The sources of the mottoes are: 
(a) Plato - Phaedrus, 246. Tr. B. Jowett. 
(bi J.H.Newman - Apologia pr6 Vita Sua, Chapter V. 
(c) James Dreyer - An Introduction to Educational Psy- 
chology, p.44. 
32 Cf. R.G.Collingwood, op.cit., p.218 
The motives of historical personages are not 
psychical forces brooding above the flow of 
historical events; they are elements in these 
events, or rather, they are simply these events 
themselves... 
33 Romanes - Fortnightly Review, Dec., 1881: 
Environment - or the sum total of the ex- 
ternal conditions of life... 
q. N.E.D. under 'environment'. 
34 Cf. G.F.Stout - A Manual of Psychology (1929), p.634, 
Thus we may define a volition as a desire 
qualified and defined by the judgement that 
so far as in us lies we shall bring about the 
attainment of the desired end because we desire it. 
and William McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology, 
p.240, 
The essential mark of volition - that which 
distinguishes it from simple desire, or simple 
conflict of desires - is that the personality as 
a whole, or the central feature or nucleus of the 
personality, the man himself, is thrown upon the 
side of the weaker motive; whereas a mere desire 
may be felt to be something that, in comparison 
with this most intimate nucleus of the personality, 
is foreign to the self, a force that we do not 
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acknowledge as our own, and which we, or the 
intimate self, may look upon with horror and 
detestation. 
35 G.F.Stout - The Groundwork of Psychology (revised by 
R.H.Thouless, London 1927), p.18, 
In so far as a conation is satisfied or ful- 
filled, it disappears in its own satisfaction 
or fulfilment. 
36 Cf. G.F.Stout - A Manual of Psychology (4th.ed.), pp. 
114:=115. 
37 Cf. G.F.Stout, q. supra, n.24. 
38 Sigmund Freud - Psychopathology of Everyday Life, 
(London 1914). 
39 F.C.Bartlett, op.cit., p.7 
"...the root tendencies remain. Only their 
inter -relations vary, together with the constant- 
ly changing environment. Students who have 
their eyes fixed upon the fundamental tendencies 
say that human nature never changes; those who 
concentrate upon the ways in which the tendencies 
are related to one another, and upon the ever - 
shifting play of external nature, assert that man 
moves endlessly towards the novel. Both views 
are in fact true ". 
40 William McDougall - o .cit., chapter III; James 
Dreyer - Instinct in Man am ridge 1921), chapter VIII. 
41 William McDougall - op.cit., p.120. 
42 op.cit., p.44. 
43 Sigmund Freud - Introductory Lectures of Psycho- 
analysis. 
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44 " James Ward - op.cit., p.75, 
...neither can we distinguish precisely at 
any link in the chain of life what is old and 
inherited, original in the sense of Locke and 
Leibniz, from what is new or acquired, original 
in the modern sense. 
Cf. also Kurt Koffka - The Growth of the Mind (London 1925), 
Chapter II. 
The following passage is from W.Stern - Psychologie der 
frühen Kindheit, p.18: 
Mental development is not a mere passive un- 
folding of inborn traits, neither is it a mere 
reception of external influences; instead it is 
a result of the convergence of both the internal 
opportunities and the external conditions of de- 
velopment. One should not ask, concerning any 
function or trait, whether it originates from with- 
in or from without; but rather, what part of it is 
derived from within and what part from without; for 
both are constantly co- operating in the work, though 
at times in varying degrees. 
(q. in Koffka - op.cit.) 
45 Cf. Graham Wallas - The Great Society (London 1919),x. 
61 et.seq. 
46 Cf. Robert R.Rusk - Experimental Education (London 1919), 
chapter III. G.M.Whipple - Manual of Mental and Physical 
Tests, part I. 
47 Robert R.Rusk - op.cit., chapters III -IX. Useful 
bibliographies are appended to these chapters. In the 
case of intelligence, the literature is considerable in 
amount: see especially the work of Binet and Simon, 
William Stern, Terman, Yerkes, Bridges and Hardwick, and 
Cyril Burt. 
48 On this subject see Kurt Koffka, op.cit., p.249. et.seq. 
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49 Ibid.,chapter II, section 1. The following sentences 
may be quoted: 
We speak of development whenever an organism 
or any special organ becomes larger, heavier, more 
finely structured, or more capable of functioning. 
One must, however, differentiate two types of de- 
velopment: development as growth or maturation, 
and development as learning. (p.38) 
50 Cf. William James - op.cit., Vol.II pp. 406 -407. 
...one may well be tempted to make a pre- 
diction about the human child, and say that 
if a baby were kept from getting on his feet 
for two or three weeks after the first impulse 
to walk had shown itself in him,... he might 
then be expected to walk about as well, through 
the mere ripening of his nerve -centres, as if 
the ordinary process of learning had been allow- 
ed to occur... 
but cf. also Kurt Koffka, op.cit., p.250 (in which the 
evidence from an experiment of Breed's on chickens is dis- 
cussed), especially his conclusion: 
...Maturation without stimulation can ac- 
complish very little; yet I believe that a 
large part of the improvement must still be 
attributed to this source,... Maturation re- 
quires stimulation through the functioning of 
the act itself. 
51 V. e.g. P.B.Ballard - 'The limit of the Growth of 
Intelligence', British Journal of Psychology, Vol.XII. 
52 The average mental age of recruits in the American 
army during the war was said to be thirteen years. V. 
Clarence S.Yoakum and Robert M.Yerkes - Mental Tests in the 
American Army (London 1920). 
53 Cf. James Dreyer - An Introduction to the Psychology 
of Education, pp.9 -10, 
It is easy to see that the normal growth and 
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development of an organism is determined from 
within, takes place, that is, in accordance 
with the laws of its own nature. The acorn 
does not grow into a fir -tree, nor is an eagle 
hatched from a turkey's egg. No matter what 
influences may be exerted from without, the 
tree that grows from an acorn is an oak, and 
the bird that comes from a turkey's egg is a 
turkey. So far it is clear and unmistakable 
that a living organism is determined by the 
laws of its own inner nature. But it is by 
no means equally clear as regards its reactions 
to external things. How far is the principle 
of self-determination valid as regards, let us 
say, the behaviour of a living organism with 
respect to some object in its environment by 
which it is disagreeably affected? On the 
long view the principle is also valid in such 
a case, though perhaps not so obviously as in 
the case of normal growth and development. 
54 F.C.Bartlett - op.cit., p.6. 
When we set out to explain human behaviour 
of any kind we must be prepared to take into 
account facts of the external world and facts 
of social structure. 
55 op.cit., pp.137 -138; but cf. also section 159 of this 
work. On the conception of the sentiment, see A.F.Shand 
- 'Character and the Emotions', in Mind, N.S., Vol. V, 
McDougall - op.cit., chapters V and VI, W.H.R.Rivers, 
A.G.Tansley, A.F.Shand, T.H.Pear, Bernard Hart, Charles S. 
Myers - 'The Relations of Complex and Sentiment', a sym- 
posium published in The British Journal of Psychology, Vol. 
XIII. 
56 Of the autonomy of even the lowest organisms see H.S. 
Jennings - The Behaviour of Lower Organisms (London 1906). 
For the purposive character of behaviour and the variability 
and adaptiveness of instinctive responses in the lower 
animals, see William McDougall - An Outline of Psychology 
(London 1923), chapters II and III. 
57 Cf. James Dreyer - op.cit., p. 78: 
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Reason is not a new force entering into mental 
life from without at the higher levels. At the 
lowest levels the life and behaviour of the organ- 
ism is co- ordinated, but the co- ordinating factor 
is not conscious of itself. When the ideational 
level emerges, however, the possibility of a con- 
scious co- ordinating factor is present,... 
Cf. also L.M.Terman, The Journal of Educational Psychology, 
1921, 
An individual is intelligent in proportion as 
he is able to carry on abstract thinking. 
in C.Spearman - The Abilities of Man, (London 1927). 
58 V. especially Köhler - The Mentality of Apes, (London 
1925). 
59 John Milton - A Maske presented At Ludlow Castle, 1634. 
¿c. 11. 704 -705. Ed. H.C.Beeching. 
60 On the morning after I wrote this, I read in The 
Times a letter in which a well known psychologist explained 
that he had so dealt with his desire to smoke tobacco. 
61 John Milton - op.cit., 1. 741. 
62 Lucretius - De rerum natura, I, 102. 
63 Cf. W.Robertson Smith - The Prophets of Israel (London 
1882) . 
64 F.C.Bartlett - op.ci.t., p.4. 
How great a variety of individual differences 
thus have their parts to play from the dawn of 
life, and by what subtleties they are distinguish- 
ed from one another, we cannot yet with certainty 
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say. 
65 Cf. J.B.Yeats's account of his experience as a 
schoolboy: Passages from the Letters of John Butler Yeats, 
selected by Ezra Pound, Cuala Press, MCM XVII. s ,, , N.0oA -nia 
66 William Dunbar - 'Lament for the Makaris', 1.13, The 
Poems of William Dunbar, ed. H. Bellyse Baildon (Cambridge 
1907). 
67 I have in the following sections avoided the use of 
the term 'the unconscious'. On this subject see Stout 
and Mace - A Manual ofP :sychology, pp. 20 -29 and C.D.Broad, 
op.cit., Section C, 'The Unconscious'. 
68 On the non- mechanical nature of retention as ex- 
perimentally demonstrated see P.B,Ballard, 'Obliviscence 
and Reminiscence', Monograph Supplement No. 2., British 
Journal of Psychology. 
69 See Sigmund Freud - Psychopathology of Everyday Life. 
70 The story of the composition of S.T.ColeridgeTs 'Kubla 
Khan' is well known. The following sentences from a 
letter of R.L.Stevenson's to W.Craibe Angus is quoted in the 
Editorial Note to Weir of Hermiston: 
I am still 'a slow study', and sit for a 
long while silent on my eggs. Unconscious 
thought, there is the only method: macerate 
your subject, let it boil slow, than take the 
lid off and look in - and there your stuff is, 
- good or bad. 
There is an interesting passage in a letter of W.A.Mozart's 
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in which he describes his method of composing as depending 
upon similar processes. V. Holmes - Life of Mozart (1845), 
p.317. The passage is quoted in V. de S.Pinto and G.G. 
Neill Wright's Tie Tree of Life (London 1929), No. 252. 
71 Sigmund Freud - The Interpretation of Dreams (London). 
72 W.H.R.Rivers - Conflict and Dream (London 1923). 
73 James Dreyer - oo.cit., p. 24. 
Chap V 
Chapter V 
The sources of the mottoes are: 
(a) Ecclesiastes, IV, 9, Authorised version, 1611. 
(b) Amos, III, 3. op.cit., 
(c) George Meredith - The Egoist, chapter XIII. 
74 The following passage may be quoted from G.Tarde 
- Social Laws (New York 1899), 
...the feeling has existed that we must look 
to psychology for any general explanation of the 
laws and pseudo -laws of economics, language, 
mythology, etc... But it is not alone, nor 
chiefly to this intra- cerebral psychology that 
we must look for the fundamental fact of 
sociology,.... it is rather in an inter -cerebral 
psychology, which studies the rise of con- 
scious relations between two or more individuals, 
that we must seek it. 
His starting -point is mine also: but our roads lead in 
different directions. 
75 F.C.Bartlett - op.cit., p.28. 
If we consider those forms of human response 
which are generally classed as instinctive, we 
find that some of them are immediately social, 
whereas others are not. For example, in Mc- 
Dougall's list the directly social forms are 
gregariousness, self -assertion, self- abasement; 
in a narrow sense the sexual and parental in- 
stincts; and perhaps pugnacity, and a social 
form of constructiveness. 
These ideas are developed in Chapter II, of which these 
sentences occur in the summary. 
Mukerjee and Sen -Gupta - Introduction to social psychology, 
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(London 1928), p.49. 
In fact there exist instincts, or motor 
patterns determined by heredity, that have for 
their object a human personality. Sex re- 
sponses, parental responses, aggressive actions, 
etc., are of this type. 
On the view stated later (sections 388 -392 of this work) 
all innate expressive movements and the innate bases of the 
responses to them (see Charles Darwin - The Expression of the 
Emotions in Man and Animals (London 1872) should be added 
to the above list . 
76 For an examination of the actual documents see Carl 
Becker - The Declaration of Independence (New York 1922). 
77 Franklyn Henry Giddings - The Elements of Sociology 
(New York 1898), p.126 et.seq,. The following passages 
may be quoted, 
When, then, two or more individuals at the 
same moment are receiving like sensations, per- 
ceiving the same relations, experiencing the 
same kind of emotion, thinking the same thoughts, 
arriving in their judgments at the same con- 
clusion, - a state of facts exists in the popul- 
ation which evidently must be classed among facts 
of mind, and yet must be distinguished from the 
mental activity of an individual who, absolutely 
alone, completely cut off from communication with 
his fellow -men, thinks solely about himself and 
his immediate material surroundings. In the one 
case there exists a concert of the emotions and 
thoughts of two or more individuals; in the other 
case, the thought of the individual is peculiar 
to himself and his isolated condition. 
In its Simplest Form, the social mind is nothing 
more or less than that simultaneous like- responsive- 
ness of like minds to the same stimulus which was 
described in Chapter V. When two or more individuals 
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receive similar sensations, or perceive the same 
object or event and react upon it in like ways, 
there is an agreement o± concert of their mental 
processes than which no simpler mode of the 
social mind is known. 
See also the same writer's Inductive Sociology (New York 
1901), p. 63 and p. 91 et.seq. 
78 Cf Mukerjee and Sen -Gupta - op.cit., p.82, 
Adaptation of one person to others, then, 
consists primarily in making the responses 
coterminal in their pursuit of the same ob- 
ject. 
79 William McDougall - An Outline of Psychology (London 
1923) p. 423 
In speaking of mental structure and likening 
it, as I did just now, to the structure of a 
machine, we must not be misled into taking the 
word "structure" in the sense of a material 
structure or any spatial arrangement of parts. 
We commonly and properly speak of the structure 
of a poem or of a musical composition, meaning 
a whole consisting of parts in orderly function- 
al relations with one another; and, though 
the structure of the mind is not of the same 
order as these structures, yet these, rather 
than the material structure of a machine, should 
be thought of as offering the closer analogy. 
80 William Wordsworth - The Recluse, p.40. W.W. has also 
...the frame of social life..." 
The Prelude XIII, 35. 
81 Cf. A New English Dictionary (Oxford 1884- 1928). From 
this final authority I may quote: 
4. An established order, plan, scheme, system, 
esp. of government... 
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b. a form or arrangement of words... 
6. Mental or emotional disposition or state 
(frame of mind, soul etc.) a. Natural or habit- 
ual disposition, temper, turn of thought etc. b. 
Temporary posture of mind, state of feeling, mood, 
condition of temper... Frames and feelings often 
used in 18th & 19.Lh -.c. as disparaging term for 
emotional states... 1719 De Foe - Robinson Crusoe 
1. XV "In this thankful frame I continued ". 
82 Instinctive responses are also emotional responses. 
(McDougall - An Introduction to Social Psychology, Chapter 
III). Emotional responses involve widespread physiological 
changes (V. eg. James - Principles of Psychology, Chapter 
XXV and W.B.Cann.on - Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear 
and Rage, New York, 1918) including changes in endocrine 
activity. It may be presumed that each occasion of social 
interaction involves modifications of such activity on a 
pattern specific to that occasion; and that each social 
relation of any individual involves a more generalised 
pattern of endocrine activity, or a tendency to such a 
pattern. V. note 95 infra. 
83 William McDougall - An Outline of Psychology, p.95 et. 
sea. 
84 Ibid. p. 163, 
The young of many mammals instinctively utter 
a cry of peculiar quality, when they are unable 
by their own efforts to attain some instinctive 
end. This cry is the master -key to the parental 
instinct and brings the parent promptly to the 
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aid of the young. 
85 op.cit., Vol. II, p. 387. 
86 William Blake - 'The Question Answer'd', ed. Geoffrey 
Keynes. 
87 James Dreyer - Instinct in Man (Cambridge 1917), p. 
191. 
88 Such cooperative relations based on similar responses 
would include all cases of social interaction which can 
properly be brought under Giddings' concept of 'likeminded- 
ness'. There are however three other types of cooperative 
relation which cannot be brought under that principle. 
89 The following quotation from Mukerjee and Sen- Gupta, 
op.cit., p.82, employs a similar conception, 
The increase of the structural complexity of 
the organism brings with it a complexity and 
variability of responses. Thus, the stimulus - 
object may be common to all individuals; and 
the consummatory response also may be similar; 
but the preparatory responses would vary in 
different individuals because of differences 
in their bodily conditions, their relative 
position in space, and the character of other 
objects which may operate also as stimuli. 
90 Samuel Butler - Hudibras Written in the Time of the 
Civil Wars, V.II, iii, 1 -2, (London 1778T. 
91 Plato - Republic, 517 b. 
92 J.G.Lockhart - Narrative of the Life of Sir Walter 
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Scott, Bart., Chapter IV. 
93 Arthur Hugh Clough - 'Amours de voyages', Collected 
Poems. 
94 Francis Thompson - Epilogue to 'A Judgement in Heaven', 
1.10, The Works of Francis Thompson (London n.d.), p. 190. 
95 Such an event may notoriously result in serious 
consequences to the bodily health. This may be interpreted 
as a confirmation of the suggestion made (supra note 82) 
with regard to the physiological organisation involved in 
a social relation - the endocrine organisation has come to 
be organised in relation to the partner so as to depend for 
its healthy functioning upon the stimulation coming from the 
partner in the course of social interaction. I have had 
described to me, by the physician who treated it, a case in 
which a break -down following upon a break of an engagement 
to marry was successfully treated on these lines. The 
physician agreed with me that in such a case a similar re- 
sult might, at least in theory, have been achieved by psy- 
chological treatment instead of by the use of drugs. 
96 An Introduction to Social Psychology, pp. 137.138. 
97 William Blake - Jerusalem, f. 96, 1. 27. ed. Geoffrey 
Keynes. 
98 Ibid. 1. 28. 
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99 Ibid. 'Proberbs of Hell', The Marriage of Heaven afid 
Hell. 
100 Thomas Traherne - Centuries of Meditations, ed. 
Bertram Dobell (London 1908), I, 52. 
101 Cf.M ukerjee and Sen -Gupta, op.cit., p.24, 
The consciousness of the social environment 
or of its influence, however, does not always 
appear on the level of introspection. 
102 Cf. note 25 supra. 
103 See note 119 infra. 
104 Cf. note 3 and note 10 supra. 
105 Cf. in this connection the myth, at once grotesque 
and beautiful, of the primeval four armed, two faced men, 
whom, because they attacked the gods, Zett,s split in two, 
so that the separate parts wander about longing after one 
another. (Plato - Symposium, 191 -193). 
106 Cf. T.Peisker - 'The Asiatic Background', Cambride 
Medieval History, Vol. I, chapter XII, 
Six to ten blood- related tents - on the 
average, families of five to six heads - form a 
camp which wanders together. 
107 James Ward - op.cit., p.76,. 
The process L4 w,etital ct"°rm"t21 resembles a 
partial segmentation of what is originally continuous 
rather than an aggregation of elements at first in- 
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dependent and distinct. 
108 Virgil - Aeneid, VI, 461 -462, ed. J.W.Mackail. 
(Oxford 1930) . 
109 James Ward - op.cit., p.26, 
...Analytic Psychology starting from human 
experience should precede any attempt to 
treat of the genesis of experience as a 
whole, 
G.F.Stout - Analytic Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 35 -36 
...if we are to set about the task of tracing 
the evolution of conscious life, we must begin 
by determining with the utmost accuracy the 
position from which we start. We must at the 
outset ascertain the number and nature and 
mutual connection of those ultimate contents of 
consciousness and modes of being conscious 
which do not admit of generic derivation, but 
at the most only of definition and description. 
This department of psychology is purely an- 
alytical... 
See also ibid., Vol. II, p. 20, note. 
110 Aristotle - The Politics, I, 2, 
And therefore, if the earlier forms of 
society are natural, so is the state, for it 
is the end of them, and the [eo.nl,,te.cL_D nature 
is the end. For what each thing is when fully 
developed, we call its nature, whether we are 
speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. 
Tr. B.JoweLx (Oxford 1885), p. 3. 
Volume Two 
The motto of volume two is taken from Edmund Burke 
- Reflections on the Revolution in France, 2nd. ed., 
1790, pp. 123 -124. 
Chapter VI 
The sources of the mottoes are: 
(a) William Wordsworth - op.cit., XIII, 35. 
(b) Alexander Pope - An Essay on Man, addressed to a Friend, 
11. 29 .032. 
111 Cf. G.F.Stout - Analytic Psychology Vol. I. p. 16, 
...in future introspection we shall be able to 
detect those components where they would other- 
wise have escaped our notice, just as one who has 
made a machine possesses, on that account, a 
better eye for machinery, or as a portrait paint- 
er has a better eye for faces than one who has 
never been compelled to attend separately to the 
individual features. 
and ibid. p. 17, 
Definite details can only be reached as the 
cumulative results of a long course of system- 
atic introspection, carried on from generation 
to generation, and constantly tested by an 
appeal to the consensus of experts. 
Professor Stout goes on to speak of the premature general- 
isations of "the infancy of introspection ". I believe the 
introspective study of social experience to be at a similar- 
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ly immature stage of its development and similarly engaged 
in making "broad and sweeping divisions instead of definite 
attempts to give detailed explanations of particular 
phenomena ", but to be capable of rapid growth as a result 
of systematic observation. 
112 William Blake - The Marriage of Heaven and Hell. 
'Proverbs of Hell'. el.77767Trey Keynes. 
113 O.W.Holmes in The Autocrat at the Breakfast -table, 
remarks that, when James and John fall out, we need not 
be surprised at the occurrence of some degree of misunder- 
standing among the six of them and goes on to explain that 
the six are: the real James, as known only to his Maker, 
James as he appears to himself, James as known to John - and 
similarly for John. The passage in the text which this 
note is appended, and other portions of this work, owe 
much to this remark, first met in my early youth. 
114 Cf. G.F.Stout - op.cit., Vol. I, p. 13. 
115 St. Jerome, in reference to the permissible use of 
the Apocrypha. 
116 Antony Trollope - Miss Mackenzie (London 1865) 
chapters III and IV. 
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Chapter VII 
The motto is taken from William Wordsworth - The Recluse, 
p. 40. 
117 William McDougall - The Group Mind (Cambridge 1920) 
p. 39 ff. 
118 op.cit., p. 62 
The idea of the whole thus operates to create 
the group, to bring it into existence; and then, 
as the idea is realised, it becomes more de- 
finite, of richer and more exact meaning; the 
collective sentiment grows up about it, and 
habit and formal organisation begin to aid in 
holding the gröup together; yet still the idea 
of the whole remains constitutive of the whole. 
119 Cf. William McDougall - An Introduction to Social Psy- 
chology (London) fifteened. p. 84 ff. and p. 170. Mc- 
Dougall makes no use of this conception in his later work 
The Group Mind. It is used in varying forms by James 
Dreyer (Instinct in Man, Cambridge 1921, p. 184 ff.), J.B. 
Watson (Psychology from the standpoint of a Behaviourist, 
Philadelphia and London, p. 258), R.H. mhouless (Social Psy- 
chology, London 1925, p. 154 ff.), F.C.Bartlett, (Psy- 
chology and Primitive Culture, Cambridge 1923, p. 34 ff.), 
W. Trotter (Instincts of the Herd in peace and War, London 
1916) and numerous other writers. 
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120 Cf. G.F.Stout - Analytic :Psychology (London 1896), 
Vo1.I p.14. 
There is no such thing as direct observation 
of other minds; all that is immediately per- 
ceptible consists of sensible signs and tokens 
of inward events; and these signs and tokens 
are interpretâ, able only through knowledge ob- 
tained by introspection or retrospection. 
and ibid. pp. 13 -14, 
This kind of intercourse is of the greatest 
service to the introspective psychologist; it 
enables him to check his results by comparing 
them with those of others, and so to ascertain 
whether they are due to idiosyncracy or mal- 
observation, or, on the contrary, are valid for 
all consciousness in certain phases of develop- 
ment. In physical science an observation made 
by one person and unconfirmed by others is re- 
garded as valueless. I have no hesitation in 
saying that in psychology we ought to be no less 
rigid. 
121 Mukerjee and Sen- Gupta, op.cit., p. 65, 
The responses of the group, if they do not 
operate affirmatively, that is, if they do not 
point to the end sought by the instinctive 
movement[I should have said incipient imuulses'J 
of the individual, serve to inhibit or modify 
the original response. The romping of the 
child, if it does not elicit a smile or some 
other sign of approval, ceases or becomes less 
boisterous. The same holds true of the adult 
individual. The signs of social approval 
which are the more stable and developed forms 
of reciprocal response set the limits within 
which the instinctive- emotive pattern runs its 
course. 
122 Cf. ibid., p. 58. 
The intrusion of a stranger may reduce a 
group of merry -making friends to silence. The 
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sullen face of a single individual may damp 
the rejoicing of a score. The sudden loss 
of temper of an individual may upset the 
harmony of a social gathering. for a whole 
evening. These and many other examples 
show how highly strung a human group may be, 
how slight a maladjustment may alter the 
character, not only in degree but also in 
quality, of a human group. 
123 Sigmund Freud - Psychopathology of Everyday Life, 
pp. 34 -36. 
124 William James - op.cit., Vol. I, p. 294. 
125 Particularly in Gustave le Bon's The Crowd (London 
1896), and Sir Martin Conway's The Crowd in Peace and War 
(London 1915). Similar are Walter Bagehot's Physics and 
Politics (London 1873), Gabriel Tarde's Les Lois de 
l'Imitation (1896), Edward, Alsworth Ross's Social Psy- 
chology, an outline and source book (New York, 1908). 
There are critical chapters on the subject in Graham 
Wallas's The Great Society (New York 1914) and Morris 
Ginsberg's The Psychology of Society (London 1921). For 
William McDougall's treatment of the subject see note 126 
infra. 
126 William McDougall - The Group Mind. The quotations 
in the text are from pp. 22 -23. 
127 William Shakespeare - Troilus and Cressida, III, iii, 
175, ed. W.J.Craig, 1919. 
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128 It is interesting to speculate on the degree of in- 
fluence which the crowd scenes in Shakespeare's Julius 
Caesar may have had not only on subsequent literary treat- 
ment of the subject but upon the thinking of most of us 
when we reflect upon the subject. This remark implies no 
stricture upon the justness of his observation of "the tag - 
rag people ". 
129 op.cit., p. 23. 
130 Morris Ginsberg - The Psychology of Society (London 
1921) pp. 137 -138, 
The Public may be described as an unorganised 
and amorphous aggregation of individuals who 
are bound together by common opinions and de- 
sires, but are too numerous for each to main- 
tain personal relations with the others. 
A.public differs from a crowd in that (1) it rests not on 
personal contact but "communication by means of the Press, 
correspondence etc." (2) "There is also absent the 
heightening of social feelings,..." (3) "...one often be- 
longs to several publics at the same time ". (4) "...there 
is not the same simultaneity of stimulation..." (5) the 
public "does generate organizations..." 
131 op.cit., p. 58. 
132 ibid. p. 59. 
133 William Shakespeare, op.cit., II, i, 61 -69. 
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134 John Gay - Poetical Works ed. John Underhill 
(London 1893), Songs from "The Beggar's Opera" (1728), Air 
XVII. 
135 V. William McDougall - op.cit., pp. 80 -82. The 
account of "the formation of a hierarchy of group 
sentiments for a system of groups in which each larger 
group includes the lesser" describes an extension of these 
processes. 
136 V. William McDougall - op.cit., chapter IV, 
especially the following: 
The idea of the whole thus operates to 
create the group, to bring it into existence; 
and then, as the idea is realised, it becomes 
more definite, of richer and more exact mean- 
ing; the collective sentiment grows up about 
it, and habit and formal organisation begin to 
aid in holding the group together; yet still 
the idea of the whole remains constitutive of 
the whole. 
I cannot arrive at any certainty as to the meaning of this 
sentence and the passage of which it forms part. If by 
"the idea of the whole" is meant such an apprehension of a 
particular army as I may have now in my study, then the 
statement seems to me obviously untrue. Each soldier 
forms such an "idea ", presently he forms a sentiment which 
"grows up about it ", finally such an idea forms the "con- 
stitutive" bonds which make the army a unity. This does 
not seem to me a true description of my experience in be- 
coming a membér of a military force, or a member of any 
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other body; and it also seems logically unsound to make 
the "constitutive" process a consequent of a process which 
assumes the "constitutive" process to be complete. If, on 
the other hand, we are to understand by the "idea of the 
whole" not only a cognitive process but the reorganisation 
of the recruit's emotional and conative life (an inter- 
pretation which would make redundant the words which follow, 
"a collective sentiment grows up about it") then the 
9 
phraseo]y adopted seems unfortunate, and the meaning is 
better expressed by speaking of the organisation of the 
recruit's dispositions as part of the common mental frame 
of his unit. I can attach no meaning to the word collect- 
ive in the phrase collective sentiment; and in the same 
passage the term group self-consciousness suggests not 
(what I suppose is intended) the individual's apprehension 
of the group but some kind of hypothetical collective corms 
sciousness. 
137 The wittiest expression of this truth is, I suppose, 
Talleyrand's remark that the only thing a government cannot 
do with bayonets is to sit on them. 
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Chapter VIII 
The sources of the mottoes are: 
(a) John Milton - Paradise Lost, IV, 358. Ed.H.C.Beeching. 
(b) R.M.Maciver - op.cit., p. 155. 
(c) George Meredit op.cit., chapter XLI. 
138 George Moore - Lewis Seymour and Some Women (London 
1917). 
139 Such statements may be, nevertheless, in the truest 
sense psychological propositions. cf. G.F.Stout - op.cit., 
Vol.I, p. 12, 
When we experiment with the stereoscope, 
the question we put to the person who looks 
at the dissimilar perspective is not, "What 
process do you, by introspection, find to be 
going on in your mind ?" but simply, "What do 
you see ?" 
140 The collaborators were Professor V.de S.Pinto and my- 
self. Professor Pinto has read the account of the 
collaboration given in the text and, after accepting it as 
a correct account of "the dialetic between the two partners", 
he continues: 
...is not literary tradition formed by a 
similar process of dialetic extending over 
several generations? For instance Wordsworth's 
The Prelude might be said to be the final outcome 
of the efforts of a number of eighteenth century 
writers to achieve a long philosophic nature poem 
in blank verse, and the Shakespearian drama is 
similarly the culmination not only of Shakespeare's 
efforts but of those of a number of his pre- 
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decessors. The error of the modernists, the 
futurists and hoc genus omne is to think that 
a great work of art is the production of one 
mind working in a spiritual vacuum, instead of 
a collaboration between a number of predecessors, 
the man of genius and possibly the audience. 
141 In my own intellectual history, I had to learn these 
truths elsewhere before I could begin to appreciate T.H. 
Green, or F.H.Bradley or Bernard Bosanquet. There is how- 
ever, no more admirable statement of the individual's re- 
lation to the society of which he is a member than that 
of F.H.Bradley in 'My Station and its Duties' (Ethical 
Studies, 2nd. ed. Oxford 1927) from which the following 
may be quoted: 
Let us take a man, an Englishman as he is 
now, and try to point out that, apart from what 
he has in common with others, apart from his 
sameness with others, he is not an Englishman 
- nor a man at all; that if you take him as 
something by himself, he is not what he is. 
Of course we do not mean to say that he can 
not go out of England without disappearing, 
nor, even if all the rest of the nation perish- 
ed, that he would not survive. What we mean 
to say is, that he is what he is because he is 
a born and educated social being, and a member 
of an individual social organism; that if you 
make abstraction of all this, which is the same 
in him and in others, what you have left is not 
an Englishman, nor a man, but some I know not 
what residuum, which never has existed by itself, 
and does not so exist. If we suppose the world 
of relations, in which he was born and bred, 
never to have been, then we suppose the very 
essence of him not to be; if we take that away, 
we have taken him away; and hence he now is not 
an individual, in the sense of owing nothing to 
the sphere of relations in which he finds himself, 
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but does contain those relations within himself 
as belonging to his very being; he is what he 
is, in brief, so far as he is what others also 
are. (pp. 166 -167) 
But cf. also note 146 infra. 
142 Cf. F.C.Bartlett - op.cit., p.18. 
...a group of individuals may unite in 
common or harmonious behaviour, although the 
attitudes of the individuals concerned may 
vary very considerably... The investigator 
who wishes to show how the group custom grows 
out of the individual belief simply takes 
some outstanding belief as typical, and assumes 
that everybody in the group experiences this. 
His explanation is pure fiction. At no stage 
are human beings as unanimous in their ideas, 
beliefs and attitudes as he supposes. 
143 Cf. Aristotle - The Politics, tr. B.Jowett, p. 50, 
(Politics, 1269), 
Even when laws have been written down, they 
ought not always to remain unaltered. As in 
other sciences, so in politics, it is impossible 
that all things should be precisely set down in 
writing; for enactments must be universal, but 
actions are concerned with particulars. 
144 Cf. R.M.Maciver - op.cit., pp. 1á57156, 
Community is any area of common life; an 
association is a definite organisation pursuing 
some specific interest or pursuing general 
interests in some specific way. The distinction 
of association from institution should now be 
obvious. For institutions are forms, establish- 
ed forms of relation between social beings in 
respect either simply of one another (as in the 
institution of rank) or of some external object 
(as in the institution of property). An 
association is more than a form, it is the creator 
as well as the created, it is a source of in- 
stitutions. An association has a subjective as 
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well as an objective aspect, it too is created 
by common will, but it consists in wills as 
organised in respect of some common interest. 
An institution has an objective aspect alone, 
it is a means alone. The association may 
modify its institutions, may dissolve some and 
create others, as the State for instance is 
constantly doing. So the association out- 
lives its institutions. Therefore if we are 
to be strict in our thinking, we should speak 
of the family as an association and of marriage 
as an institution, of the State as an associ- 
ation and of representative government as an 
institution, of the church as an association 
and of baptism as an institution. The associ- 
ation is a living thing, the institution is 
but a form, a means. 
145 Cf. A.V.Dicey - op.cit., p.1, 
True it is that the existence... of in- 
stitutions must, in a sense, always and every- 
where depend upon the beliefs or feelings, or, 
in other words, upon the opinion of the society 
in which such institutions flourish. 
146 Thus the consideration of such principles and their 
validity takes us outside of the field of social psy- 
chology altogether. Cf. The following passage from Ernest 
Barker - Political Thought in England, from Herbert Spencer 
to the present day (London 1917) which describes the 
metaphysical basis of the views on political obligation of 
T.H.Green: 
But it must be remembered that behind his 
conception of the State lies the idea of an 
eternal self -consciousness, which communicates 
to human consciousness the idea of the social 
good, and to whose perfection, in turn, human 
consciousness is ever seeking to attain, and, 
in the higher forms of human society, has al- 
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ready partially attained. In the light of 
such an idea citizenship becomes Christian 
citizenship, and the State a civitas Dei. p. 32. 
147 It is however true that the processes whereby a 
system of principles embodied in institutions is at a later 
stage rendered self-consistent (section 307) may owe much to 
processes of philosophic reflection. 
The Roman legislation was in a twofold manner 
the child of philosophy. It was in the first 
place formed upon the philosophical model, for, 
instead of being a mere empirical system adjust- 
ed to the existing requirements of society, it 
laid down abstract principles of right to which 
it endeavoured to conform; and, in the next 
place, these principles were borrowed directly 
from Stoicism. 
The quotation is from Lecky's History of European Morals, q. 
in Whitehead - Science and the Modern World. (Cambridge 
1926), pp. 16 -17. 
148 The widest extension of these principles is of course 
to be found when the most imposing and authoritative 
systems of principles are subjected by the highest scholar- 
ship to processes of comparison and criticism. This 
happens when the science of comparative jurisprudence brings 
into one universe of discourse legal systems which have 
grown up independently in different countries. This is 
well expressed in L'oeuvre juridique de R.Saleilles 
(Thaller, Gény and others), p. 108: 
"In short, it [comparative jurisprudence] will 
provide the jurisconsult with an entirely new field 
of observation, which will permit him to prove the 
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value and the solidity of national constructions, 
to modify them, and even to make innovations 
among them, provided that the latter are in harmony 
with the body of internal law and do not inter- 
fere with its economy. If the result of the 
teaching of comparative law is that the same 
idea explains the juridical regulation of an in- 
stitution in many legislations, will not this 
conception be singularly fortified ?" 
q. in Vinogradoff - op.cit., p.138. 
This quotation also illustrates the contention in section 
318 that jurisprudence is in its development a social 
process as well as a science viewing social processes with 
detachment. 
149 Vinogradoff - op.cit., p. 142, 
...in early periods legal rules grow more or 
less organically, like language and myth, later 
stages are characterized by universal and, as it 
were, impersonal conceptions, which, like coins 
of standard value, circulate without difficulty 
right through the world. 
150 A.V.Dicey - op.cit., p. 363, 
New combinations of circumstances - that is, 
new cases - constantly call for the application, 
which means in truth the extension, of old 
principles; or it may be, even for the think- 
ing out of some new principle, in harmony with 
the general spirit of the law, fitted to meet 
the novel requirements of the time. 
151 Cf. Sir Percy Nunn - Education, its Data and First 
Principles (London 1920), 
The statement that a man's will is free is 
ridiculous if understood as a claim that he 
can escape from the laws of his own nature; but 
it is sound sense when understood as extending 
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to the whole of life the obvious truth that 
it is impossible to invent a machine before 
it is invented,or to compose a sonata before 
it is composed. 
152 These conative states may lead him to take the matter 
before a Court, whereupon if the regulative form of express- 
ion, though action is usually guided by it, has not been 
defined as a principle it becomes the business of the 
Court so to define it. Cf. A.V.Dicey, op.cit., p. 483. 
...every Court in deciding a case must 
tacitly, or expressly, apply to it some de- 
finite principle which is often indeed so 
clearly known that no special mention need 
be made of it, but which may be difficult to 
discover; and when this is so the Court must 
lay down the rule which guides its decision. 
Whereupon the principle so defined guides future action with- 
in the jurisdiction of that Court. Cf. A.V.Dicey - op.cit., 
pp. 483 -484. 
...a Court or a judge must follow pre- 
cedents, by which expression is really meant 
that a Court having once decided a particular 
case on a given principle... must decide all 
really similar cases in accordance with the 
same principle, or, to put the same thing in 
other words, that a Court is bound, as the 
expression goes, by its own judgements. 
153 Landsberg - Geschichte der Rechtwissenseh af t , III, 
816, 
A juridical institution stands and falls 
with the achievement of its aim. It arises 
for the sake of aims, in the consciousness 
of aims, and in the struggle between aims. 
This is the reason why law cannot be explain- 
ed either by mechanical processes or by blind 
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growth. Its justification lies in its ends, 
as a means for their realization. 
q. in Vinogradoff, op.cit., p. 143, n. 
Vinogradoff - op.cit., p. 142, 
...he [Ihering] insisted energetically 
on the social aims of juridical activity, 
attacked with bitter scorn the tendency to- 
wards the self -satisfied exercise of 
juridical logic divorced from practical 
needs, and represented the process of legal 
formation as a "struggle for right" among 
contending individual and social claims. 
154 Cf. sections 28, 119 and 187 of the present work. 
The relation between the lawyer as a participant in a 
social process to the lawyer as a scientific thinker is 
described by A.V.Dicey (op.cit., pp. 364 -365) in the 
following passage: 
'The main employment of a Court is the 
application of well -known legal principles 
to the solution of given cases, and the 
deduction from these principles of their 
fair logical result. Men trained in and 
for this kind of employment acquire a 
logical conscience; they come to care 
greatly - in some cases excessively - for 
consistency. A Court, even whén it really 
legislates, does so indirectly. Its 
immediate object is to apply a given prin- 
ciple to a particular case, or to determine 
under which of two or more principles a part- 
icular case really falls. The duty of a 
Court, in short, is not to remedy a particular 
grievance, but to determine whether an 
alleged grievance is one for which the law 
supplies a remedy. Hence the further re- 
sult that Courts are affected, as Parliament 
never is, by the ideas and theories of 
writers on law. A Uourt, when called upon 
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to decide cases which present some legal 
difficulty, is often engaged - unconscious- 
ly it may be - in the search for principles. 
If an author of ingenuity has reduced some 
branch of the law to a consistent scheme 
of logically coherent rules, he supplies 
exactly the principles of which a Court is 
in need. Hence the development of English 
law has depended, more than many students 
perceive, on the writings of the authors who 
have produced the best text -books.' 
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Chapter IX 
The sources of the mottoes are: 
(a) John Milton - Paradise Lost, III, 108. ed. H.C.Beeching. 
(b) I Corinthians,XII, 4. Authorised version, 1611. 
(c) FIesiod - Works and Days, 291 -295. 
155 Mukerjee and Sen- Gupta, op.cit.,pp. 84 -85, 
Normally, the processes of adaptation to 
a situation do not begin simultaneously in 
all the individuals concerned. An individual, 
or a set of individuals, first responds to the 
stimulus situation and the others follow suit. 
This is as true of man as it is of most of the 
sub -human organisms living a group life. 
Throw a stone at a flock of birds, and some 
will fly at once but the others take more time. 
A flock of sheep sights a dog at a distance; 
when one or two from the middle begin to run, 
the movement spreads. 
156 The example used here was an actual incident in East 
Lothian. Whether or not the animal was a ferret I do 
not know; but, whatever it was, it behaved as described. 
The further elaboration of the incident in section 327 is 
imaginary. 
157 Dante Alighieri - Paradiso, XXX, 37. Temple Classics. 
158 A.J.Evans - The Escaping Club (London 1921), pp. 60 
and 61. 
159 Some amusing examples of the consequences of 
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Tennyson's great reputation as a poet are quoted in 
Harold Nicolson - Tennyson, Aspects of his Life, Character 
and Poetry (London 1925) pp. 197 -199; for example, 
Tennyson was publicly appealed to to decide upon Colonel 
Richards' claim to be considered the chief originator of 
the Volunteer Movement of 1859. 
160 Admiral Sir R.H.Bacon - The Life of Lord Fisher of 
Kilverstone (London 1929) Vol. Il,p.4. 
161 Samuel Butler - Notebooks, p. 206 
162 L.T.Hobhouse - Mind in Evolution (London 1901). 
See also the work of E.L.Thorndike and J.B.Watson. 
163 Monsterberg initiated the study of special abilities 
in relation to vocational activities with his investigation 
of the capacities of tram drivers. 
164 Robert H.Thouless - Social Psychology (London 1925), 
p. 302, 
The meaning of intelligence in comparative 
psychology is the plasticity of behaviour 
which contrasts with the mechanical behaviour 
of pure instinct. Its meaning in the history 
of mental tests is the general capacity which 
varies from individual to individual, and is 
measured in intelligence tests. It would 
probably, therefore, be better to avoid the 
use of the word intelligence in speaking of 
what is measured by these tests and to sub- 
stitute some such term as "general ability ". 
165 Works dealing with the investigation of general 
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ability include Binet and Simon - The Development of 
Intelligence in Children (New Jersey 1916), L.M.Terman 
- The Measurement of Intelligence (London 1919), Cyril 
Burt - Mental and Scholastic Tests (London 1922) W.Brown 
and G.H.Thomson - Essentials of Mental Measurement, Yerkes, 
Bridges, Hardwick - A Point Scale for Measuring Intelligence 
(New York). 
166 See Yoakum and Yerkes.. Mental Tests in the 
American Army (London 1920). J.H.Duff and G.H.Thomson 
- 'The social and geographical Distribution of Intelligence 
in Northumberland', British Journal of Psychology, Vol. 
XIV, Hector Macdonald - 'The Social distribution of In- 
telligence in the Isle of Wight', ibid. ,Vol. XVI. 
167 James Dreyer - op.cit.,p.44. 
168 On the relation of "intelligence" or general ability 
to conceptual processes see C.Spearman - The Nature of 
'Intelligence' and the Principles of Cognition (London 1923) 
and the same author's The Abilities of Man (London 1927). 
He approves of the description of "intelligence" as, 
...the operation of thinking in abstract 
or universal terms... 
The Abilities of Man, p.21. 
169 Cf. Graham Wallas - Our Social Heritage, (London 1921), 
chapter III. 
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170 Plato - Republic, V, 473. tr. B.Jowett. 
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Chapter X 
The sources of the mottoes are: 
(a) Ecclesiastes, XII, 11. Tr. James Moffatt - A New 
Translation of the Bible (London N.D.). 
(b) A.N.Whitehead - op.cit., pp. 299 -300. 
171 As by M. Tarde and J .Jï. Baldwin. 
172 William McDougall - An Introduction to Social Psy- 
chology, p. 91. 
...careful consideration of imitative actions 
shows that they are of many kinds, that they 
issue from mental processes of a number of 
different types, and that none are attributable 
to a specific instinct of imitation,... 
173 See Bernard Bosanquet - A History of Aesthetic (London 
1904) and S.H.Butcher - Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and. 
Fine Art, (London 4th.ed.1927), chapter II. 
174 Alexander Pope - An Essay on Criticism, 1. 140. on 
the confusion of thought alluded to see George Saintsbury 
- A History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe,. 
175 See Ronald Knox - The Viaduct Murder. 
176 William Shakespeare - Macbeth, III, ii, 50 -51. ed. 
W.J. Craig. 
177 Catullus - LXII, 1. ed. F.W.Cornish. 
178 John Milton - Paradise Lost, IV, 598. ed. H.C.Beeching. 
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179 Robert Bridges - Poetical Works excluding the eight 
dramas (Oxford 1914) p. 410; Milton's Prosody (Oxford 
MITT New Verse (Oxford 1926). 
180 Striking examples are to be found in case of 
language. Phenomenon and idea have altered their meanings 
both by deterioration resulting from failure to grasp the 
doncepts for which they stood and by becoming the terms 
for new conceptions. Complex has had a sufficient variety 
of determinants as a term of psychology (V. note 55 supra) 
and it has also deteriorated as a term of journalism and 
popular speech. 
181 V. J.C.Flitgel - The Psychology of Clothes (London 
1930). 
182 E.g. the use of pilasters in neo- classical 
architecture. 
183 The Cockney tourist in a kilt and the Austrian 
holiday -maker in Tyrolese costume are obvious examples. 
184 Cf. Anthony Trollope - Framley Parsonage, chapter 
XVII, 'Mrs. Proudie's Conversazione'. The imitation of 
the manner of entertainment of the Duke of Omnium and Lady 
Hartletop by their less opulent neighbours who cannot 
afford the same number of servants is discussed and cri' :1cì eá., 
185 M.Rostovtzeff - The Social and Economic History of 
the Roman Empire (Oxford, 1926) p.486. 
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186 Ibid. p.487. 
187 Charles Darwin - op.cit., 
188 For the James -Lange theory, see William James - E. 
cit., Vol. II, chapter XXV. For William McDougall's 
views on the relation of emotion to instinct see his 
Social Psychology and Outline of Psychology. For ex- 
perimental evidence not wholly favourable to James's 
view see Cannon - Bodily Changes (cited above). See also 
James Dreyer - An Introduction to the Psychology of 
Education, pp. 51 -57. 
189 William McDougall - op.cit., p. 92, 
The fundamental and primitive form of 
sympathy is exactly what the word implies, a 
suffering with, the experiencing of any feel- 
ing or emotion when and because we observe in 
other persons or creatures the expression of 
that feeling or emotion. 
The process is recognised by Herbert Spencer (Principles 
of Psychology, Vol. II p. 563). It is described in terms 
similar to McDougall's by James Dreyer (Introduction to the 
Psychology of Education, p. 83). It is discussed. in James 
Drever's Instinct in Man, pp. 235 -240, from which the 
following sentence may be quoted: 
...emotion which is pretended,... rarely, 
if ever, establishes itself through sympath- 
etic induction... 
190 In this connection the views of the 'gestalt' school 
are interesting; but I do not at present care to "found" 
on them. V. e.g. K.Koffka - op.cit., pp. 115 -118 from 
which the following may be quoted: 
Chap X 
...every form of behaviour has a certain 
articulation or phrasing. This articulation 
issues from a similar articulation of the 
nervous processes of the acting individual. 
This central articulation in turn corresponds 
to the individual's "experience" which is 
articulated in a like manner. Thus the per- 
ception in the mind of an onlooker, if it be 
so constituted as to embrace what is going on 
in the reagent, must itself possess a similar 
articulation. And hence the experience of 
the reagent A, and of the observant B must 
resemble each other. 
V, also Wolfgang Köhler - Gestalt Psychology (London,1930), 
p. 181 ff. 
191 For the operation of this process in the animal 
world cf. Benjamin Kidd - The Science of Power (London 1918), 
pp. 283 -286. A beautiful example of the strength and 
permanence of a sentiment. 
192 James Dreyer - op.cit., p. 240, 
...it is perhaps in the sphere of the moral 
sentiments that sympathy is most important. 
193 The Times, December, 1927. 
194 Graham Wallas - Human Nature in Politics, (London 1908). 
195 In my own experience I can recall a number of in- 
cidents of this kind. In the case of Robert Bridges' 
experimental metres (particularly his quantitive hexa- 
meters) I have produced the same result designedly. In this 
case however there was obviously more involved than a 
sympathetic reaction, viz. the ability to produce from the 
printed page the spoken rhythm intended by the writer. 
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196 William Blake - Blake's Poetry and Prose, ed. Geoffrey 
Keynes, p. 856. 
197 Walter Pater - The Renaissance., Studies in Art and 
Poetry, 'Leonardo da Vinci'. 
198 By a deterioration in expressiveness, I mean that, 
though the form may be preserved, it is no longer the 
focus of appropriate determinants, or of all the de- 
terminants for the expression of which it came into ex- 
istence, nor has it become in process of transmission a 
focus of other determinants of equivalent value. 
199 Horace - Odarum, III, vi, 45 -49. recensuit Car. Herm. 
Weise,(Lipsiae, 1886). 
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Addenda 
205 Cf. J.C.Fltigel - op.cit., 
206 The following is the passage from John Butler Yeats 
which is referred to in note 65 and the source of which is 
there given wrongly, 
...the boy with the eyes of a painter... 
will know the shape and surface of every object 
in his schoolroom, and how light falls on desk 
and table; he will know among his school- 
fellows all the profiles and all the front 
faces, what colour the eyes are and how they 
are shaped; every detail of form and colour 
will be familiar to him, since to watch these 
things and to draw from them a continuous, 
intellectual intoxication is the very purpose 
for which he has been created;... 
John Butler Yeats - Essays Irish and American (Dublin 1918), 
p. 76. 
207 Coventry Patmore - To the Unknown Eros, 'Arbor Vitae', 
1. 16. 
208 Cf. A.V.Dicey, op.cit., p.360, n. 
...Gladstone from peculiarities of character 
and education was able to unite, whether con- 
sistently or not, the sentiment of liberalism 
with the ecclesiastical sentiment belonging to 
a High Churchman. In the sphere of economics, 
and even of politics, he to a great extent 
accepted the doctrines of Benthamite individual- 
ism as represented by the Manchester school, In 
the ecclesiastical sphere he accepted, it would 
seem, High Church principles as represented by 
Archdeacon Manning, until the Archdeacon was 
transformed into a Roman Catholic ecclesiastic. 
This singular combination of sentiments or 
principles, which are rarely united in the 
mind of one man, contributed greatly to 
Gladstone's influence. The capacity for 
honestly sharing the varying, and even the 
inconsistent, sentiments of his age augments 
the influence of a statesman. 
